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La lutte contre la famine: un mythe de Sisyphe?

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Vorwort

Dr. Hans Rudolph Herren, Präsident Biovision

Weiter wie bisher ist keine Option

Wir produzieren rund 4'600 Kalorien pro Kopf und Tag auf unserem Planeten, rund doppelt so viel wie wir bräuchten – trotzdem leiden über 800 Millionen Menschen unter Hunger. Ein globaler Kurswechsel in unserem Nahrungssystem ist deshalb eine unserer dringendsten Aufgaben.

Der Ansatz der industriellen Landwirtschaft ist nicht bloss reduktionistisch, weil er allein auf eine Maximierung der Erträge abzielt, sondern im Kern auch uniformistisch. Überall gilt dasselbe Standardmodell: Monokulturen und Grossmästereien dominieren heute Agrarlandschaften rund um den Erdball, weltweit werden dieselben Hochertragssorten angebaut und die Felder mit denselben Agrochemikalien behandelt. Die Folge sind nicht bloss Umweltschäden und eine schleichende Zerstörung der Produktionsgrundlagen: Uniforme Systeme sind im Gegensatz zu diversifizierten ökologischen Systemen verletzlicher und wenig resilient.

Die natürlichen Ressourcen der Erde sind begrenzt. Wir müssen von den Zinsen leben, die sie abwerfen, und dürfen das Kapital nicht aufbrauchen. Doch genau Letzteres tun wir heute: Im August ist der Zins für das ganze Jahr bereits verbraucht – während der restlichen Monate verzehren wir Kapital. Und jährlich haben wir den Zins schon eine Woche früher aufgebraucht.

Die Probleme des heutigen Ernährungssystems sind verknüpft mit anderen Problemen: Umweltzerstörung, Klimawandel, wachsende soziale Ungleichheit, Mangelernährung und Hunger, ernährungsbedingte Krankheiten wie Fettleibigkeit, Diabetes Typ 2, Herz- und Kreislaufkrankheiten. Keines dieser Probleme lässt sich für sich allein lösen. Deshalb ist ein ganzheitlicher Ansatz erforderlich.

In einer Zeit, die geprägt ist von aggressivem Nationalismus, Profitgier, Intoleranz, wirtschaftlicher Unsicherheit und der Schwächung internationaler Institutionen mag eine Vision, deren Realisierung Weitsicht, weltweite Kooperation und die Bereitschaft zur Suffizienz erfordert, utopisch erscheinen. Doch wenn man an eine Sache glaubt, kann man Berge versetzen.

In dieser Situation sind die nationalen und regionalen Regierungen gestern wie heute gefordert: Wir müssen Kleinbetriebe in ihren qualitativen Vorteilen stärken und die Konsumentennähe fördern, sowie die ländliche Infrastruktur verbessern. Wir sind angewiesen auf eine Politik, die den Schritt weg vom produktivistischen Paradigma hin zum ökologischen Landbau wagt, die sich entschlossen zeigt, die Böden zu schützen und regenerieren, die Biodiversität zu fördern und dem Klimawandel entschieden entgegenzutreten. Nur so können die künftigen Generationen überleben.

Für einen langfristigen und effektiven Kurswechsel ist die öffentliche Unterstützung und Finanzierung von diversifizierten Anbausystemen unerlässlich. Eine Schlüsselrolle spielt dabei die Forschung: Der agrarökologische Anbau ist per se wissensintensiv – Wissen, das sich oft nicht durch Patente schützen lässt. Deshalb müssen Forschungsorganisationen befähigt werden, partizipativ mit Bäuerinnen und Bauern die Lücken in der Forschung und Anwendung zu schliessen.

Meine Vision ist keine Utopie. Sie ist mit den heute verfügbaren Technologien und deren Entwicklungspotenzial durchaus realisierbar. Doch dies erfordert einen fundamentalen Kurswechsel in der Landwirtschaftspolitik und eine Neuorientierung der Agrarforschung. Die Transformation des Ernährungssystems ist nicht gratis, doch die Gelder, die wir dafür einsetzen, verhindern viel höhere Kosten für die kommenden Generationen: Es sind Investitionen in die Zukunft.

INTRODUCTION

Manuel Bessler[1]

Ce numéro de la revue Politorbis, dédié à la lutte contre la famine, reprend le thème de la Conférence annuelle 2018 de l'Aide humanitaire.

La famine est un phénomène intolérable; il est établi que la quantité de nourriture disponible est suffisante pour nourrir l'ensemble de la population mondiale. Pourtant, un enfant meurt de malnutrition ou de sous-alimentation toutes les dix secondes. Bien sûr, la communauté internationale a réagi, mais les résultats sont insuffisants.

Pourquoi si peu de progrès ? Pourquoi faisons-nous face, au vingt-et-unième siècle, à des situations de famine dans le monde? Quels sont les liens entre conflit et famine? Comment pallier et éradiquer la famine ?

Des experts et praticiens avertis offrent ici leurs analyses et réponses. La première partie propose une présentation historique, régionale et thématique du phénomène de la faim. Dans son article co-écrit avec Peter Hailey, le Professeur Daniel Maxwell, de l'Université Tufts au Massachussetts, rappelle que le nombre de ceux qui souffrent de la faim a diminué globalement; ils étaient un milliard en 1990; ils sont 815 millions aujourd'hui. Mais le retour de la famine en Somalie, au printemps 2011 - qui a fait 250'000 victimes - a illustré combien les progrès atteints sont fragiles et réversibles. En 2017, quatre pays ont été identifiés par l'ONU comme risquant la famine: le Nigéria, le Soudan du Sud, la Somalie et le Yémen. Suite à l'appel du Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies et à l'intervention de la communauté internationale, une catastrophe majeure a pu être évitée.

Pour le Prof. Maxwell, cette résurgence de la famine au 21ème siècle est un développement inattendu. Il suggère que la gouvernance des crises (« politics of hunger ») et le disfonctionnement des systèmes d'alerte en sont les causes majeures. Les quatre pays menacés par la famine sont impliqués dans des conflits armés. Les conflits créent la famine, même si d'autres facteurs, tels que des conditions climatiques défavorables, sont également significatifs.

Le 'Club du Sahel', une organisation basée à Paris et soutenue par la Suisse, suit une approche régionale. C'est une autorité reconnue dans la mise en œuvre et le suivi des politiques visant à combattre la famine au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest. Les auteurs écrivant au nom du Club font d'abord l'analyse des défis alimentaires que connait la région depuis plusieurs années. Ils décrivent ensuite l'évolution de la nature des crises alimentaires et nutritionnelles. On constate toujours des déficits de production vivrière causés par le changement climatique, mais de plus en plus, l'accès alimentaire, le pouvoir d'achat et les conditions de vie des ménages sont déterminants. D'autre part, les crises alimentaires sont accentuées par les défis sécuritaires et sanitaires auxquels la région fait face.

La seconde partie de l'article décrit les progrès effectués. Ils sont le fruit d'un investissement de plus de trente ans dans le renforcement de la gouvernance régionale de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle, notamment à travers le Réseau de prévention des crises alimentaires (RPCA), mis en place depuis 1984. A cet égard, le Sahel et l'Afrique de l'Ouest sont une région pionnière du continent.

Les auteurs notent enfin que la région ne manque pas de politiques, mais bien par contre de financement de leur mise en œuvre. Agir sur le terrain est capital selon les auteurs, qui concluent par un proverbe africain : « Si tu veux aller vite, marche seul ; mais si tu veux aller loin, marchons ensemble ».

Action contre la Faim (ACF) est un partenaire important de la Suisse, soutenu par la DDC depuis le milieu des années 90. ACF a accumulé une grande expérience à travers ses trois branches, hispanique, francophone et anglophone. Dans la contribution proposée ici, ACF présente le problème de la faim dans toutes ses dimensions, concluant qu'en dernier ressort, la volonté politique fait défaut pour dépasser la pauvreté: «To eradicate hunger, political will is missing. Not Food. »

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1   Délégué du Conseil fédéral à l'aide humanitaire, Chef du Corps suisse d'aide humanitaire et Vice-Directeur de la Direction du développement et de la coopération (DDC)

ACF joue aussi un rôle capital dans le domaine des études sur la pauvreté[2] et de l'analyse prospective des pratiques de l'aide internationale[3].

La deuxième section de Politorbis discute l'importance des conflits dans l'émergence des famines et rappelle le rôle joué par la Suisse dans les discussions internationales menées à ce sujet. Ariadna Pop, de la Mission permanente de la Suisse à Genève, décrit le cycle de débats tenus sur le thème « Conflit et Faim », lancé par la Suisse en partenariat avec la Hollande. Cette série d'ateliers a permis en particulier de discuter le rôle du Conseil de sécurité dans les crises humanitaires.

Plusieurs participants livrent ici leur point de vue. Ana Suarez et Emily Mattheisen de FIAN International, plaident pour une approche de la famine par les droits de l'homme, se concentrant sur les plus démunis et visant à préserver leur dignité.

Après un survol de l'histoire de la famine dans la littérature - largement ethnocentrique selon lui - Hugo Slim, du CICR, s'interroge sur l'utilisation de la famine comme instrument de guerre dans les conflits. Elle constitue une atteinte aux Conventions de Genève; un fait qui devrait être reflété dans l'analyse et l'action contre la faim dans les situations de conflit. Il préconise l'établissement de « contrats politiques » entre communautés et autorités. Hugo Slim propose aussi un renforcement des systèmes d'alerte. Il vaut mieux, dit-il, agir « early and wrong » plutôt que « right but late ».

Christina Bennett et Eva Sloboda du Humanitarian Policy Group, un think tank rattaché à l'Overseas Development Institute (ODI), partent du constat que le système humanitaire a été incapable à ce jour de trouver des modes adéquats de gestion collective des urgences. Elles voient les causes de cette défaillance dans les « pathologies systémiques » qui caractérisent une architecture « top-down », dans laquelle les victimes et les affamés n'ont pas la parole.

Quant au « Grand Bargain », il a permis quelques avancées techniques, mais il ne propose pas les termes et conditions d'une révision fondamentale du système humanitaire, pourtant nécessaire. Les auteurs déplorent également que le « Grand Bargain » n'aborde pas la prévention des conflits, pourtant centrale dans la lutte contre les famines. Elles concluent néanmoins sur une note d'espoir en affirmant: « Famines often have man-made causes; it should be possible to address them with man-made solutions ».

Zita Weise Prinzo présente les vues et expériences de la division « Nutrition in Emergencies and Undernutrition » de l'OMS. Dans ce domaine comme dans les autres, l'OMS définit les normes et les standards internationaux qui s'appliquent à l'ensemble de la communauté internationale[4]. Elle rappelle que la malnutrition induit de nombreuses conséquences sanitaires, comme le fait que les infections se répandent plus rapidement parmi des enfants sous-nourris. Une forte insécurité alimentaire influence aussi les maladies non transmissibles, comme les maladies cardiaques, le diabète, la pression sanguine ou la fréquence des cancers.

Dans son article, Bruce Campbell, de la Mission permanente de la Suisse à Rome, explique le fonctionnement du Programme alimentaire Mondial (PAM), de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), ainsi que du Fonds International de développement agricole (IFAD). Il rappelle que ces agences sont reliées au « Committee on World Food Security » (WFS), le point focal rassemblant tous les acteurs engagés dans ce domaine, que ce soient des chercheurs, des ONGs, des représentants du secteur privé ou, des universitaires.

Manuel Flury, en charge de la division Sécurité alimentaire à la DDC, a passé plusieurs années en Ethiopie et livre ici un témoignage de première main sur la manière dont ce pays gère les situations de famine. Il relève que le gouvernement éthiopien n'est pas en mesure de garantir un accès à la nourriture à tous ses citoyens. Huit millions d'Ethiopiennes et d'Ethiopiens dépendent toujours d'un soutien pour leur survie alimentaire. L'aide internationale demeure ainsi indispensable.

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2   An Outlook on Hunger, A Scenario Analysis on the Drivers of Hunger Through 2030, IRIS, ACF, Paris, 2017, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/593eb9e7b8a79bc4102fd8aa/t/59dfdac146c3c4c2a29772f9/1507842787289/Hunger-+an+outlook+to+2030.compressed.pdf

3   Future of Aid: INGOs in 2030, IRIS, ACF, Center for Humanitarian Leadership, futuribles international, Paris, 2017 http://futureofaid.iaran.org/

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4   Pour qu'un état de famine soit déclaré, trois critères doivent être remplis selon l'OMS : 1) 3 familles sur 4 ne doivent plus avoir d'accès à de la nourriture ; 2) plus de 30% de la population doit être sous-alimentée ; 3) une personne sur 10'000 meurt chaque jour de sous-alimentation.

L'ambassadeur Manuel Bessler présente le rapport issu des divers ateliers co-organisés avec la Hollande, consacrés au thème 'Conflit et Famine' à l'ONU à New York le 14 décembre 2017
Photo : Jonas Pasquier

Sécheresse et famine ponctuent la vie politique du pays. Le refus de la classe dirigeante de considérer des questions essentielles comme celle de l'accès à la terre constitue certainement un des obstacles à la sécurité alimentaire dans le pays. Comme le résumait un expert de droit foncier éthiopien: «Land is the biggest tool for political control».

La Suisse dépêche en Ethiopie de l'aide alimentaire tout en contribuant à l'amélioration des conditions de vie à long terme des populations.

La dernière section présente des exemples d'engagement de deux ONGs suisses, Helvetas et Caritas, en Ethiopie, à Haïti et au Tchad. Les deux organisations ont développé des approches adaptées à des environnements particulièrement complexes et fragiles, qui produisent des résultats tangibles.

Je tiens à remercier les auteurs qui ont livré des contributions originales à ce numéro de Politorbis et qui ont permis de faire le point sur un thème aux multiples facettes et tristement actuel. Je remercie aussi Hans Rudolph Herren, président de la Fondation biovision pour un développement écologique, pour un avant-propos stimulant et plein de lucidité, qui nous invite à réfléchir sérieusement à notre mode de vie et de consommation. Finalement, je tiens encore à remercier la Division Afrique au sein de l'Aide Humanitaire de la Suisse, qui a pris l'initiative de cette publication, et en particulier Pierre Maurer qui en a assuré la réalisation.

Part 1: **Hunger in Historical, Regional and Thematic Perspectives**

The Re-Emergence of Famine in the Twenty-First Century?

Daniel Maxwell[1], Peter Hailey[2]

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, the international community has been tracking progress made to overcome hunger as a global priority, and until recently we have seen steady—if uneven—progress towards reducing both the overall numbers, and the proportion, of the world's population living in hunger. This went from a little over a billion hungry people (18 percent of global population) in 1990 to an estimated level in 2016 of a bit less than 800 million or about 11 percent of current population. This is not stunning progress—and indeed progress that is highly skewed towards gains in India and China—but progress nevertheless. Figure 1 depicts the just-released 2017 figures, which show that both the total numbers and the prevalence of hunger have unexpectedly risen again (FAO/WFP/UNICEF 2017).

These are highly synthetic figures and subject to adjustment by future estimation, so it is still too soon to conclude very much about longer-term trends in global hunger. However, we do know that famines killed something like 70 million people during the twentieth century (de Waal 2018). Then famines disappeared for a decade in the early twenty-first century, leading many to hope that at least famine—if not hunger—was a thing of the past. But famine re-emerged with a vengeance in Somalia in the first half of 2011, killing an estimated quarter million people (Checchi and Robinson 2013). In 2016–17, four countries were declared at risk of famine—including two that did breach famine thresholds (Nigeria and South Sudan). Somalia narrowly escaped a second famine in six years because of a heavy investment in prevention, resilience, and humanitarian response measures. And Yemen, while *not yet* experiencing famine conditions, threatens to overwhelm global response capabilities, with nearly 17 million people urgently requiring food assistance and an estimated

7 million on the verge of famine (FEWSNET 2017). This comes at a time when the war in Yemen that has led to the extreme humanitarian crisis is ramping up—leading to fears that the worst may be still to come.

We don't yet know what the total mortality from the current crises is. But we know that some 81 million people are in need of emergency food assistance this year—up from about 45 million just two years ago in 2015 (FEWSNET 2017). The global hunger figures can be affected by anything from climate-related production shocks, changes in demand, changes in land-use patterns and uneven economic growth. But the re-emergence of famine in the twenty-first century is a surprising development—and a key challenge that we may still be misunderstanding.

Figure 1. Estimated number of undernourished people in the world, showing recent famines

Source: FAO/WFP/UNICEF 2017

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1   Henry J. Leir Professor in Food Security, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University, Boston
2   Director, Centre for Humanitarian Change, Nairobi

This paper will briefly address several basic questions about the re-emergence of famine in the twenty-first century. What are famines? Why is famine making something of a "comeback" in the face of long-term improvement in the fight against hunger? What do we know about the most appropriate strategies for famine prevention, prediction, and response, and why are we not fully applying these strategies when it seems that famine risk is higher than it has been for two decades?

Alex de Waal has depicted the great famines of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Figure 2). Between 1870 and 2010, famines killed more than 100 million people, but famine mortality declined steeply in the late twentieth century and by contemporary definition disappeared entirely between 2000 and 2011.[3] Despite our biases today, famine mortality mostly didn't occur in Africa—the worst famines were in Asia, with several of the biggest ones in Europe (and this data doesn't go back to the 1840s or Europe would look worse). De Waal's data suggest that ending famine is possible—and indeed de Waal himself suggested not so long ago that we had ended famine (de Waal 2018). But the events of 2017 have clearly demonstrated that we have *not* ended the risk of famine.

What are famines?
Several definitions exist, but the international community has mostly agreed to the one spelled out in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)—the tool used to define food security crises of differing severity—including famine. This definition is very technical and focuses mainly on the level of severity of several outcome indicators that emphasize extreme food insecurity and its consequences. In brief, according to IPC analysis, famine is defined by food insecurity, malnutrition, and mortality. More specifically, the simultaneous breach of thresholds in these three indicators—more than 20 percent of a defined population with *no* access to food; more than 30 percent of children under five years of age acutely malnourished (extremely low body weight compared to height); and more than two out of 10,000

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3   De Waal uses a slightly different definition of famine than IPC analysis uses. For his study, de Waal defined famine as any food security crisis in which total mortality exceeded 100,000 people. The currently accepted technical definition of famine, derived from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification system (explained in the next section) would show no actual famines in the early twenty-first century, until 2011.

Figure 2. Famine Mortality, by Region, 1870–2010

Source: de Waal, World Peace Foundation

people dying per day—roughly ten times the death rate in industrialized societies and five times the rate in Sub-Saharan Africa (IPC Partners 2012).

But famines are more than mere indicator thresholds. They entail widespread hunger, human suffering, destitution, and mortality. They are frequently characterized by distress migration as people search for food, safety, or employment; they commonly involve the partial or total breakdown of people's networks of social support; and of course in some cases, starvation may be a deliberate consequence of policy or military strategy. In nearly all cases, famines have not only devastating short-term impacts; they can have long-lasting effects even on those who survive. And in nearly all cases, famines involve some element of human causation—either deliberately where starvation is used as a weapon, or through neglect or the prioritization of other objectives besides preventing famine.

Why is famine re-emerging?
Three points must be understood to explain the re-emergence of famine. The first is about the relationship between conflict and famine. The second is about the multiple causes of famine. The third is about the politics of famine, and the politicization of famine and its analysis.

Conflict and famine. The four countries currently at immediate risk for famine are Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen. All—or at least the areas at risk for famine—are in violent conflict of some kind. Somalia and Nigeria have internal insurgencies with armed non-state groups labeled as terrorists by

Figure 3: "Four Famines" 2017/18

Source: FEWSNET

both the state and the international community (*Al Shabaab* in the case of Somalia and *Boko Haram* in the case of Nigeria). The violence resulting from these insurgencies—and the counter-insurgency strategies arrayed against them—have not only severely disrupted livelihoods and displaced people, they have severely restricted the access of humanitarian actors—both local and international—who could provide life-protecting assistance under such circumstances. To prevent aid from ending up in the hands of terrorist groups, governments and international donors have placed heavy restrictions on where and to whom aid can flow.

The combined restrictions by Al Shabaab and Western donors in Somalia in 2011 resulted in long delays in mounting an international response at sufficient scale to prevent a worsening crisis—and in effect tipped a bad year over into an outright famine. There was a bad drought, which triggered a production shock; and there was an independent spike in the global price of food, but ultimately it was the failure to enable or implement a timely response to these shocks that resulted in an actual famine in 2011 (Maxwell and Majid, 2016).

In Nigeria, there were fewer donor restrictions, but in 2016, Boko Haram held a desperately hungry population hostage in the face of a Nigerian army offensive. Several enclaves where the displaced had congregated had fallen into famine conditions by the time the Nigerian military had retaken them from Boko Haram control, enabling aid agencies to reach them (FEWSNET 2016).

However, as of late 2017, the Nigerian military strategy appeared to one of surrounding and cutting off

all communications and supplies to Boko Haram-held territory—no market access, no telecommunications, no transportation, and of course, no humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid is being used as a magnet to draw the population out of Boko Haram areas. Humanitarian estimates of civilians in Boko Haram-controlled territory are about 930,000 (OCHA 2017). The threat of famine arose when the conflict with Boko Haram changed from a police action to a counter-insurgency strategy. No one has a plan for how to change the nature of this confrontation—indeed much of the humanitarian community appears unaware of the extent to which the aid effort supports a counter-insurgency strategy. A similar situation currently exists in Somalia, with more than a million people displaced to areas where receiving humanitarian assistance is possible (OCHA Humanitarian Dashboard 2017). An estimate of populations in "inaccessible areas" of Somalia cannot be found.

In South Sudan, a political falling-out at the highest level of government in 2013 has resulted in a civil war that now affects *the entirety* of the world's newest nation and has seen elements of ethnic cleansing and assault on civilians and their livelihoods and assets by all the belligerents—the national military as well as a variety of non-state militias that constitute a loosely affiliated armed opposition. The international community has not yet labeled any of these groups a "terrorist" organization, but suffice it to say that affected populations are as terrified of these belligerents as people in Somalia are of Al Shabaab—or populations in Nigeria are of Boko Haram. In February of this year, amid some controversy, the UN declared a famine in one of the most conflict-affected areas of South Sudan.

Figure 4 depicts the rapid deterioration of food security status in the conflict-affected parts of South Sudan. The vertical axis depicts the average food security classification at the county level (the smallest administrative unit for which the classification exists) but depicts the mean classification for all counties in the state. The graph charts the mean IPC phase classification, the higher the number, the greater the food insecurity. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013 in Juba between different elements of the Presidential Guard quickly took on ethnic dimensions, and the opposition—rallying around deposed Vice President Riek Machar—quickly captured the Greater Upper Nile region. In response, the fighting shifted from the capital to Greater Upper Nile.

Figure 4. Conflict and Famine (South Sudan, 2013–17)

4a. Greater Upper Nile

4b. Greater Equatoria

Source: Author (Data from FEWSNET)

The vertical line in Figure 4a depicts the onset of fighting in Greater Upper Nile, and the graph plots the rapidly deteriorating food security situation. This ultimately resulted in a famine being declared in parts of Leer County (the home area of Machar) in the early months of 2017. Although the famine declaration was lifted with the June assessment, the number of people in crisis or emergency (IPC Phase 3 or 4) actually increased by several hundred thousand—creating the odd situation in which the government declare the famine over but the UN declared the magnitude of the acute need to have grown (IPC TWG 2017). The conflict spread to Greater Equatoria—traditionally the surplus-food-producing area of the country—in early to mid-2016, leading to rapid deterioration in food security there as well (4b). Greater Equatoria had been peaceful up to that point but is now the epicenter of the conflict, with nearly a million refugees having fled to Uganda. Conflict now engulfs nearly all of South Sudan in one way or another, and conflict is—directly or indirectly—the major driver of displacement, hunger, malnutrition, and death throughout the country.

However, in terms of numbers, the current crisis in Yemen threatens a more massive crisis than all the other three combined, with over 22.2 million (76 percent) of a total population of 29.3 in need and nearly 18 million people urgently requiring food assistance (that is, nearly two-thirds of the population of the country), and the situation is predicted to worsen over coming months (OCHA 2018). A civil war is going on in Yemen as well, but one with direct ties to a regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran—with all the sectarian overtones that implies. Some countries (such as Saudi Arabia, which is leading the international coalition to restore to power the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh) have labeled the Houthi rebels that control the capital, Sana'a, as "terrorists" although the UN and most Western countries have not. The conflict has displaced large numbers of people, led to the near total breakdown of public services—especially water and health, and crippled the economy. More recently Saudi Arabia has imposed a blockade on the main seaport serving the Houthi-controlled area of the country—a country that is heavily dependent on trade and imports to meet its food requirements. Although some Western governments have called for allowing humanitarian aid to bypass the blockade, this is going to be too little and too late in a country that imports not only some 90 percent of its food, but also fuel, medicines,

and other necessities. Humanitarian aid can assist the worst-affected, but it cannot replace commercial imports of an entire country. This is a recipe for a disaster that could dwarf the impact of the 2011 famine in Somalia not only in terms of severity, but particularly in magnitude. Throughout the latter months of 2017, the UN, the media, and advocacy groups have all been clearly stating the threat to Yemen's civilian population—pleas that are falling on unhearing ears in Saudi Arabia and in the capitals of it allies (*The Guardian*, 2017).

As of late 2017, many analysts would include Ethiopia on the famine-risk watch list (FEWSNET 2017). More recently, the Democratic Republic of Congo has fallen into a widespread crisis that threatens the basic safety and food security of more than 5 million people, with an average of 5,500 people displaced *per day* in 2017 (OCHA 2017). This crisis, which is focused on the heretofore largely peaceful regions of North and South Kasai and Tanganyika, is also heavily conflict driven (Thomson Reuters 2017).

The multi-causality of famine. The second point is about the multiple causes of famine. While there is little doubt about the commonality of conflict across all these cases, other causes and complicating factors are at work as well. In some cases, climatic factors play a significant role. Somalia in 2011 experienced a major drought. Drought is again playing a major role in the current crisis in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia as well as Somalia). But drought and the more predictable impact of seasonality on production and food access are relatively less significant factors in the other countries currently at risk. Pictures showing desert scenes with displaced people or malnourished children are used to depict the crises in Yemen and sometimes Nigeria and South Sudan, but drought and climate change—while underpinning some of the longer-term environmental hazards in these contexts—are not the main explanation for the acute risk of famine in the near term.

The famine in Somalia in 2011 was caused by the combination of the war with Al Shabaab and a drought of major proportions, together with an acute spike in the price of food globally. Somalia, like Yemen, is heavily dependent of the importation of grains and other basic foodstuffs, so a tripling of the global price of some basic food commodities dealt a major shock to people's ability to access adequate food in Somalia. These factors were in addition to a long-standing

livelihoods crisis and environmental degradation in Somalia following the collapse of the state in 1991.

Figure 5 depicts the decline in terms of trade—the wage received for daily labor compared to the cost of purchased food—for people in three of the most heavily affected regions of Southern Somalia between 2010 and 2012. The drought led to a collapse of demand for rural labor at the time that the price of food tripled—meaning that average purchasing power declined by 75–80 percent between September 2010 and February 2011and remained extremely low until the famine was declared in July. (The price of food globally began to drop thereafter, and with the return of the *deyr* rains in the autumn of 2011, rural labor markets recovered, causing purchasing power to rise dramatically).

Figure 5. Market Shocks (Somalia, 2011)

Source: Maxwell and Majid, 2016

Nevertheless, it was the delay in response—due in part to Al Shabaab's antipathy to humanitarian actors, in part to donor restrictions about aid going astray, and in part to the refusal or reluctance of some major agencies to engage given the security and reputational risks—that tipped a very serious emergency into being a full-blown famine. Figure 6 depicts the mortality caused by the famine, along with levels of donor commitments to the humanitarian appeal for Somalia and the numbers of people receiving assistance. All through the early months of 2011, mortality was climbing, and then spiked when the *gu* rains failed in April/May.

Figure 6: Response Failure

Source: Maxwell and Majid (2016)

But donor funding—mostly constrained by concerns about aid being diverted and ending up in the hands of terrorists—increased only very slowly. And the number of people receiving cash or food assistance completely flat-lined—until the UN declared the famine in July (and even after the declaration, the bulk of the assistance was made available only in Mogadishu and other accessible areas). This depicts not only the failure in response until *after* the crisis had peaked (and indeed, mortality was already beginning to decline when the famine was declared), it also demonstrates the enormous political power of the word "famine"—when famine was declared, the response changed dramatically (Maxwell and Majid, 2016).

The politics of famine. This brings us to the third point critical to understanding the current context: the politics of famine. Famine is not just an extreme crisis of malnutrition and mortality, it is also a failure of governance; it suggests state failure—or at least neglect on a grand scale—and it may suggest an abdication of international responsibility. As noted above, almost all famines have some degree of human causation. At the same time, it "tarnishes the reputation" of the affected country, in the words of respondents in our current study on the political influences on famine analysis. It also tarnishes—or *should tarnish*—the reputation of other actors: of armed groups who use civilians as human shields or aid bait, donor governments and agencies that fail to act to prevent or mitigate famine, or opposition politicians who cash in on famine to try to undermine the government of the day. In short, it is impossible to talk about famine without implicating politics.

The very fact that the word "famine" has such political ramifications means that, almost by definition, the assessment and declaration of famine conditions is also going to be politically fraught. Food security analysis and classification systems—in particular the IPC system discussed above—are built on two fundamental objectives: The first is to provide an accurate, evidence-based and independent analysis of the severity of food insecurity in a country or a given area or region of a country. The second is to build capacity for a system that is state-led, participatory, and consensus-based. These two objectives work reasonably well side by side if the food security situation is stable, or even in crises of modest impact. But when famine threatens, states and some major humanitarian actors clearly have incentives to "tone down" the analysis—to understate the risks, or make declarations as close to famine as possible without actually saying the "f-word"—a phenomenon seen repeatedly in recent extreme crises and the subject of our current research.

At a minimum, this requires not just technical competence, but also a good deal of political savvy on the part of the analysts who undertake the assessment of famine, and agencies—be they governmental, UN, or non-governmental— that respond to these analyses. It requires the ability to analyze not just food security outcomes, but also conflict and other complex drivers, including response failure (Maxwell and Hailey 2017). Technically poor or incorrect analysis can actually make the problem worse by failing to focus the right resources and attention in the right places— particularly in the context of multiple major crises, each demanding donor resources that are not expanding at a pace commensurate with rapidly expanding humanitarian needs. Analysis that does not take into consideration these political influences runs the risk of significantly undermining the humanitarian and "Do No Harm" principles. A major rationale for global analysis systems like IPC is to produce information that is comparable across dissimilar crises and contexts to support the impartial allocation of resources. When analysis is undermined or subject to strong political influences, impartiality (already a difficult principle to uphold) is compromised further.

But all of this raises the question about accountability—and whose responsibility it is to prevent famine and to ensure adequate access to food for all. In the first instance, the state is clearly responsible. But

what happens when the state is unwilling or unable (as was the case in Somalia) or is a party to the conflict that is causing famine? We touch on this point below.

What are the most appropriate responses?
Most experts would now agree that at least three tracks for famine prevention and response exist that must be pursued simultaneously: reducing the risk of famine; responding quickly and robustly when famine threatens; and developing mechanisms that hold to account the individuals or parties that have caused a famine.

Reducing the risk of famine. Since the famine of 2011, and subsequent crises in 2012 that affected the Sahel, much of the humanitarian and development investment has been about resilience—that is, about enabling at-risk populations to develop more resilient livelihoods, to be better able to withstand setbacks, to be able to "bounce back" from shocks, and to proactively shape the environment in which they live, to not simply be passive victims of the constraints. Indeed much of the work we do at the Feinstein Center and Centre for Humanitarian Change has focused on understanding livelihood systems under stress and how to make them more resilient in the face of multiple and recurrent shocks and stresses.

However, much of the policy attention to resilience focuses on climatic, environmental, and (to some degree) economic hazards—and in some cases progress has been made through improved marketing systems, drought resistant approaches, good disaster preparedness and risk reduction, and the development of permanent social safety nets. For instance, the current drought affecting Somalia and Ethiopia also affects northern Kenya, but populations in Kenya are much less at risk of a humanitarian emergency resulting from the drought—in large part because of a government-led program called "Ending Drought Emergencies" that incorporates the various components just described as well as other innovations such as devolution of power to locally-elected county governments and improved investment in health systems, roads, and communications infrastructure. But we are less experienced with enabling "resilience" in the face of political risks, and yet violent conflict—the most acute of political risks—is the common factor across all the current famine-risk crises.

Discussions about famine often quickly raise questions about things like agriculture, pastoralism, drought resistant seeds (possibly even genetically modified crops), or about empowering women farmers in developing countries, diversifying livelihood opportunities, improving access to basic services, starting savings and loans groups, or starting other local development initiatives. All of these are important to addressing acute and chronic hunger, and insofar as hunger is reduced and the resilience of livelihoods is increased, the risk of famine is reduced. But famine isn't just a more extreme occurrence of factors that contribute to chronic hunger. The best evidence we have suggests that to prevent famine, governments, donors, agencies, and local communities will have to work together both to build resilience and to respond quickly when famines—or crises of lesser severity—threaten (Cabot-Venton 2017).

Rapid and robust responses. The responses to which Cabot-Venton refers are not only triggered by the early warning systems that have been well-developed over the past thirty years. They first aim to protect the livelihood assets of at-risk populations (livestock in the case of pastoralists, for example) and also provide life-saving assistance in the form of food or cash *before* people have either lost their assets or been forced to sell them to buy food or other needed goods and services. Major changes have been made in the way that large-scale hunger and malnutrition are treated in emergencies. The traditional response to hunger or food insecurity was food aid, typically shipped from a donor country to the affected country. Much of the response now is in the form of cash or other transfers that rely on local markets rather than outside shipments. Ready-to-use therapeutic foods are now used to treat malnutrition—mostly without requiring the malnourished child to be admitted to a clinic or feeding center. If affected populations are allowed to access the assistance, humanitarians know how to prevent malnutrition and death. Though some of this kind of support—particularly food assistance—was not available at anything like the scale required in Somalia in 2011, the early evidence is that such support was mobilized in time in 2017. In the other cases discussed here, the jury is still out. And 2018 threatens to be as bad or worse as 2017.

Access is a major constraint in *all* the cases discussed here—both humanitarian access to affected populations and affected populations' access to the help

they need. And this raises a critical point that is frequently overlooked in famines and other extreme emergencies: Much of the support that affected populations receive (all of it, in some cases), comes not from the state or international humanitarian agencies, but from neighbors, friends, and people's own social networks. Thus the extent to which affected groups can access their own social networks in times of crisis is critical to their survival and recovery. Yet frequently the actions taken by outsiders may undermine this access, even actions taken by states or agencies supporting the formal humanitarian response. Perhaps the most egregious example was during the 2011 famine, when the very states supporting the humanitarian response were simultaneously attempting to shut down the access of the money transfer companies in Somalia to the formal, Western banking system for fear of money being transferred to Al Shabaab. Yet those same money transfer companies were critical as a conduit for the remittances being sent by the Somali diaspora to people affected by the famine—in amounts that likely well surpassed the formal humanitarian response (Maxwell and Majid 2016).

Ensuring accountability. Famines are human-made: They happen either when someone or a government wants them to, or when someone or a government fails to prevent them. Preventing famine is therefore about understanding the full panoply of hazards—climatic, environmental, economic, social, and political—that put people at risk of famine, and ensuring that none of these reaches the point of pushing vulnerable groups into the descending spiral of famine.

Thus preventing the recurrence of famine is as much about political accountability on a global scale as it is about improved agriculture, access to credit, or functioning markets. The goal of establishing accountability affects how we measure analyze, predict, and communicate the risks of famines. It certainly affects how we prepare for and attempt to prevent famines. And it goes far beyond humanitarian budgets to response to famines—as self-evidently important as that might be. And these are the issues that present the most complex challenges to making famine a thing of the past.

If multiple causes are known to result in famine, then all of these causal factors have to be better monitored, and acted on sooner. If conflict is a key driver of famine risk, then measurement and analysis of its likely impact on famine risk is key. Just as the analysis of the causes of famine have to come to grips with politics and conflict, so too does famine prevention and response. But the issue here isn't just conflict in a specific location at risk of or experiencing famine. It is also about regional politics and global security concerns like counter-terrorism. It's about sectarian competition that plays out in regional power struggles such as the one now taking place in Yemen. And it's about more localized sources of marginalization and exclusion. Conflict management and conflict resolution have traditionally been rather different interventions—separated from humanitarian response or famine prevention. But if famine is political, the response must take into account dealing with causes as well as effects.

These are the "competing imperatives" implied in the title of our recent book on the Somalia famine (Maxwell and Majid 2016). In the Somalia case, these competing imperatives referred to a security or counter-terrorism imperative on the one hand, and the humanitarian imperative to address human suffering on the other. "Famine" is a word that is so bad it over-rode some of the counter-terrorism concerns in Somalia—but only once famine was declared. The challenge is to evoke a similarly intentioned response but not have to wait for famine to be declared. The evidence on this is murky, but strongly suggests that an earlier response in 2017 likely averted a famine this year—but famine still looms in 2018. And though the threat of famine is being used with regard to Yemen, it remains to be seen if significant preventative action will be taken there as well.

When there are over-arching security concerns (as there are in *all* these cases) the humanitarian imperative is unlikely (on its own) to trump a security imperative. So humanitarians—or anyone worried about hunger and human security—will have to think about conflict resolution, but also must be smarter about how we work *in conflict*—in terms of doing humanitarian protection, upholding International Humanitarian Law, and differentiating between armed groups and civilians.

And finally, numerous observers have noted that, given the role of human causation in the development of famines, they will only end when responsible decision makers are held to account for their actions. Already, some activists are talking about bringing criminal charges in some of the most fla-

grant cases. Establishing famine as a crime on par with genocide will certainly concentrate minds, but holding governments and individual actors accountable is a complex process and can take a long time. Most of all, preventing famine requires a humanitarian consensus (technical and political) that famine is caused by humans, and therefore the responsibility and accountability for eliminating famine, once and for all, is in our own hands.

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Éradiquer la faim et la malnutrition au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest :
« Marchons ensemble si l'on veut aller loin… »

Sibiri Jean Zoundi[1], Laurent Bossard[2] et Julia Wanjiru[3]

1. La nouvelle configuration des défis

Chaque année, cinq à sept millions de personnes souffrent d'insécurité alimentaire aiguë (phase 3 à 5 du Cadre harmonisé[4]) au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest. Que la campagne agro-pastorale soit bonne ou mauvaise, ces personnes sont structurellement vulnérables. Leur situation dépend de nombreux facteurs, tels que la pauvreté, le niveau de pouvoir d'achat et l'accès aux services sociaux de base (santé, éducation, eau-hygiène-assainissement). Elle se dégrade généralement à la période de soudure (juin-août), lorsque les greniers commencent à se vider.

La dernière décennie a vu les enjeux alimentaires et nutritionnels devenir de plus en plus complexes et s'hybrider avec les problématiques sécuritaires. Le bassin du Lac Tchad, le nord du Mali et la boucle du Liptako-Gourma en sont des illustrations. En 2017, le Réseau de prévention des crises alimentaires (RPCA) estimait que 13,8 millions de personnes étaient en situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle critique en juin-août (Figure 1). Au nord-est du Nigéria, dans les États les plus affectés par le conflit en cours, Borno, Adamawa et Yobe, le nombre de personnes nécessitant une assistance alimentaire et nutritionnelle d'urgence était estimé à 5,3 millions. Cette augmentation spectaculaire du nombre de personnes exposées illustre l'impact désastreux des conflits sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle. Les menaces sécuritaires aggravent les fragilités structurelles.

> *Les menaces sécuritaires aggravent les fragilités structurelles*

Figure 1. Situation alimentaire dans la région en 2017

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4 Outil consensuel développé et mis en œuvre par le RPCA pour l'analyse et l'identification des zones à risque et des populations victimes d'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle. L'analyse du Cadre harmonisé est menée dans les 17 pays sahéliens et ouest-africains.

Proportion de la population sous-alimentée

11 % = moyenne pondérée de l'Afrique de l'Ouest

Légende : 2008–10 ; 2000–02 ; 1990–92

Sources : FAO (2015) ; OCDE/CSAO (2015)

Figure 2. Évolution de la population sous-alimentée

Environ 11 % de la population (Figure 2), soit près de 42 millions de personnes, souffre encore de ce fléau. Les plus concernés sont les ménages d'agriculteurs exclus du marché, les pasteurs dépendants d'un cheptel soumis aux aléas climatiques et les travailleurs pauvres de l'économie informelle. Structurellement vulnérables, ces personnes – dont une majorité de femmes et d'enfants – sont incapables de résister aux chocs récurrents causés par les sécheresses, les inondations, les ravageurs des cultures, et les crises socio-économiques, politiques, sécuritaires.

Pourtant, la région a fait d'importants progrès dans la lutte contre la malnutrition, dont la prévalence a baissé de 60 % au cours des deux dernières décennies ; passant de 24.2 % en 1990-92 à 9.6 % en 2014-16.

Pour autant, les défis demeurent considérables dans certaines parties de la région. Dans le Sahel, les taux de malnutrition aiguë globale (GAM) dépassent régulièrement le niveau d'alerte de 10 % ; dans certaines zones, ils sont au-delà du seuil d'urgence de 15 %.

En avril 2017, le RPCA estimait que près de 3,5 millions d'enfants pourraient être affectés par la malnutrition sévère d'ici la fin de l'année, si des interventions adéquates ne sont pas mises en œuvre. Selon le dernier rapport sur l'état de la sécurité alimentaire et de la nutrition dans le monde (FAO, FIDA, OMS, PAM, UNICEF, 2017), quelque 20 millions d'enfants sahéliens et ouest-africains âgés de moins de cinq ans souffrent de retard de croissance (Figure 3), l'un des symptômes de la malnutrition les plus répandus, et dont les conséquences sont les plus irréversibles. Par ailleurs, 5,5 millions d'enfants souffrent d'insuffisance pondérale et 2 millions sont en surpoids. Environ 43 millions de femmes en âge de procréer souffrent d'anémie ; une menace pour la nutrition et la santé des enfants.

Enfants de moins de 5 ans souffrant de retard de croissance

Sources : UNICEF, OMS (2013) ; UNICEF, OMS, Banque mondiale (2015) ; Rapport mondial de la nutrition 2015

Figure 3. Évolution de la population sous-alimentée

La faim n'est plus la seule affaire des ruraux ; elle touche désormais des milliers de ménages urbains et péri-urbains.

2. Les progrès accomplis grâce à un engagement régional depuis plus de 30 ans

L'indice de la faim dans le monde (Global Hunger Index - GHI), construit autour de quatre indicateurs (sous-alimentation, retard de croissance des enfants âgés de moins de cinq ans, leur insuffisance pondérale et taux de mortalité), indique des progrès spectaculaires à l'échelle régionale. Si dans les années 1990 la quasi-totalité de la bande sahélienne se trouvait dans une situation alors qualifiée d' « extrêmement alarmante », les choses se sont nettement améliorées aujourd'hui. Même si le Libéria, la Sierra Leone et le Tchad restent classés dans la zone orange « situation alarmante », tous les pays ont amélioré leurs scores (Tableau 1). Le Ghana et le Sénégal ont même réussi de rejoindre la catégorie des pays en situation « modérée » avec des indices inférieurs à 20.

Encadré 1 : Causes multiples et imbriquées de la faim

Les causes de la faim et de la malnutrition ont évolué. Si dans les années 1960 à 1980, les famines étaient essentiellement associées à des déficits de production vivrière occasionnés par les sécheresses, les crises alimentaires et nutritionnelles sont aujourd'hui multifactorielles et complexes ; déterminées par les prix, le pouvoir d'achat, et l'accès aux services sociaux de base (santé, éducation, eau-hygiène-assainissement, planning familial). La faim n'est plus la seule affaire des ruraux ; elle touche désormais des milliers de ménages urbains et péri-urbains. Les prix sont désormais un facteur clé de l'accessibilité à l'alimentation – et cela dans un contexte où la plupart des ménages (y compris les ruraux) dépend des marchés pour la satisfaction d'au moins deux-tiers de leurs besoins alimentaires (Allen, 2017). La population de la région a été multipliée par cinq au cours des 65 dernières années et devrait encore plus que doubler d'ici 2050. Les urbains représentent déjà près de 50 % de la population. Ces dynamiques sont sources de transformation, de diversification économique et de développement. Elles portent cependant de nouveaux défis en matière d'éducation, de santé et de protection sociale, et constituent par conséquent une variable centrale des enjeux alimentaires et nutritionnels.

Encadré 2 : Coût élevé de l'inaction face à la malnutrition

Conduites sous le leadership de l'Union africaine (UA), de la Commission économique pour l'Afrique (CEA) et du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), des études sur le coût de la faim au Burkina Faso, au Ghana et au Tchad ont montré qu'en 2012, le coût associé à la malnutrition infantile, était équivalent respectivement à 6.4 %, 7.7 % et 9.6 % du PIB, soit un montant total d'environ 3.9 milliards d'euros pour ces trois pays.

Une bonne nutrition contribue au développement économique et permet de générer des ressources supplémentaires. Selon le professeur Hoddinott, « Les interventions qui préviennent la malnutrition sont d'excellents investissements ; pour un pays africain typique, chaque dollar investi dans la réduction de la sous-nutrition chronique de l'enfant génère 16 dollars en retour »

Source : Hoddinott, J (2016) : « L'économie de la réduction de la malnutrition en Afrique subsaharienne », document de travail, Panel mondial sur l'agriculture et les systèmes alimentaires pour la nutrition, Université de Cornell

Tableau 1. Évolution de l'Indice de la faim (GHI) des pays de la région*

Pays	Indice de la faim (GHI)			
	1992	2000	2008	2017
Bénin	44.5	37.5	31.7	24.4
Burkina Faso	47.0	47.9	36.4	27.6
Côte d'Ivoire	32.9	32.6	35.1	26.5
Gambie	35.2	27.5	23.8	23.2
Ghana	41.9	29.2	21.9	16.2
Guinée	46.5	44.0	33.4	28.6
Guinée-Bissau	44.5	43.1	31.4	30.6
Libéria	51.2	48.2	38.9	35.3
Mali	51.4	44.2	35.1	28.6
Mauritanie	39.4	33.6	23.7	25.2
Niger	66.2	52.6	37.0	34.5
Nigéria	48.8	41.0	33.7	25.5
Sénégal	37.5	37.3	23.7	18.4
Sierra Leone	57.2	54.7	44.5	38.5
Tchad	62.5	51.9	50.9	43.5
Togo	45.8	39.0	28.3	22.5

*Absence de données pour le Cabo Verde

> 50 = extrêmement alarmante ⎪ 35-49.9 = alarmante ⎪ 20-34.9 : sévère ⎪ 10-19.9 = modérée ⎪ < 9.9 = niveau bas

Source : Indice de la Faim, www.globalhungerindex.org

Encadré 3 : ODD 2 « Éliminer la faim, assurer la sécurité alimentaire, améliorer la nutrition et promouvoir l'agriculture durable »

L'élimination de la faim et de la malnutrition est l'objectif 2 (ODD2) du Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030 et est également inscrite dans l'Agenda 2063 pour l'Afrique de l'Union africaine. Avec son initiative « Faim zéro », la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO) et ses partenaires ont défini leur propre cadre stratégique pour la réalisation de la faim zéro en Afrique de l'Ouest.

Ces progrès remarquables sont le fruit de l'investissement des États et de leurs organisations intergouvernementales, avec l'appui de leurs partenaires techniques et financiers. Ils sont également et surtout imputables au fait que contrairement aux autres régions du continent, l'espace Sahel et Afrique de l'Ouest dispose d'un avantage de taille en matière de de gouvernance régionale de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle.

> *Le Global Hunger Index démontre les progrès spectaculaires de la région sahélienne et ouest-africaine.*

Des instruments de gouvernance de la SAN

Depuis plus de 30 ans, les principales parties prenantes unissent leurs efforts au sein du Réseau de prévention des crises alimentaires (RPCA), créé en 1984 et pierre angulaire du renforcement des capacités collectives de prévention, d'anticipation et de gestion des crises alimentaires. À travers cette plateforme, plusieurs instruments de gouvernance régionale de la SAN sont promus :

- **La Charte** de l'aide alimentaire : adoptée en 1990, cette Charte a révolutionné la façon de travailler entre pays bénéficiaires et partenaires ; elle préfigurait déjà la Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide et a amplement inspiré la Convention internationale sur l'aide alimentaire en 1998. Ce code de bonne conduite a permis d'améliorer la coordination et l'efficacité de l'aide alimentaire au Sahel. Il a contribué à réduire l'aide alimentaire en nature qui se déversait massivement la région et perturbait l'économie alimentaire locale et les habitudes de consommation des populations. La Charte a été révisée pour s'adapter à la complexité croissante des crises alimentaires et nutritionnelles et aux nouvelles ambitions de la région. Ainsi, la Charte pour la prévention et la gestion des crises alimentaires (Charte PREGEC) fut-elle adoptée en 2012 par les 17 États de la région et leurs partenaires. En engageant l'ensemble des pays signataires à effectuer des évaluations régulières, elle s'affiche comme la boussole de la gouvernance régionale de la SAN.

> *L'Afrique de l'Ouest est la seule région du continent à disposer d'une analyse consensuelle de l'information sur la SAN, comparable entre pays et agrégée à l'échelle régionale.*

- **Les outils d'analyse :** À travers le dispositif de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (PREGEC) du RPCA, plusieurs outils ont été développés dont le Cadre harmonisé d'analyse des zones à risque et d'identification des populations en insécurité alimentaires et nutritionnelle. Mis en œuvre à travers le cycle d'analyse du dispositif PREGEC, cet instrument permet à la région de disposer d'une information validée par toutes les parties prenantes.

> *La région sahélienne et ouest-africaine dispose d'un avantage de taille par rapport aux autres régions africaines. Depuis plus de 30 ans, les principales parties prenantes unissent leurs efforts au sein du Réseau de prévention des crises alimentaires (RPCA).*

Grâce au RPCA, l'Afrique de l'Ouest est la seule région du continent à disposer d'une analyse consensuelle de l'information sur la SAN comparable entre les pays et agrégée à l'échelle régionale. Les analyses et les recommandations du Réseau nourrissent les décisions des gouvernements, des organisations régionales et des partenaires techniques et financiers. Les agences des Nations Unies s'appuient sur cette information consensuelle pour la préparation des appels d'assistance alimentaire et humanitaire. D'autres instruments de solidarité régionale, tel que la Réserve régionale de sécurité alimentaire (RRSA), ont été promus dans le cadre du Réseau.

Encadré 4 : Cadres stratégiques et politiques communautaires agricoles et de SAN

- Cadre stratégique de sécurité alimentaire dans une perspective de lutte contre la pauvreté – CSSA – CILSS (2000), suite au processus Sahel 21 (1997-2000)

- Politique agricole de l'Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine – PAU/UEMOA (2001)

- Politique agricole commune de la CEDEAO – ECOWAP (2005)

- Politique pour la réduction des risques de catastrophe – CEDEAO (2007)

- Politique environnementale de la CEDEAO (2008)

- Politique du travail et de l'emploi – CEDEAO (2009)

- Politique humanitaire – CEDEAO (2012)

Programmes d'investissement de mise en œuvre des politiques

- 15 Programmes nationaux d'investissements agricoles (PNIA) et son volet régional (PRIA) de 1ère génération – espace CEDEAO (2010)

- Programme communautaire décennal de transformation de l'agriculture pour la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle (PCD-TASAN) – espace UEMOA (2015)

- 2e génération du Programme régional d'investissement agricole, de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle (PRIA-SAN) – espace CEDEAO (2017)

- 2e génération des Programmes nationaux d'investissement agricole, de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle (PNIA-SAN) en cours de formulation – espace CEDEAO

De fortes ambitions politiques

Depuis le début des années 2000, les États ouest-africains et sahéliens et leurs organisations intergouvernementales se sont investis dans la formulation et la mise en œuvre de nombreuses politiques et stratégies (Encadré 4).

La plupart de ces politiques ont été opérationnalisées à travers des programmes d'investissements. Au sein de l'espace CEDEAO, la mise en œuvre de l'ECOWAP a débouché en 2010 sur une première génération de programmes nationaux d'investissements agricoles (PNIA) et leur composante régionale (PRIA). Conformément à la Déclaration de l'Union africaine de Malabo en 2014, les États sont en train de se doter d'une deuxième génération de programmes nationaux d'investissement agricole, de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle (PNIA-SAN) avec un accent particulier sur les enjeux nutritionnels et de résilience; leur composante régionale (PRIA-SAN) a été approuvée en juin 2017.

Au niveau de l'UEMOA, la mise en œuvre de la politique agricole commune de l'Union (PAU) s'appuie sur le Programme communautaire décennal de transformation de l'agriculture pour la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle (PCD-TASAN), adopté en mars 2015.

Dans le but d'éradiquer l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle chronique, les acteurs ouest-africains et leurs partenaires ont scellé dans le cadre du RPCA en décembre 2012 à Ouagadougou, l'Alliance globale pour la résilience (AGIR) – Sahel et Afrique de l'Ouest. En s'appuyant sur une feuille de route régionale, une dizaine de pays se sont déjà dotés de « Priorités Résilience Pays » (PRP-AGIR) ; cadres de convergence et d'investissement visant à renforcer la cohérence et l'efficacité des initiatives en faveur de la résilience au sein de chaque pays.

3. La délicate épreuve de la concrétisation des ambitions politiques

Si les politiques et des ambitions existent, d'importants défis persistent quant à leur mise en œuvre.

Mieux se coordonner et renforcer les complémentarités

Les nouvelles ambitions régionales en matière de SAN et de résilience se sont traduites par une floraison d'initiatives conçues et mises en œuvre le plus souvent de manière cloisonnée, créant un risque de doublon, de gaspillage de ressources et plus globalement d'inefficacité de l'action collective. Il est par conséquent indispensable d'assurer une meilleure coordination et de développer des synergies favorables à l'optimisation des complémentarités des interventions. Cette situation interpelle d'une part les partenaires au développement en termes d'alignement sur les stratégies de la région. Elle challenge également les acteurs régionaux qui doivent faire preuve de leadership suffisant pour susciter la coordination et l'harmonisation des interventions. Prenant la mesure de ce défi et rappelant les principes de la Déclaration de Paris et des engagements de Busan, le Réseau réalise une cartographie des interventions SAN et de résilience dans la région. Cet exercice vise à fournir à l'ensemble des parties prenantes, l'information utile pour animer le dialogue politique en faveur des synergies et des complémentarités. Savoir qui fait quoi ? où ? et comment ?, est un indispensable prérequis.

> *L'espace Sahel et Afrique de l'Ouest ne manque pas de politiques et de programmes de SAN et de résilience. Le principal défi réside dans mobilisation des ressources financières pour leur mise en œuvre.*

Franchir le cap de la concrétisation de l'ambition

L'espace du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ne manque pas de politiques et de programmes de SAN et de résilience. Le principal défi est celui de de la mobilisation des ressources financières pour leur mise en œuvre. Le premier impératif est celui du financement souverain indispensable pour convaincre les partenaires et assurer des investissements structurels à l'abri de la volatilité des financements extérieurs. L'engagement de Maputo pour l'allocation de au 10 % des budgets nationaux à l'agriculture et à la sécurité alimentaire est une bonne démarche mais risque fort de demeurer une simple déclaration d'intention si les pays ne trouvent pas les moyens financiers suffisants pour faire face à leur longue liste de priorités. Pour l'heure, l'évaluation de Maputo dix ans après (Benin and Yu, 2013) indique que moins d'une dizaine de pays, dont cinq pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, ont dépassé ce seuil de 10 % (Burkina Faso, Guinée, Mali, Niger et Sénégal). De nombreux États demeurent largement dépendants de l'aide internationale pour concrétiser leurs priorités de SAN et de résilience. Le financement souverain des ambitions régionales de SAN et de résilience demeure une question centrale à aborder de front, et en toute responsabilité avec les décideurs politiques de la région.

Maintenir le focus sur les enjeux alimentaires et nutritionnels

Le contexte international actuel est marqué par la résurgence des défis migratoires et sécuritaires. Zone de fragilité, l'espace saharo-sahélien, et plus largement l'Afrique de l'Ouest, sont directement frappés par ces phénomènes, et leurs conséquences humanitaires pèsent lourdement sur les finances publiques des États et des organisations régionales. Sous la pression de leurs opinions publiques et de leurs contribuables, les agences internationales d'aide au développement voient désormais une bonne partie de leurs priorités graviter autour des enjeux sécuritaires et migratoires et des opérations de paix et de stabilisation. Cette cristallisation autour des enjeux migratoires et sécuritaires ignore malheureusement que l'alimentation est la mère de la paix, de la stabilité et de la prospérité. L'économie alimentaire, tout en étant un des piliers clés de la SAN et de la résilience, constitue par ailleurs le principal gisement d'emplois.

Une nouvelle impulsion politique s'avère nécessaire pour replacer l'alimentation et la nutrition au cœur des priorités des agendas de développement. C'est le grand défi du moment. Il suppose que la démonstration soit faite que les enjeux alimentaires et nutritionnels font bien partie intégrante des solutions aux défis sécuritaires, migratoires et de stabilité.

> *Le financement souverain des ambitions régionales de SAN et de résilience demeure une question centrale à aborder de front, et en toute responsabilité avec les décideurs politiques de la région.*

4. Si tu veux aller loin, marchons ensemble

D'importants progrès ont été réalisés en matière de SAN et de résilience. Les capacités de la région en matière de prévention lui ont permis d'être épargnée par les crises majeures au cours de ces dix dernières années, hormis l'épreuve mondiale des émeutes de la faim en 2007-08. D'autres progrès sont réalisables si les efforts sont conjugués, les idées mises en commun et les complémentarités optimisées. L'effort d'alignement devrait aussi aller de pair avec la mise en œuvre d'approches favorisant l'appropriation et le renforcement des capacités d'auto-détermination des acteurs régionaux. Il est toujours plus simple de faire cavalier seul et d'avancer à son rythme. Ce qui est plus difficile, c'est d'avoir tout le monde à bord, de créer un consensus, d'avancer dans la même direction et de construire de manière durable. Comme le dit ce sage proverbe africain : « Si tu veux aller vite, marche seul mais si tu veux aller loin, marchons ensemble ». Agir collectivement permet également de gagner en efficacité et en impact.

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Hunger on the rise: a Call for a Multidimensioal Approach to address Complexity

Véronique Andrieux[1]

Hunger is rising. According to the 2017 "State of Food Insecurity" (SOFI) report about 815 million[2] people worldwide were undernourished in 2016. The majority of them are women and children. 66% of children in Sub-Saharan Africa and 65% of children in South Asia are at risk of being further marginalized, suffering from hunger, undernutrition, isolation and poverty[3]. Severe food insecurity in Africa is on the rise, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an increase of almost three percentage points from 2014 to 2016. 2017 will be remembered as the year of the 4 pre-famines (Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen), which represent the worst global humanitarian crisis since 1945. According to FEWSNET forecasts for 2018, around 76 million additional people across 45 countries are expected to require emergency food assistance during 2018.

Progress on the ground is not at the level of the commitments made by the international community. On the eve of the 10th anniversary of the global food crisis of 2007-2008, the international community has failed to eradicate hunger and still faces multiple nutrition and food crises in countries experiencing conflicts. The root causes of hunger are complex and diverse: poverty and social inequality, conflicts and displacement, violation of human rights, women inequality and lack of women's empowerment, climate change, inadequate agricultural policies, and failing states, all contribute to increased world hunger and malnutrition. In addition to being a public health and food security problem, hunger is also a development problem with human, social and economic impacts, killing two children every minute. Hunger contributes to refugees flows and displacements, creates despair and encourages violence.

Hunger is also the consequence of our inability to prevent and avoid conflict.

More than two years after the SDGs, time has come to move from generous intentions to action. Political commitments do not replace political will. Ten year after the food crisis of 2008, the eradication of hunger and extreme poverty is once again placed at the top of the political agenda. To eradicate hunger, political will is missing. Not Food.

Our goal in Action Against Hunger is to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and lay the foundation for the upcoming generation to feed themselves within the boundaries of the planet. We believe that hunger is not just the largest humanitarian concern and a massive killer; it is the most painful symptom of a global political system in crisis, an offense to human dignity and a major constraint to development and peace. The solutions that are envisaged are insufficient if not inadequate requiring a change in the way hunger is seen and addressed. This paper gives our collective vision of a world free of hunger grounded on analyses deriving from Action Against Hunger's field operations and a body of evidences from expert institutions. It particularly builds on a report released by the inter-Agency Regional Analysts Network[4].

Why are we failing?

In September 2015, for the first time in history, leaders of every country have put on record that they were "determined to end hunger" in all its forms and dimensions, and "end hunger everywhere between now and 2030". Although the world has succeeded in reducing poverty in accordance with the millennium development goal (MDG) targets, food security and adequate nutrition have not been achieved. Ten years ago, the food crisis of 2007–08, followed by

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1   Executive Director at Action Against Hunger, France

2   FAO, WFP, UNICEF, The state of food insecurity, 2017

3   Chunling Lu, Maureen M. Black, and Linda M. Richter, "Risk of poor development in young children in low-income and middle-income countries: an estimation and analysis at the global, regional, and country level", The Lancet, 4(12), October 4, 2016

4   An outlook on Hunger. A Scenario Analysis on the Drivers of Hunger Through 2030. Inter-Agency Regional Analysts Network.

the financial and economic crisis in 2009 has drawn attention to the daily challenges faced by millions of families in their struggle to overcome hunger and poverty. The conventionally agreed causes of the 2007-08 crisis can be summarized as:

• the increase in oil prices that increased the costs of farming
• the impact of diverting food production to the production of bio-fuels
• the rising demand for meat and feed grains from rapidly growing countries such as China
• climatic events in Australia and in Russia
• food and commodity speculation

Symptoms of the world food crisis were partly controlled (ie: food prices have remained stable yet) but the root causes of hunger remain unsolved, the ones that were already behind the symptoms declared 10 years ago: poverty, inequalities, violence against women, the monopoly power of current global food empires. Conflict, climate change and the environmental degradation are becoming increasingly severe drivers as well.

Hunger and malnutrition

Hunger and undernutrition are related. Undernourishment, the lack of sufficient energy (kilocalories) intake, has been the primary measure of hunger. It was used to track the progress of the World Food Summit and Millennium Development Goals. FAO, UNICEF and WFP, in the SOFI report, continue to institutionally define hunger as a caloric deficiency, while addressing nutrient deficiencies as a related but distinct issue. In Action Against Hunger we believe that hunger cannot be limited to under-nourishment. We define hunger as a "state of deprivation according to which an individual cannot satisfy his/ her basic food needs (quantity and quality), required for a healthy and active life." Defining hunger as undernourishment overlooks many of its aspects such as the nutritional quality of food and periods of acute hunger lasting less than one year. Our definition is intended to take a more holistic approach to this pressing issue. One that encompasses the physiological toll on an individual resulting from the inadequate intake of energy and nutrients including macronutrients like protein and micronutrients (vitamins and minerals). It is also intended to include a range of time scales from periodic hunger that could last only days or weeks to chronic hunger lasting years. It should also be noted that the number of people experiencing hunger is far greater when using this definition than a very restricted one like undernourishment as used to count the 815 million people suffering from hunger in 2016.

Persisting poverty and growing inequalities

In 2012, the World Economic Forum identified rising economic inequality as a major threat to social stability[5] and in 2015, the World Bank twinned its goal for ending poverty with the need for shared prosperity[6]. Since then, and despite world leaders committing to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities within the SDGs, the gap between the richest and the rest has increased. Even though hundreds of millions people have been lifted out of poverty in recent decades, eight men still own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world[7], and the incomes of the 10% poorest people increased by less than $3 a year between 1988 and 2011 while the incomes of the richest 1% increased 182 times as much[8].

Women are the first victims

Higher levels of gender inequality are associated with higher levels of food and nutrition insecurity. Women account for 70% of the world's hungry and are disproportionately affected by malnutrition and food insecurity[9]. Across the world, women are concentrated in the lowest paid and least secure forms of work[10]. Even though women in developing countries have to face more extreme poverty, lower literacy rates than men and no access to or control over land and productive resources, on average, women achieve higher values of output per hectare than men, on much smaller plots. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that if women had the same access to productive resources as men, the total agricultural output in developing countries would increase by up to 4% and reduce the number of hungry people in the

world by 12–17%. Understanding these gendered differences and acting upon them is central to fight against hunger and malnutrition, as well as ensure long-term recovery and development.

Hunger and conflicts

We define conflict as a broad category referring to a range of situations from armed conflict to contexts of violence. According to the 2017 SOFI report, conflict is a main driver of hunger. Indeed, out of the 815 million hungry people on the planet, 489 million live in conflict-affected countries. Globally, countries in protracted conflicts have on average over twice the rate of undernourishment than developing countries[11].

In the past 15 years, at least 53 countries have been impacted by political violence, and roughly a third of this violence is directed towards civilians[12]. Since the end of the Cold War, interstate and intra-state violence have strongly decreased, though there has been a small increase in the latter since 2011. However in the last decades other kinds of violence of great concern have increased. Nearly half the world's population, or 3.34 billion people, live in proximity to or feel the impact of political violence[13]. Civilians living in conflict areas are increasingly suffering from the (unlawful) conduct of hostilities, and their access to life-saving services is also increasingly restricted, including by a growing violence against humanitarian action. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is not respected and parties to conflicts target civilians, their livelihoods and their access to lifesaving services. Freedom of movement is deliberately limited, including of humanitarian actors and of civilians towards life-saving aid. Moreover, a range of political decisions, including economic blockages, anti-migration or counter-terrorism policies, tend to limit even further the delivery of humanitarian aid. Civilian populations in conflicts areas are therefore made extremely vulnerable, not only by war and fighting, but also by additional man-made decisions, that further food insecurity. Moreover, as they are erupting in contexts of chronic malnutrition, fragile health systems and poor access to water services, conflicts

5   World Economic Forum. (2012). 'Global Risk Report 2012'. http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2012/?doing_wp_cron =1478086016.0533339977264404296877

6   World Bank. (2015). 'A Measured Approach to Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared Prosperity: Concepts, Data, and the Twin Goals'. Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/publication/a-measured-approach-to-ending-poverty-and-boosting-shared-prosperity DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-0361-1

7   An economy for the 99%, Briefing paper, Oxfam international, 2017

8   Ibid

9   See (A/HRC/16/40) Study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on discrimination in the context of the right to food, para 29

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One displaced family from Mosul waits in the ground after receiving the food ration from Action against Hunger in Alfalah, Syria
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have a dramatic impact on acute malnutrition, risks of epidemics, morbidity and mortality levels.

At the same time, persistent hunger and food insecurity can contribute to triggering new tensions and instabilities, or further fueling conflicts and preventing States from resolving crises, that become protracted. A vicious circle can emerge when conflict leads to a worsening of the food security and nutrition situation, which in turn enhances the risk of deepening and prolonging the conflict. Yet, humanitarian crises within conflicts are often poorly responded to and millions of affected people remain without appropriate assistance. Humanitarian Response Plans are chronically largely underfunded, while development aid is failing to respond to rising global hunger Emergency preparedness is also often underinvested and underfunded. For instance, in countries in situation of pre-famine, development aid for health remains focused on short-term programs, neglecting the need to strengthen health systems on the long run and build their resilience.

Climate change and biodiversity losses feed hunger

According to WWF[14], 150 to 200 species of plant, insect, bird and mammal go extinct every 24 hours. This is almost 1,000 times the natural rate of extinction and the fastest rate of species loss since the demise of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. 60 per cent of the wildlife population has disappeared in the last 40 years. This loss of biodiversity has dramatic consequences on food availability and food diversity. One of the main causes of this major loss of biodiversity is the way we produce our food. Yet, the most potentially devastating impacts of industrial modes of agricultural production stem from their contribution to increased greenhouse gas emissions. Together, emissions related to our food systems represent approximatively between 44 and 57% of the total human-made gas emissions (production of fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, deforestation,

14   WWF International, Living planet report, 2016

crop production, transport, packaging and conservation of food). A major chunk of these emissions comes from large-scale monocultures and industrial animal feedlots in the global North, and from the loss of carbon sinks in the global South as land is cleared – often to make way for maize and soybean monocultures for animal feed exportation. Without real efforts towards adaptation, the populations' production capacity and livelihoods are under serious threat. Indeed, land deterioration, destruction of harvests, salinization of freshwater, reduction of both arable and pasture lands, floods and droughts increasingly more frequent and intense: the impacts of climate change will put serious strain on the four pillars of food security e.g. availability, access, stability and use. According to the International Panel of experts on Climate Change (IPCC) forecasts, every decade will see the main crop yields (wheat, rice, corn...) cut down by 2 %. Through its impact on agriculture and food security, climate change could leave an additional 600 million facing acute malnutrition by the 2080s over and above the level in a no-climate change scenario. Up to 50% of the world population could be at risk of food insecurity by 2030 and the number of stunted children could increase by 30 to 50%. The global struggle against poverty and hunger cannot be won without changing the way we are interacting with nature and addressing the issue of climate change through more attention to mitigation and adaptation. Climate change increases existing global inequalities and worsen food insecurity and dependence for much of the developing countries[15]. Climate change will also have devastating consequences on the availability and the quality of natural resources, first of which, water (for human consumption and agriculture), already strongly subject to stress. Forced displacement due to climate change can also destabilize host communities and create new tensions as competition of increasingly scarce resources intensifies.

Broken food systems

The perception of hunger being caused by a lack of food /kcal is an old conviction. After the world food crisis in 2008, the fight against hunger has been even more focused on increasing agricultural production and yields, reducing the hunger problem to a lack of food. The idea that we need to increase world agricultural production by 60% by 2050[16] has become a recurring theme, even though the figures were debunked early on. For the last 10 years, World Bank, IMF (International Monetary Fund), ADB (African development Bank), GAFSP (Global Agriculture and Food security Program) or the G7 pleaded the case for an agricultural model based on agribusiness and underlining the creation and consolidation of food systems causing severe damage to the nutrition security of future generations and the right to food of the poorest. In recent years agricultural growth poles have spread across Sub-Saharan Africa. While they have an increasingly prominent role in agricultural development strategies and national policies in the region, there is no evidence that they contribute to food and nutritional security or the fight against poverty. The promotion of agricultural growth poles is part of a broader push for African agriculture to be transformed through increased large-scale agriculture. According to the advocates of this approach, we must urgently produce more, invest more and "modernize" rather than opting for better or alternative farming practices, or working to improve the distribution and protection of food sources. Following this logic, it is vital to facilitate the entry of major private organizations and individuals mechanization, food manufacture and processing, plantations, etc., which are trapped in low growth markets in other parts of the world. The underlying belief is that small-scale producers are unable to rise to the challenge of feeding themselves, although they already provide the vast majority of food available on the continent. Over the last 20 years, world food production has risen steadily at over 2% a year, while the rate of global population growth has declined. Population is not outstripping food supply, yet at least one in nine people in our world go to bed hungry.
To feed the "kcal gap", countries have invested in staple foods and cash crops; most of the African land converted into agricultural land has been used predominantly to produce export crops, leaving African

15 See the different reports released by Action Against Hunger on climate change including « For a climate against hunger », ACF, 2017

16 FAO 2009 estimated the needed increase in world agriculture production to 70% in 2009 , revised to 60% in 2012

farmers without land to grow food staples intended for domestic consumption. They have turned away from millet, sorghum, manioc or sweet potatoes even though they are essential for families' food and nutrition security. Many African countries whose economy was traditionally based on agriculture and exporting raw materials are highly dependent on food imports. Indeed, for the past 40 years, the focus has been on improving, expanding, and increasing production to provide a level of supply that matches increasing demand (focus on staple food). African agriculture and smallholder farmers have too often been forgotten. In Haiti, for instance an Action Against Hunger report shows that, structural adjustment programs reduced customs duties on rice imports from 35% in the 1980s to 3% in 2005, which resulted in massive importation of (heavily subsidized) American rice and the devastation of local rice farmers, who figured among the first victims of the food crisis. This abandonment has also had dramatic repercussions in many African countries. The emphasis on macronutrients and calorie-protein availability has led to a severe lack of essential micronutrients in diets.

Addressing complexity instead of investing in quick fixes

The international community has committed to the principle of ending hunger around the world. However, hunger keeps killing every day. Through prevailing narratives and "solutions," the different faces of hunger continue to be disconnected from one another and from their underlying drivers, reinforcing the view that these are discrete problems to be solved by targeted actions to fill the gaps in the edifice. We believe quick fixes are not a sustainable solution and that only a holistic approach addressing the key drivers of hunger can have a long lasting effect and eradicate hunger.

Respect, promote and fulfill human rights

States should recognize the human right to adequate food and nutrition, health, clean water, sanitation and hygienic conditions, and women's and children rights, including sexual and reproductive rights, among other rights and commit to ensure that national and international policies are in line and coherent within and across sectors with their human rights obligations. Governments and intergovernmental bodies should elaborate, with the direct par-

ticipation of rights-holders, human rights compliant national and international strategies with clear goals, timelines and budget allocation, capable of tackling the root causes of hunger. These strategies should be associated with participatory mechanisms to ensure development and implementation of policies, informed by the knowledge and experience of rights-holders, and to hold governments accountable to people for their obligations and commitments. Development efforts should be people-centered and needs-based, include civil society and allow for the realization of people's rights.

The respect of Human Rights of displaced people must also be at the core of any response to displacements, regardless of their status or the causes of displacement. The priority of all responses to displacement must be put on protection and ensuring dignified reception conditions to people on the move, including access to food and water, basic services and livelihoods to guarantee they are not suffering from hunger.

In acute crisis, humanitarian responses should appropriately respond to people's needs, through adequate resources and capacity, and while respecting humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Humanitarian and longer-term assistance, especially livelihood-related, should complement each other flexibly and simultaneously. A humanitarian space, where principled humanitarian actors can access civilians in need, must be protected, as part of the efforts to transcend the humanitarian-development divide. Moreover, development support to fragile States is essential to prevent that extreme poverty, lack of access to basic services and poor governance meet with triggering factors that lead to conflicts.

Break the vicious circle of poverty

Although world leaders have increasingly spoken about the need to tackle inequalities and addressed them through the SDGs, the gap between the richest and the rest is widening year after year. To come to grips with the food crisis and chronic undernourishment, governments must base their efforts on the causes underlying these plagues: poverty, inequalities and social, economic and political exclusion and discrimination. Action Against Hunger is calling for urgent and massive action to tackle inequalities which threaten to undermine the progress made in

Action against Hunger visits a farmer in Kahn Yunis, Gaza, that benefited from a project of agricultural inputs and technical support.
© Lys Arango pour Action contre la Faim

tackling poverty during the last quarter of a century. We are calling for an increase of the quantity and quality of the ODA (official development assistance) as the recent decrease have denied governments valuable resources needed to tackle poverty and inequality. While ODA is only a small part of financial resources at country level, it remains the largest international resource flow for 43 poor countries with over 250 million people living on less than $1.25 a day. There is a need for donors to make allocative decisions according to the burden of malnutrition and ability of countries to self-finance nutrition programs.

In addition, mobilizing additional domestic resources is a priority issue. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development marks a shift in global development finance from an ODA-based model to a new global framework that emphasizes the need to rely on domestic sources of finance, with a prominent role of public resources for achieving the SDGs. We will need multi-year Humanitarian Funding, and longer-term development funding aligned with nu-

trition strategies that will last beyond the humanitarian phase. Investing in the long-term for the most nutritionally vulnerable population who are continuously exposed, will be less expensive than investing once the crises has occurred. Governments must guarantee rural populations fair access to productive resources (primarily the land, water and seeds, but also fishing and forests).

Access to basic services: the core of development priorities

Health needs to be further prioritized by national donors and development aid. Worrying trends suggest a decrease of development aid for health, which is not matched by an increase of developing countries public health expenditures. In the meantime and due to this neglect, millions of women and children die from easily preventable causes every year. Health remains overlooked politically in many countries, and so is nutrition. For instance, many countries do not train their health workers on identifying and managing malnutrition. Some nutrition services such as treatment of severe acute malnutrition remain unavailable. Health centers are chronically out of stock of the lifesaving products and medicines needed. Governments should make the reinforcement of access to quality health services a top priority, with a specific focus on mainstreaming of nutrition throughout health systems, and addressing the much overlooked issue of acute malnutrition.

Similarly, **access to water**, sanitation and hygiene are human rights, yet around 1.8 billion people globally use a source of drinking water that is fecally contaminated and 2.4 billion people lack access to basic sanitation services. Water and sanitation related diseases remain among the major causes of death in children under five and WHO considers that 50% of undernutrition is associated with infections due to inadequate WASH. States have engaged to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all by 2030, in line with Sustainable Development Goal number 6.

Women, youth and children first

Women account for 70% of the world's hungry and are disproportionately affected by malnutrition and food insecurity[17]. Women's economic empowerment is crucial to achieving gender equality and the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Institutionalized gender discrimination and violence still impose barriers that prevent women from enjoying their economic, social and cultural rights and specifically the right to adequate food and nutrition, and the status of women and girls has not substantially improved, despite recurrent calls for the inclusion of a gender perspective to development programs and to social policies.

The world must acknowledge the key role women play in agriculture and the potential that they have to change the world, if afforded access to the same resources as men. Equality for female farmers is not just about empowering women - it's about ending hunger and poverty. Unequal pay and discrimination must be eradicated in every economic sector, and women must be represented in leadership roles at every level. In the formal sector, governments must not only provide protection in hiring, maternity, and wage situations, but must also ensure that women's organizations are given full representation. Businesses must support women's enterprises and women as role models in their own organizations. Gender equality will never be achieved while women have fewer economic rights, less control over economic resources, and less access to economic opportunities, than men. It is, fundamentally, an issue of social and economic justice. The empowerment of women and the protection of their rights should be placed at the center of the right to food policy-making process and should not be limited to rural areas, but should also be extended to urban women, as well as women from indigenous communities, those living in refugee camps, undocumented migrants, and ethnic, racial and religious minorities.

Invest in conflict prevention

People living in areas of conflicts are suffering from the conduct of hostilities until they even starve. The four countries on the brink of famine (Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen) also highlight the dramatic consequences of conflicts on hunger. Conflict in all four countries, compounded by drought in the case of Somalia, has created a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions, the worst since 1945. In many places (as also in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq or Palestine), access constraints, often linked to security issues, prevent aid delivery. During conflicts, the more the conduct of hostilities is illegal, the more imminent the famine is.

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17   See (A/HRC/16/40) Study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on discrimination in the context of the right to food, para 29.

Active in all four pre-famines countries through emergency response and mid-long term multi sectorial programming, ACF faces fundamental challenges of humanitarian access, respect of the International Humanitarian Law and protection of civilians. As highlighted for the first time by the 9 August 2017 UN Security Council's presidential statement on the four pre-famines, we are convinced for a long time that conflicts are a major cause of hunger.

To put an end to the vicious circle between hunger and conflicts, we call for the creation of an early warning system that combines food indicators and a humanitarian access indicator. We believe that this kind of tool will reinforce the political will to act of the political decision-makers. We urge the UN Security Council to take immediate actions in all conflicts where certain thresholds of hunger and access constraints are crossed. Finally, we urge the States and the International Community to act, by direct actions and diplomatic dialogue, for the protection of civilians during conflicts, to ensure the humanitarian access to the most vulnerable population and to address the root causes of hunger.

Change the way we produce and share food

Small farmers, breeders and fishermen produce around 70% of the global food production. They are also the first to suffer the impacts of climate change and should receive a particular attention from adaptation policies and finance. Despite the rapid urbanization, agriculture still employs up to two-thirds of the workforce. Evidence has shown that growth in agriculture is up to 11 times more effective in reducing poverty than growth in any other sector. If we want to end poverty and hunger by 2030, **family farming needs to be right at the heart of the strategy**. All agricultural models are not equal when it comes to food security, preserving diversity, creating jobs and reducing green gas emission. Protecting biodiversity, adapting to climate change, and reversing the degradation of ecosystems, have been treated as challenges that sit alongside the primary goal of achieving food and nutrition security, as if they were not all inextricably connected.

We are calling for an **urgent re-foundation of our food systems**. Our vision is of a future in which our resilient food and farming system works within the finite limits of our earth and for the benefit of all; protects and regenerates natural resources and communities; builds soil; cools our planet and preserves our rich inheritance of agricultural biodiversity. **We need a paradigm shift toward diversified agro ecological systems as the key to address the negative environmental and social impacts of our food systems.** Diversified, agro ecological systems refer to a model based on diversifying farms and farming landscapes, replacing chemical inputs with organic matter, optimizing biodiversity, and stimulating interactions between different species, as part of holistic strategies to build long-term fertility, healthy agro-ecosystems, and secure livelihoods. Action Against Hunger call government to support and promote agro-ecology as this approach has the potential to deliver strong and stable yields, health-promoting food and farming systems, environmental resilience, and secure farming livelihoods.

How is Action Against Hunger accompanying the necessary agricultural transition

The mandate of Action Against Hunger is to eradicate hunger in a global, lasting and effective way worldwide. To fulfil its mandate in the field, Action Against Hunger mobilizes different types of operational activities, including on Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) interventions. As Action Against Hunger operates in countries where the agricultural sector is predominant and essential for the local economy, agricultural programs constitute a major part of Action Against Hunger FSL activities. Their overarching goal is to allow populations to meet their own food needs either through self-production and/or by increasing incomes by boosting sustainable agriculture. Action Against Hunger strategy for agricultural interventions aims to increase populations' resilience to food crises, to prevent under-nutrition during and after emergency situations and to permit an access to a diversified diet. It is also promoting advocacy in favor of family farming. Action Against Hunger promotes an agriculture model that is nutrition-sensitive, through numerous actions on the ground that directly target small-scale farmers and producer organizations, as well as through advocacy for change of regional and national policy frameworks. One such model is agro-ecology. The agro-ecology model favors a territorial approach based on the development and appreciation of natural resources, on the investments in favor of smallholder farming, building on existing indigenous knowledge and making the most of local capacities. This model promotes the sustainable intensification of the agriculture production, through various set of techniques and practices, such as conservation agriculture, agro-forestry, and organic farming among others, to be adopted and adapted according to specific contexts. The performance of the agro-ecology model already appears quite interesting: it reaches good yielding, it has positive impacts on the food diversity and reduction of undernutrition and it preserves environmental assets. This model appears particularly relevant to small-scale farmers and most food insecure food producers, particularly in regions where household food security originates primarily from their own production. Moreover, agro-ecology still has some unexplored but promising potentials, as it has not benefited yet from substantial public investments and research programs. Action Against Hunger supports agro-ecology because Action Against Hunger considers agro-ecology as the best agricultural approach to achieve food and nutrition security at household level, particularly for the most vulnerable populations. In addition, agro-ecology has the potential to meet the challenges of feeding the growing and urbanized world population. Action Against Hunger expertise in agriculture covers a large range of activities, including crop and animal production (livestock and fishery) and development of agricultural value chains, so as to ensure that populations at risk of being food insecure will become able to access nutritious diet.

A market in a slum of Freetown, Sierra Leone
© Samuel Hauenstein Swan pour Action contre la Faim.

Biodiversity loss - especially loss of diversity within crops and some animal species - is in itself an important cause of malnutrition. **Agro-biodiversity and community capacity building are key drivers of dietary diversity and nutritional wellbeing**. Agro-biodiversity and the development of new plant varieties need to build on traditional methods and approaches that protect native seeds rather than engaging in forms of genetic modification that may present grave consequences for biodiversity and food sovereignty. Farmers must also be protected against the contamination risks that GM crops might cause to conventional varieties and the associated contamination with agrochemicals. We cannot eradicate hunger if we do not ensure sustainability. In that sense, the baseline of any agriculture and food policies should be the "do no harm" principle to human health. Governments have a strong role to play in reshaping the food system by ensuring that food and agriculture policies and investment lead to improved nutritional and health outcomes for all. Donors, states should fully embrace the "do no harm" principle as the baseline of any agricultural and food policy and ensure that these policies at a minimum do not harm people's nutrition. In this context, it is necessary to reaffirm the centrality of small-scale and family food producers as the key actors and drivers of local food systems and the main investors in agriculture. Their secure access to, and control over, pro-

ductive assets such as land, water, seeds, technical and financial resources, and social protection, particularly for women, is essential for a diversified diet and adequate nutrition.

Governments must invest in climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. They need to speed up and direct the low carbon transition, for example by investing in low carbon energy / renewable energy and halt investment in bio-fuel. With the international agreements largely set for a goal of reducing CO2 emission, energy policies must adapt both in terms of quantity and quality. They need to implement the Paris Agreement and build up the ambition. The scale of the challenge is unprecedented, but this is the only way to build a sustainable future, free of hunger. Hence, while big corporations are indeed in a position to contribute to food security thanks to their great investment capacity, but also their position in most food chains, this is not likely to happen without certain changes. When the net profit of a company is worth the double of a country's GDP, not to speak about the annual budget of a small farmer organization, those power asymmetries cannot be ignored and must be considered in the way discussions are organized and decisions taken. Such platforms should also make progresses towards, stronger accountability and increased transparency.

Part 2: **Hunger and Conflict**

Conflict and Hunger: Breaking a Vicious Circle. A joint initiative by Switzerland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Ariadna Pop[1]

Switzerland and the Netherlands, in their respective roles as Chairs of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians and on Food Security, decided to launch a series of workshops to better understand the nature of the relationship between conflict and hunger and to identify recommendations for potential courses of action that the international community could take to address and prevent hunger. The discussions took place in New York (co-organised by Switzerland, the Netherlands and the International Peace Institute), Rome (co-organised by the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, WFP and FAO) and Geneva (co-organised by Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute) and culminated with the presentation of a final report in New York in December 2017.

Interlinkages between Conflict and Hunger

Hunger is on the rise again. In early 2017, the UN Secretary-General informed the international community about the devastating levels of food insecurity in South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia as well as northeast Nigeria. A formal declaration of famine in parts of South Sudan followed.

It is not a coincidence that all of these countries or regions were also ravaged by armed conflict. On the contrary: as is generally acknowledged[2], conflict is a key driver for situations of severe food insecurity and famine. Conflict and hunger reinforce each other and form a vicious circle that is exceedingly difficult to break.

Thankfully, famine was averted or reverted in all four contexts, owing in part to the early ringing of alarm bells and a swift humanitarian response. But the outlook remains bleak, with estimates predicting a further deterioration in food security, in particular chronic malnutrition, in areas affected by drought[3].

In response to these developments and the recognition of the interlinkages between conflict and hunger, Switzerland and the Netherlands, in their respective roles as Chairs of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians and on Food Security, decided to launch a series of workshops to better understand the nature of the relationship between conflict and hunger and to identify recommendations for potential courses of action that the international community could take to address and prevent hunger.

The objective of this article is to introduce the initiative and summarize its key outcomes.

Three Workshops

The first workshop took place in March 2017 in New York. It examined how and to what extent conflict exacerbates hunger and emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach that includes broader discussions around humanitarian access, the protection of civilians, and compliance with international humanitarian law.

The New York event was also an occasion to discuss how existing normative and policy frameworks can be leveraged to protect people's lives and livelihoods. The participants therefore looked at the extent to which the Security Council could or should play a role in achieving this.

The second workshop took place in October 2017 in Rome and reviewed the evidence of the links between conflict and food security. It also looked at the operational experience in preventing and responding to conflict-driven hunger and explored the relationship between food security and stability, particularly in post-conflict recovery.

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1   1st Secretary, Multilateral Division, Humanitarian Affairs, Swiss Mission to the UN and to the other international organizations in Geneva.

2   See, for example, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2017), The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Rome: FAO.

3   See, for example, Food Security Information Network (2017), Global Report on Food Crises.

The operational experience highlighted the obstacles humanitarian agencies face, such as lack of access. At the same time, there was a shared understanding that it is often a combination of factors that lead to hunger: land disputes, water shortages, weak institutions and pre-existing malnutrition can be contributing factors as well.

HOW DOES CONFLICT AFFECT FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION?

KEY MESSAGES:

→ The adverse impacts of conflict on food security and nutrition are unambiguous and well-documented.

→ How conflict affects food security and nutrition is highly dependent on context.

→ Conflict tends to create multiple compounding impacts, direct and indirect, which flow through a variety of channels.

→ Conflict can cause deep economic recessions, drive up inflation, disrupt employment and erode finances for social protection and health care, to the detriment of the availability and access of food in markets and so damaging health and nutrition.

→ The impact on food systems can be severe if the economy and people's livelihoods rely significantly on agriculture, as the effects can be felt across the food-value chain, including production, harvesting, processing, transportation, financing and marketing.

→ Conflict undermines resilience and often forces individuals and households to engage in increasingly destructive and irreversible coping strategies that threaten their future livelihoods, food security and nutrition.

Source: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2017. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security, p. 39.

Finally, the Rome participants acknowledged that although the interest in the topic of conflict and hunger has increased sharply in recent months, the current crises represent a challenge to the architecture that was put in place in 1945: The UN specifically, and the humanitarian system more broadly, cannot respond to these crises alone. There is need for a comprehensive approach that includes the support of member states, civil society and the private sector.

The third and last workshop took place in November 2017 in Geneva, where the organizers decided to focus on the dimension of prevention—that is, on the kinds of norms and policies that States should put in place to mitigate the negative impact of conflict on food security. Given that Geneva is not only the humanitarian, but also the human rights capital of the world, the aim of the workshop was to bring these two communities closer together, thereby leveraging their specific expertise.

Accordingly, the Geneva event examined, on the one hand, the existing normative framework in both International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law. On the other hand, the participants sought to better understand the contexts in which prevention policies have been effective in mitigating the consequences of conflict on food security and where they have been inadequate or failed altogether.

Another topic that received significant attention in Geneva concerned the so-called humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Participants had diverging views on whether the nexus was helpful as a lens to analyze and a modus operandi through which to potentially resolve the issue of conflict and hunger. More specifically, the question was raised whether the nexus was pulling in different directions (political, humanitarian, security, development) and whether it can be expected that every organization do everything for everybody. Arguably, responding to acute malnutrition requires a different skill set than negotiating peace. Additional concerns were raised regarding migration and forced displacement. In particular, it was deplored that the situation of IDPs was absent from the nexus debate.

The three3 articles that follow, both of them written by participants in the event in Geneva, are a reflection of these discussions.

Ambassador Zellweger opening the Geneva Chapter of the Conflict&Hunger series
Photo: Ariadna Pop

Final Report and Recommendations

The "Conflict and Hunger" workshop series was formally brought to a close in December 2017 in New York with the presentation of a final report. The report acknowledges that although the current legal frameworks are broadly adequate to limit the adverse impact of conflict on hunger, there is a systematic failure to comply with the relevant norms and rules. In other words: it is not the lack of such norms and rules that represents the greatest challenge in combating hunger, but it is the deficiencies in compliance and accountability that aggravate situations of food insecurity, particularly in situations of conflict.

The report also establishes that in order to mitigate the negative impacts of conflict on food security and establish sustainable and resilient food systems, the international community must act in a coordinated, comprehensive and multi-disciplinary manner. Relatedly, the report demands that the international community build on existing mechanisms and initiatives, such as the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) mechanism or the Appeal of June 13th, while looking for innovative ways to respond to the immediate and long-term needs of communities affected by conflict and hunger.

The report concludes by making recommendations to the UN Security Council, to the UN Member States and to the UN System and relevant organizations.

Thus, the report asks the UN Security Council, for example, to include in existing reporting mechanisms information on worrying levels of food insecurity as well as diminishing levels of access for operational agencies on the ground as early warning indicators for hunger. Moreover, it recommends to step-up efforts to address the interlinkages between conflict and hunger and to provide a concrete framework of action, possibly with a corresponding Security Council resolution. Finally, it recommends strengthening the links with the Human Rights Council through regular briefings by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, focusing on conflict prevention and hunger. This last recommendation addresses a central outcome of the Geneva event, namely, to ensure that the humanitarian and human rights community work closer together and share relevant data.

When it comes to UN Member States, the report reminds them that they are not only obliged to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law, including rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access. States must also ensure that national legislation provides an adequate framework to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to adequate food both in times of peace and in situations of conflict.

Finally, the report recommends that the UN system and relevant actors provide further evidence-based analysis on how conflict can exacerbate situations of food insecurity and vice versa; that they make investments in rural development and agriculture, natural resource management and social protection; that they explore innovative ways of funding models such as forecast-based financing and that they strengthen collaboration between humanitarian, human rights, development and peacebuilding actors as well as the private sector and civil society.

The Way Ahead

In Geneva, the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced that the outcome of the workshop series shall be used to table a resolution in the UN Security Council in 2018. Additionally, both Switzerland and the Netherlands committed themselves to seize opportunities for action both on the ground and at the policy level in line with the following three pathways:

• Prevent food insecurity as resulting from or contributing to conflict.
• Ensure compliance and accountability regarding the relevant legal frameworks.
• Develop a comprehensive and coordinated operational response to situations of severe food insecurity or famine.

In this way, Switzerland and the Netherlands not only hope to contribute to the efforts of keeping famine at bay. They also hope to contribute to the reduction of food insecurity and malnutrition more broadly. As the UN Secretary General recently put it, the international community has a responsibility to help people not just to survive, but also to thrive. By having shed light on the interlinkages between conflict and hunger, Switzerland and the Netherlands endeavored to do precisely that: they garnered the momentum and mobilized the international community to do their utmost possible to reduce the suffering of those 815 million people who still go to bed hungry every day.

A Glimpse into Hunger, Malnutrition and Conflict from the Human Right to Food and Nutrition Perspective

Emily Mattheisen[1] and Ana María Suárez Franco[2]

According to the Report of the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs issued in March 2017 to the Security Council, the world is experiencing the largest humanitarian crisis since the creation of the UN. Similarly, the 2017 "State of Food Insecurity and Nutrition in the World" report poses conflict as one of the major causes of the 795 millions of people suffering hunger and malnutrition worldwide and highlights that hunger in protracted crisis is three times higher than in other developing countries.[3] In her most recent Report to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Ms. Hilal Elver, calls attention to the devastating forms of food insecurity and famine in northeast Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. According to the Global Report on Food Crises 2017, currently 70 Million people in 45 Countries require emergency food assistance, mostly in situations of protracted crisis or post-conflict, which is a 40% increase since 2015.[4]

The Special Rapporteur highlights that this problem is underpinned by the lack of political will for implementation of existing regulatory standards, and the need for accountability mechanisms for violations and abuses of the right to food and nutrition of civilians in the context of conflict. There is also the need to consider famine as a multi-causal phenomena, which does not exclusively depend on conflict or other disasters, but also derives from political decisions and actions which contradict existing human rights obligations of states.

The public debate on hunger, in particular within the humanitarian sector, tends to focus on how conflict contributes to hunger and malnutrition, or explicitly focusing on situations once they have evolved into famine. However, this ignores the root causes of the issue, and the social, political and economic context in which people starve. While the questions of how situations of food insecurity and violations of the Right to Food and Nutrition (RtFN) contribute to conflict are not tackled.

When looking from the human rights perspective, addressing situations of hunger without examining the root causes only, tackles the symptom of the issues, and avoids the structural causes of conflict and the needed measures for prevention, including the ever-present outcomes of hunger and malnutrition. This article seeks to provide some ideas on the benefits of utilizing a human rights lens when addressing situations of conflict and hunger, and offers some recommendations on the way forward, building on the recent report of the Special Rapporteur.

How does hunger contribute to conflicts?

Human rights analysis requires first to ask how violations of the Right to Food and Nutrition contribute to conflict. The right to Food encompasses not only having physical and economic access to food, but also access to resources to produce food (land, seeds, water, coastal areas, etc.). According to FIAN's experience in supporting communities, the deprivation of natural resources, the destruction of livelihoods, forced evictions, contamination of crops through agro-toxics, inadequacy of support for food production, marginalization of traditional food systems, lack of a dignified income etc. breaches the social cohesion of communities, and creates fertile soil for violence or exacerbating existing conflicts. Together with other factors, such as abuses of power, lack of participation and repression, and the absence of the state in marginal regions of a country, hunger and malnutrition contributes to conflict and migration, both within the country and externally.

This situation is illustrated through one of the cases FIAN has supported, which is the Community Council Palenque Monte Oscuro, in the south-west

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1 Emily Mattheisen: Secretariat of the Global Network of the Right to Food and Nutrition and Program Officer on Monitoring and Accountability of FIAN International

2 Ana María Suarez Franco: Permanent Representative of FIAN International in Geneva and Accountability Coordinator.

3 http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/

4 http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/72/188

of Colombia[5]. Summarizing the situation, this Afro-Colombian community used to have access to their land and produced the needed food to feed themselves collectively. According to the testimonies of the women of the Council, prior to the influx of interest in land to produce sugarcane for agro fuels entered the region, the communities used to produce their food and exchange products with neighbouring communities; mothers used to work the small farms and the men worked the plantations or livestock to preserve the family, joining forces with other families for collective food production. In cases of climate contingencies or years with low crop yields, the families would share available food and support each other and they lived in relative peace. Once the pressure for the land became stronger and the prices increased, the families proceed to sell their plots, hoping for a better life, nonetheless, when moving to the closest city, Puerto Tejada, the situation for many families was not positive. The money received from the land sale was quickly used to buy new houses or to cover primary needs. In order to access food and basic needs, many women had to go to the next bigger city, Cali, to become domestic workers under unfair conditions, while the men were employed under precarious jobs in the sugar cane plantations.

This disruption of their social system created more concurrence and conflict in the community. Their own food system was dismantled. The family division let the children and elderly unattended and the environmental detriment caused by the cane plantations damaged community spaces. In these circumstances of poverty and broken social nets, children became easy targets to be enrolled in the armed groups, while others migrated or were used as "tools" for the war as they became entangled in the informal drug business to cover their basic needs. According to the testimonies of the communities this situation contributed to Puerto Tejada to be the second most violent municipality in Colombia at the time of FIAN's visit in 2012. Although the multi-faceted situation of the conflict in Colombia does not allow to attribute the conflict only to the described situation, the food insecurity and lack of food sovereignty faced by the community contributed to escalation of the conflict for this specific population, with consequences which are very difficult to redress and repair.

Famine relief «from Africa for Africa»
Foto: Manuel Flury

From a human rights approach, state's compliance with its obligations derived from the human right to food and nutrition of the community, protecting them from the sugar business and protecting their tenure of land would have prevented from the escalation of violence and conflict in the region, and secured human dignity and the fundamental rights for the community in question.

Why does conflict produce hunger?

Undertaking a human rights analysis on how conflict produces hunger requires addressing the whole food system, and not just the nutritional dimension of the right to food; similarly, a narrow focus only of famine and starvation further limits the ability to understand the depth of the issue. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, in her previously mentioned report[6] presents an interesting analysis, summarized in the following paragraphs:

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5   For more information, see FIAN's website: http://www.fian.org/library/publication/colombian_afro_descendant_peasant_women_make_demands_to_un_committee/

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6   http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/72/188

The Rapporteur highlights that the most affected populations are rural people, including peasants, fishers, pastoralists, and rural workers. They are affected by the destruction of their livelihoods, through damage to the resources needed to produce food, forced displacement, disruption of agricultural activities, hunting which allows access to protein, and the use of food as a weapon. This is exacerbated by inadequate food assistance, including inconsistent aid, or culturally inadequate food, which creates health problems in the communities, due to the lack of assimilation of nutrients.

In many situations conflict also undermines communities' coping capacities through the interruption of cash social security transfers, prosecution of identifiable groups or collectives on political, ethnic, racial cultural, religious, gender or other grounds recognized as impermissible in international law, in contradiction to the obligation of non-discrimination. Other ways in which the right to food is violated in conflict is through the unjustified destruction of property or its appropriation, the breakdown of social support systems, weakening resilience capacity for other causes of hunger, exacerbating existing inequalities, food blockades, land mines, lack of access to food sources and to markets to buy or to sell food, provision of food which is not nutritious or culturally acceptable.

The pressure for land of displaced people during the conflict impedes return to productive activities or makes return highly risky prolonging the incapacity of the communities to feed themselves. In other cases, the pressure for food for armed forces puts civil populations in danger, food producers are recruited or conscripted by armed forces, crops are destroyed, animals killed or water provision is interrupted. Food for animals and or veterinary attention can also be interrupted, what destroys main or additional sources of animal protein or crops are fumigated affecting the food safety and the health of the communities obliging them to migrate. This food insecurity contributes to political unrest, creating a vicious circle of hunger and conflict and escalating the situations.

Even if the rural areas in some cases suffer more, because they lose their capacity to feed themselves through food production and market access, economic deterioration affects both rural and urban populations through increased food prices due to scarcity, inflation and speculation which reduces purchasing power. Furthermore, conflict destructs social nets, salary payments and mobility for work. There are also often restrictions of humanitarian assistance, obstruction of food delivery, reduction of states authorities to coordinate actions, and difficulties for authorities to support the affected communities. This situation especially affects generations of those children and young people who are condemned to poverty and lack opportunities of education and capacity building to assure their future, creating long-term cycles of poverty.

What are the problems with aid based solutions?

In cases of emergency, humanitarian aid is a fundamental part to ensure communities have access to basic needs - in particular food, health care, and shelter; these life-saving interventions are fundamental to ensuring the survival of communities. However, as many of us know, conflict and crisis are rarely short-term issues; they have deep roots and long impacts. And while these mechanisms of humanitarian and emergency aid are important that offer needed assistance in times of conflict or crisis, they are not sufficient to address long-term or protracted crisis. Some humanitarian responses, such as food aid, which are important in emergency and short-term contexts, when implemented over long term periods, can negatively impact existing food production at national level, as well as negatively impact food culture and practices, as well as nutritional status. Though this attention to the "symptoms" of conflict can be pertinent in the short term, they do not provide a long-term strategy, which supports the affected communities in recovering their autonomy and living life in dignity, through own food production (where appropriate) or opportunities for income and livelihoods, but rather create dependency and a lack of agency in generating solutions, including methods of aid delivery. In some cases, belated humanitarian aid or political pressure results in serious health crisis in the communities, starvation and death. In fact, and according to the report of the Special Rapporteur, currently international funds are not able to cover the current aid needs, and there is a serious insufficiency of the global humanitarian architecture.

As stated by the Special Rapporteur, due to the "selective" approach by donors and the lack of a geopolitical analysis which determines a strategy to overcome the systematic violations of the right to food in the critical areas, donor based aid has left some countries abandoned or has imposed conditions by the interests of the donors.

In order to avoid the private donors' selectiveness and to ensure that states are not marginalized from the compliance of their international obligations to the right to food, even in conflict, it is necessary to reiterate the importance to keep the primary responsibility of states in the realization of the right to food and nutrition - both within and outside of borders. In order to accomplish this, it is fundamental to strengthen states ability to act, rather than fully re-placing services and interventions by private actors. In doing so, States' assistance should consider to go beyond standard forms of aid, and focus simultaneously on the integral implementation of the right to food and nutrition and its various dimensions.

Why the Human Right to Food?

From a legal analysis, - excluding sociological, cultural and economic considerations-, to face hunger and conflict from a human rights perspective, includes recognizing that States have clear obligations derived from the human right to food and nutrition in all times of peace and war, and that the people are human rights holders, able to claim their rights vis à vis such authorities and hold them accountable. Under a human rights approach people cannot just be considered as passive recipients of aid. A human rights perspective implies also putting the most marginalized into the centre and to consider human dignity as the aim of every public policy or decision, over for instance, profit and economic development. The human right to food has been recognized in a number international binding instruments, including the article 25 of the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (1966).

Furthermore, the right to food has been a fundamental pillar of soft law standards which guide states on how to comply with their international obligations under this right. Some of the most relevant are the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (FAO 2004), the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fishers and Forests (Committee on World Food Security, 2012), and the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (FAO 2015). More specifically, the Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crisis (Committee on World Food Security, 2015), in short FFA, provides relevant rules and guidance connecting the right to food, humanitarian and criminal law in order to guide states in the compliance of their obligations derived from the right to food in situations of protracted conflicts.

Offering aliments on a local market in Ethiopia
Foto: Manuel Flury

According to the existing legal standards, and specifically General Comment 12 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the body in charge to interpret the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), states have the general obligation to use as soon as possible the maximum of available resources for the progressive realization of the right to food, the obligation of non-discrimination and the obligation of international cooperation. Furthermore, the states have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food. The legal elements of the right to food are adequacy, availability access and sustainability. State obligations apply to each of these elements.

From our institutional perspective, an evolved concept of the right to food, to be effective facing the current challenges of society, should also recognize the relevance of women's right to food and nutrition, the relevance of food sovereignty for the realization of the right to food, and the extraterritorial obligations of states under this right.

How do the existing human rights standards serve to tackle hunger and malnutrition and conflict?

The human right to food standards obligations under article 11 of ICESCR can be applied to avoid discrimination in the distribution of food aid. The obligation to respect should serve to hold governments accountable for blockades or destruction of natural resources needed to produce food. Under the obligation to protect states are obliged to adopt all necessary measures to avoid violations of the right to

food caused by the armed parties of the conflict or to impede private actors using the conflict situation to get advantage, for instance, from speculation of food products or land grabbing. The obligation to fulfil obliges states to ensure at least the minimum essential levels required for the realization of the right to food of the communities and populations.

The "Right to Food Guidelines" provide standards regarding the access to natural resources for people to feed themselves (Guideline 8), a critical preventive measure to prevent conflict. Furthermore, in Guideline 15 they reiterate that food shall not be used as instrument for political and economic pressure in situations of armed conflict and occupation. It establishes that food aid supports efforts by recipients' states to achieve food security and assistance should provide safe food (which means food which does not contain adverse organic or chemical components). The same guideline provides that food aid should not disrupt food production neither the dietary cultures of the affected communities. It recommends states to develop clear strategies to avoid dependency on food aid and to promote the use of local and regional commercial markets in famine prone situations to avoid dependency. Additionally, Guideline 15 puts the affected communities at the centre when recommending the participation of the national and local recipient governments in the definition of food assistance.

The Framework for Action focuses on protracted crisis, those who tend to be in some of the worst situations of hunger and malnutrition. This document has the objective to improve the conditions of populations at risk or affected by protracted crisis (including a prevention aspect), to build resilience and adapt to specific challenges faced. The FFA is based on principles, including meeting immediate humanitarian aid, building resilient livelihoods, women and gender equality, strengthening country ownership, participation, coordination, accountability, contributing to resolve underlying causes and peace building trough food security and nutrition. One of the added values of the FFA is its strong human rights and humanitarian framework combining needed short term interventions and long term strategies and clarifying the importance of implementing a human rights framework.

How does the right to food relate to other applicable law in conflict?

Though applicable norms of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, applicable to food provision, can be useful to prevent famine, according to the experience they are quite restrictive when dealing with the prevention of hunger, malnutrition, famine and starvation in conflict. On the contrary, existing international human rights standards provide a more holistic regulatory framework. In fact, international human rights law is functional to tackle the causes of hunger during protracted crisis and to prevent social conflicts leading to war.

We are aware that in the past there was an interpretation affirming that human rights would just be applicable in times of peace, and during times of war humanitarian law would be applicable. However, this restrictive interpretation has been discussed by diverse human rights bodies, which have affirmed the simultaneous applicability of humanitarian law and human rights in conflict, including the General Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee and the General Comments 3, 14 and 15 on essential levels of rights of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

In the opinion of the authors, human rights law, international humanitarian law and International Criminal Law should be applied as interdependent and interrelated - in the way they address hunger, malnutrition, famine and starvation in conflict. In this sense, human rights law should serve as a bigger umbrella applicable both in times of conflict and peace, with the aim to prevent conflict and its consequences with regard to food security and food sovereignty. In this context, humanitarian law would simultaneously apply in situations of conflict, preventing further violations to the right to food of the civilian population in the very specific situations foreseen in respective laws; while international criminal focuses on holding perpetrators accountable for famine and starvation in conflict, an application which has yet to be effectively applied.

Which steps could inform the way ahead?

It is fundamental that the concept of food sovereignty be included in the debates on hunger and malnutrition in conflict. In order to realize their right to food, communities need to be able to have decision-making power over their own food systems, as both a measure to mitigate and prevent conflict, as well as rights to land and resources for those migrant and refugee populations that are able to return home. Food sovereignty can also improve the quality of diets of urban and rural populations, as it reinforces local food system development and addresses the food system - from production to consumption.

One of the main issues to be tackled is the lack of accountability for right to food violations which manifest in hunger, malnutrition, famine or even starvation during the conflicts. How to improve the effectiveness on the existing mechanisms and, if needed, create new mechanisms is still a pending task. What is clear is that the current standards are still insufficient and that better bridges among the existing regulatory frameworks is needed, attending to the evolving character of human rights and in general of international law and taking as basis the primacy of human rights.

It is also imminent to continue evolving international human rights law with regards to the extraterritorial obligations of states with regards to food aid. Furthermore, remedy mechanisms in the states where harmful decisions are taken are ineffective or non-existent should be improved. The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States can be a good point of departure for more detailed analysis of such obligations.

There is a need to also recognize the central role of the Committee on Food Security (CFS), the main body dealing with Food and Nutrition. It has the UN charter as bases of its obligations, creates bridges across UN systems and agencies, and has a well-organized, representative and autonomous mechanism for civil society engagement, led by those constituencies most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition. Unfortunately, CFS decisions are not fully implemented or discussed at national level, and are not yet considered with the same weight as those from the Geneva institutions. It is fundamental to create stronger links between the decisions taken in the CFS and the accountability mechanisms in Geneva, something which civil society is actively working on.

States should use the opportunity of the CFS monitoring process in 2020, which will address the use and implementation of the FFA. This monitoring process of the CFS is still underdevelopment, but will include examining the policy coherence of states in order to make an updated assessment of the situation and adopt the needed corrective measures, especially those in protracted crisis and those which cooperate with them. The results of this monitoring exercise should be communicated to the UN Security Council and UN specialized agencies.

Critical analysis of donors/ development partners must be undertaken by the CFS, to ensure that aid is addressed where most needed, according to national priorities and human rights obligations. It must do so while not exacerbating crises, food insecurity and import dependency and not circumventing or supplanting national institutions, markets or production capacities, in line with extraterritorial human rights obligations of states under the right to food.

It is urgent for the international community to adopt effective, strong and binding mechanisms to hold transnational companies and other business enterprises liable when these are complicit with armed parties or making profit out of conflicts producing hunger and malnutrition. One of the biggest challenges is how to hold liable controlling companies located in other countries different to the one in which the conflict takes place, but make profit of the abusive activities of their filial, suppliers or controlled companies. In this aspect, we welcome the proposal by some members of the Treaty Alliance to include a chapter on Conflict in the treaty to be adopted as result of the current Human Rights Council negotiations towards a Binding Instrument on Transnational Companies and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights.

Last, but the most important, we highlight the importance to give particular attention to the voices, rights and needs of communities living in the most affected territories (women, refugees, IDP, indigenous, peasants, unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities, etc.) in the debates on hunger and conflict.

War-Related Hunger and the Risk of Famine in Today's Armed Conflicts: Next Steps for Policy Makers

Hugo Slim[1]

The deadly connection between hunger, famine and armed conflict has been made real again for many millions of people enduring today's armed conflicts. At the level of global policy, several States are now considering conflict-related hunger and famine as a threat to international peace and security, and so worthy of more specific policy-making by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The purpose of this paper is to bring clearer intellectual focus to the pressing subject of conflict-related hunger. It looks first at what the humanitarian policy community already knows - or should know - about hunger, famine and its close relationship with armed conflict. It then examines the important question of intent in the emergence of war-related hunger before summarizing some key points arising from the Workshop on Conflict and Hunger organized by the Netherlands and Switzerland in cooperation with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) and the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) in Geneva on the 1st of November 2017.

A short (and largely western) intellectual history of famine

International humanitarian action has focused hard in 2017 on "the four famines" which the UN appealed to States to prevent in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria. We have seen again the hollowed out faces, pointed bones and flapping skin that have been the iconic visual cues for starvation in the western imagination since the thousands of living skeletons were discovered at Belsen concentration camp in March 1945.

It was at Belsen that Allied medics struggled for the first time to apply modern medical science to the treatment of extreme malnutrition. They began to learn – by tragic trial and error – how best to cure starvation. They learnt fast that hunger and disease work closely together as co-killers. Infectious diseases, respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases and organ failure are what kill you, rather than hunger itself.

In the decades that followed the widespread starvation of World War Two, famine was increasingly understood as an inter-disciplinary problem and certainly not the particular problem of nutritionists. But, while famine was recognized as a complex phenomenon of multiple causation, two particular factors remained stubbornly persistent in analysis of the great majority of famines: war and repression.

Where there was famine or intense food insecurity, there was usually armed conflict and political repression too.

The seminal work in the modern understanding of famine and hunger was Amartya Sen's Poverty and Famines in 1981[2]. Working as an economist, Sen studied the Bengal famine of 1943 brought on by British wartime policies which killed around 2 million people. Sen's analysis introduced two key concepts – entitlement and deprivation – which argued against popular imagination that hunger and famine are not caused by lack of food supply because of poor rainfall or harvest failures. Instead, he argued that food and surpluses are usually available somewhere but poor people cannot access them because of deliberate or unthinking government policies.

From Sen's work developed the important "food economy" approach to famine prevention which was taken up rapidly by pioneering humanitarian workers like John Seaman and Julius Holt at Save the Children working closely with the Ethiopian government, the World Food Programme, the UK government, other African governments and US AID throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The food economy approach developed "early warning" programmes which looked broadly at a basket of market prices for assets and essential consumables alongside climatic conditions, crop yields, agricultural policies

and political conditions. Today's FEWS NET whose global early warning system mixes satellite imagery with "ground-truthing" of socio-economic data has its origins in 1985. So too does the Ethiopian government's national Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) which is credited with saving many thousands of lives in 2011 – the same drought year when famine killed 250,000 people in the Somalia conflict[3]. The next game-changing research on famine after Sen was Alex de Waal's Famine That Kills, which was a real-time study of famine in Darfur in 1985 and focused on hungry people's interactions with the then nascent international humanitarian system that is the norm today[4]. De Waal's work consolidated Sen's core thesis but emphasized the risks of destitution and ill health that are so dangerous to people in the dynamics of famine, and the difficult judgements people need to make about survival. It also showed the particular risks to health and livelihoods of making the move to IDP camps and engaging in a humanitarian system which provided some valuable goods and services but also cut people off from other vital networks and resources. From De Waal's work an important new "health crisis model" was added to humanitarian understandings of hunger and famine, which made the clear link between famine and disease.

The focus of famine research stayed in the Horn of Africa but was complemented by an important historical study of women's knowledge and experience of famine in Malawi by Megan Vaughan, which used oral history and traditional song to show the gendering of famine in different male and female coping and suffering[5]. Sadly, a solid understanding of the gendering of hunger and famine has not been mainstreamed strongly enough into humanitarian policy in recent decades. A bias has developed towards a more general political economy analysis that lacks a gendered and intersectional understanding of people's different experience of war-related hunger as minorities, majorities, abled, disabled, young, old and different mixtures of all these identities.

This political economy work took off soon after De Waal's discoveries. Other scholars in Sudan were working more deliberately on the connections between famine and war in Sudan. David Keen and Mark Duffield were looking at conflict systems and the "incentives" warring parties found for creating famine in their political and military policies[6].

Fred Cuny then synthesized much of the emerging knowledge and good practice in his book Famine, Conflict and Response in 1999 which focused on formalizing "counter-famine operations". Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Sue Lautze, Helen Young and others from the Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University continued to research and respond to hunger, food insecurity and livelihoods crises in Sudan. Lautze's particular insight was on the importance of "saving lives and livelihoods" or "saving lives through livelihoods", an approach which has become a consistent mantra in humanitarian programming[7]. In 2016, Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid from Tufts published the most recent famine study, Famine in Somalia, which analyses the causes and policy failures that led to 250,000 deaths in 2011. All this intellectual and operational analysis of hunger, famine and its relationship with conflict means we know a lot about how famine comes about and how to prevent it. Much of this knowledge has recently been put into an easy-to-read guide for humanitarian policy makers in Famine: Lessons Learned by the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University[8]. ALNAP also did an important learning paper after the 2011 crisis which is more broadly focused on drought[9].

One important message from all these studies is counter-intuitive: don't think food first. Hunger and famine are shaped by deep political, social, climatic and economic causes. Typically, famine prevention

3   Hugo Slim, IASC Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya – Synthesis Report, June 2012 at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/iasc-real-time-evaluation-humanitarian-response-horn-africa-drought-crisis-somalia

4   Alex de Waal, Famine that Kills, Darfur, Sudan, Oxford University Press, 1989

5   Megan Vaughan, The Story of African Famine: Gender and Famine in Malawi, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987

6   David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in South-Western Sudan 1983-89, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994. Mark Duffield The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid, in eds Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwy, War and Hunger, Zed, London, 1994, pp50-69.

7   Sue Lautze, Saving Lives and Livelihoods: The Fundamentals of a Livelihoods Strategy, Tufts University, 1997.

8   Steven Devereux, Lewis Sida and Tina Nelis, Famine: Lessons Learned, August 2017, at https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/13173/Lessons%20Learned%20FINAL%20online.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

9   Paul Knox Clarke, Humanitarian Action in Drought Related Emergencies, ALNAP, October 2011.

and response are best designed in strategies of protection, asset support, healthcare, income, and livelihood adaptation that increase people's access and entitlement to food security and prevent their deprivation and destitution.

War-related hunger and the question of intent

Food insecurity, hunger and famine emerge in armed conflict in two main ways. Either they are a "humanitarian consequence" of armed conflict – regrettable but hard to avoid collateral damage of the disruption and destruction of war. Or, hunger and famine are caused deliberately by political and military strategists who intentionally use starvation as a method of war, or who decide not to stop it even if they can. In their 1994 edited volume, War and Hunger, Antony Zwy and Joanna Macrae usefully distinguish between acts of commission and act of omission in the deliberate construction of hunger and famine in armed conflict[10]. An act of commission would be a deliberate policy of scorched earth or blockade. An act of omission would be a deliberate policy to withhold or obstruct urgently needed humanitarian assistance to hungry people. Hunger as humanitarian consequence is unfortunate but not illegal. In contrast, using starvation as a method in armed conflict is a war crime and a breach of the Geneva Conventions[11].

Alex de Waal recently observed that there have been 61 famines between 1870 and today which have killed over 100,000 people each, and amassed a total death count of 105 million people. He notes that "the biggest killers were famines that resulted from political decisions" and clearly identifies these as "political famines"[12]. Today's hunger crises in Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria and South Sudan fall into this category. Each one is directly linked to political and military decisions to adopt a variety of hunger causing strategies like restricting the economy, using scorched earth tactics, imposing security measures which prevent people pursuing their livelihoods, or blocking the movement of humanitarian aid.

Policies of blockade, indiscriminate attack and scorched earth have always been used to crush a civilian population and deprive an enemy force of vital resources. The British have blockaded enemy occupied Europe three times in modern European history – in the Napoleonic Wars and in both World Wars. In the secessionist wars fought by Eritrea and Tigray against Addis Ababa in the 1980s, Ethiopian jets targeted grain supplies and forced farmers to plough and work by night to avoid being strafed in their fields by day[13]. Today, warring parties in South Sudan deliberately pursue scorched earth policies and forced displacement. In Yemen, ports and airports are closed in a contemporary blockade. Many towns and urban areas in Syria have been besieged.

The question of intent and legal responsibility must be at the heart of international analysis and action on hunger in armed conflict today. The burden of de Waal's historical evidence means that policy makers should assume that famine in armed conflict is political choice much more often than it is unwanted side-effect. Deliberate "political famines" are the norm.

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10 Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwy, Famine, Complex Emergencies and International Policy, in War and Hunger: Rethinking International Response to Complex Emergencies, Zed, London 1994.

11 ICRC, Protection of the Civilian Population Against Famine in Situations of Armed Conflict, Geneva, 1991. Starvation is prohibited as a method of combat in API article 14 and attacks on indispensable objects and food and agricultural areas in API article 54. APII article 17 prohibits forced displacement without proper mitigating measures including adequate nutrition. The general rule to facilitate relief action in API article 70 is partly to ensure adequate nutrition and health.

12 Alex de Waal, The Nazis Used It, We Use It, London Review of Books, Vol 39:12, 15 June 2017, see also his forthcoming book, Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine, Polity, Cambridge, 2017.

13 Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War, Hurst and OUP, 2007, pp 98-106.

Policy issues arising from the Geneva Workshop

The Workshop on Conflict and Hunger that took place in Geneva on November 1st 2017 and sponsored by the Netherlands and Switzerland involved a range of States, UN agencies and several civil society NGOs specializing in hunger and food security. The participants seemed to agree on a number of clear policy positions. They also staked out important issues that needed further clarification and noted a couple of areas which look likely but remain consistently ambiguous.

There was strong agreement on a rights-based approach to hunger and famine. Participants clearly supported the principle of the right to food and noted how rich so many international standards and mechanisms are on protections against hunger. The workshop recommended that the first point in any new policy on conflict-related hunger must be to recognize every person as a holder of this right and States as duty bearers for the responsibility to ensure that hunger is prevented and food security assured. A critical part of this rights-based approach is the need to develop and respect clear "political contract" between people and power about the right to food[14]. The importance of widely owned political contracts to prevent hunger and famine are recognized as one of the most important factors in famine prevention, and are well evidenced in the "turnaround" stories of India and Ethiopia. Famine is no longer politically acceptable in either State. An alignment of public opinion and government policy is essential to forge such explicit political contracts.

Another clear position in the workshop was adherence to the "early call principle". It was widely agreed that the UN had acted correctly to "call famine" before it was evidentially obvious on the ground. There should be clear incentives and rewards for being unambiguous about the risk of extreme food insecurity and famine. The need to call it early is essential, as recommended in the IASC review of the 2011 crisis in the Horn of Africa. It was widely acknowledged that the risk of "being early and wrong" is profoundly preferable to the much greater risk of "being right but late".

Greater policy clarity was requested in two areas: on definitions and on causality. The workshop admitted to significant confusion around the definition of terms like hunger, food security, food insecurity, food emergency, starvation and famine. Any new policy making must be clear on these distinctions.
The problem of causality also needs greater rigour before new global policy is made. Many causal arguments around hunger are in danger of pedalling myth. For example, is it evidentially true that hungry communities are more likely to generate more "violent extremists" as is widely espoused in counter-terrorism policy and argument? Does climate risk and drought cause hunger and famine or contribute to it? Is climate change causing conflict? What is the difference between the causes, drivers and triggers of conflict-related hunger?

None of the diplomats in the workshop felt on solid ground on any of these questions, and were wary of making policy on hunger, conflict and international security until they knew more. There was a consensus that hunger and famine is usually multi-causal rather than mono-causal but nobody was very clear how far it is possible to generalize about the causes of conflict-related hunger. Generally, there seemed to be two kinds of situation: sometimes conflict compounds other pre-existing hunger making conditions; at other times conflict is the single biggest hunger making problem. In either case, there was also a strong consensus at the workshop that humanitarian and human rights organizations should work closely in complementary approaches to hunger, famine and starvation related to armed conflicts.

The deficit or ambiguity of real-time information about the emergence and extent of hunger in armed conflicts was also recognized by everyone. War zones are not the best place to gather information and, therefore, data collection and analysis is often incomplete. This makes interpretation more speculative than usual.

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14 The importance of political contract was first noted by Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze in Hunger and Public Action, Oxford University Press, 1991 and again by Alex de Waal in Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, James Murray, 1997.

Next Steps

There is a lot we know already about conflict-related hunger and famine. The next phase challenge for policy and diplomacy seems to be twofold.

First, States interested in developing clearer global peace and security policy on conflict-related hunger need to make their case more convincingly than they do at present. This means clearly presenting the existing political, social, economic and biological science about hunger to better effect.

Secondly, these same States need to build a broad constituency of States, civil society, food insecure populations and experts to engage international attention and mobilize political responsibility. They then need to choose the best policy venue and mechanism in which to secure new norms and greater operational implementation. This may be the UNSC but it may also be wiser to "build the wave" more slowly in other multilateral fora and mechanisms - like SDG 2 - before risking its intense politicization in the UNSC where several members may see a new level of concern about hunger within States as undue interference in State sovereignty.

Conflict, Hunger and System Change: the Grand Bargain and beyond

Christina Bennett and Eva Svoboda[1]

Introduction

Until recently, the international community seemed to have put the prospects of large-scale famine behind it. According to the World Peace Foundation, nearly 115 million people died of starvation between 1870 and 1980, almost 90 percent of them from conflict. With the end of major international conflicts, decolonisation and democratisation, widespread hunger in the 21st Century appeared to be in decline (De Waal, 2016).

In 2017, the threat of famine across multiple countries was back, and hunger appeared to be on the rise once again. According to The State of the Food Security and Nutrition in the World report there were 815 million undernourished people in the world in 2016, up from 777 million the year before (FAO et al, 2017).

Although the public narrative around famines often focuses on weather – cycles of floods, droughts and other natural events – the roots of today's famines are similar to those of their 19th Century predecessors: protracted and violent conflicts that weaken governance systems, destroy farms and markets and strangle economies. In Yemen, Houthi attacks against Yemeni civilians and the Saudi coalition's bombing of ports and economic blockade have combined to bring commerce to a halt, paralyse relief efforts and bring about large-scale hunger (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017). In Nigeria, Boko Haram attacks and the government counter-insurgency campaign have displaced 2.4 million people, destroyed villages and stripped communities of assets, income and food (HPN, 2017; De Waal 2017). In Somalia a pernicious drought killed more than 250,000 people in 2011 and put millions on the brink of starvation again in 2017, it is the 25 years of chronic conflict that have destroyed Somalis' savings and livelihoods,

rendering them unable to cope when these cyclical droughts set in (ICG, 2017).

Addressing the problem of famine is therefore not merely about more effective food assistance or improved farming outputs, but a complex combination of short- and longer-term political, economic and aid solutions that address not only the symptoms of hunger, but also its myriad causes. This requires a shift in the way we approach conflicts – and protracted conflicts in particular – as well as the reform of an aid system that struggles politically, financially and operationally to tackle the range of problems famine presents.

The Grand Bargain, an initiative borne out of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and since agreed by 52 members of the international aid community, set out to address some of these challenges, committing its signatories to financial and institutional reforms to make humanitarian assistance more flexible, cost-effective, and better suited to the needs and aspirations of the people affected by crisis. Close to two years on, the Grand Bargain has generated some momentum around its 10 commitment areas, but has been slow to inspire real change.

Conflict and hunger: A long-term, lethal mix

After a steady decline following the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts are once again on the rise. In 2014, the number of armed conflicts around the world reached its highest point since 1999 (Gates et al., 2016). In addition, unrestrained violence, the easy availability of weapons, a lack of respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and seemingly no consequences for those who violate the obligations they are meant to uphold, have compounded the complexity, number and longevity of contemporary conflict, resulting in human suffering, broken social cohesion, crumbling social systems and massive displacement that lasts years and often generations.

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FAO currently identifies 19 countries as being in a protracted conflict situation. Of these, 14 have been in this category since 2010 (FAO et al, 2017). The increasing longevity of conflicts is also apparent through humanitarian appeals and the duration of organisations' presence in particular contexts. In 2014, more than 90% of countries with annual humanitarian appeals had had them for three or more years; 60% had had annual appeals for more than eight years, including long-running relief programmes in Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and northern Kenya (Swithern, 2014). In terms of duration, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been on the ground for an average of 36 years in ten of its largest operations (ICRC, 2017).

There is broad recognition of the negative correlation between conflict and hunger: Conflict is a well-known, major cause of food emergencies and is suspected of causing the renewed upward trend in the number of people suffering from hunger (FAO, 2017). Moreover, the majority of chronically food insecure and malnourished people live in countries affected by conflict: an estimated 489 million of 815 million undernourished people and an estimated 122 million of 155 million stunted children (ibid). Conflict-induced food crises led to displacement of more than 15 million people in 2016 (ibid). Widespread awareness of the links among policy makers and the public can also be high, particularly when headlines focus on obstruction of emergency food deliveries, the bombing of aid convoys and when the risk of famine is heightened, as is now the case of Yemen[2].

In the case of protracted conflicts, however, the effects on food security are less visible but cause no less suffering – and often well before famine is technically declared. Protracted crises affect different dimensions of food security: availability, access, stability and nutrition (CFS, 2015) and create multiple compound impacts, including inflation, disrupted employment, declines in social protection and public health services. They overstretch national and local institutions, deplete state, community and individual resources, prevent farmers from accessing their land and wear down the resilience of affected communities.

And despite the fact that denying the use of starvation as a weapon of war and protecting the right to be free from hunger are all covered by existing legal frameworks, compliance with such frameworks remains low. Disregard for international laws and legislation such as IHL, human rights law and arms trade treaties have made crisis contexts more frustrating and dangerous for aid organisations whose staff put their lives at risk only to be denied access to populations in need.

The lethal combination of conflict and hunger in protracted settings is particularly tricky for the humanitarian system, as addressing it prompts an expectation of a range of responses requiring a wide variety of skills that often compete for time and resources. This can mean mobilising financial resources for prevention and early action when the threat of famine is documented and real, to an array of short and long-term aid activities that stave off hunger, malnutrition and disease, to advocacy efforts to prevent conflicts, and then ensure compliance with IHL once they are underway. Whether the humanitarian system is sufficiently resourced, skilled or mandated to accomplish all of this is an enduring question, and whether humanitarian assistance serves as a convenient alibi and substitute for political and diplomatic action in situations of famine is a matter of great debate.

System-wide pathologies

During the past two years, the Humanitarian Policy Group, as part of its research on the changing humanitarian landscape, identified a 'crisis of legitimacy' in the humanitarian sector. It found that despite a decade of technical reforms and year-on-year, exponential growth in the amount of funding channelled to humanitarian assistance, the sector is still falling short in the world's most enduring crises. And despite commitments its own accountability to affected populations, it is not doing a good job in the eyes of the people it aims to serve (Bennett et al. 2016). The source of the crisis of legitimacy is not inadequate skills, processes or tools. It is more about system level pathologies and fundamental characteristics, that have substantially weakened its ability to respond to protracted conflicts (Collinson, 2016) and break the persistent and destructive cycle that conflict and hunger propel, including:

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2   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-conflict-un/saudi-arabia-should-fund-all-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen-wfp-idUSK-CN1BF22R

A top-down architecture whereby the people most affected have the least power to influence what happens to them. The current humanitarian architecture privileges large organisations, bureaucratic processes, and well-worn methods and tools. The sector's main point of reference is the humanitarian donor and its measures for success linked to the ability to secure ever-larger amounts of funding to preserve – and grow – its dominant organisations. The result is a predisposition in the aid system towards control and an inflated sense of its own importance, rather than responses and strategies that engage with and rely on communities.

As a result, aid recipients have little to say as to what, when and how they receive assistance. What assistance is delivered does not always fit or align with what is really needed on the ground. Surveys documenting progress on the Grand Bargain by Groundtruth Solutions reveal a sharp disconnect between the positive perceptions of field staff and the more pessimistic views of aid recipients (Groundtruth, June 2017).

Q2. Relevance

Does the aid you currently receive cover your basic needs?

1 = Not at all	
2 = Not really	
3 = Neutral	
4 = Mostly yes	
5 = Yes, very much	
No opinion	
Do not want to answer	

(values in %)   **Mean: 2.8**

17	20	33	21	8

Opinions are divided as to whether the aid is sufficient in meeting people's basic needs.

Q1. Transparency

Do you feel aid funds go where they are most needed?

1 = Not at all	
2	
3	
4	
5 = Yes, I do	

(values in %)   **Mean score: 4.3**

5	1	56	38

Aid funds are regarded as well-managed and used where need is greatest.

Respondents from local organisations are slightly more critical than international agencies of how the funds are allocated.

Type of organisation	Mean
INGOs	**4.3**
0 4 1	52	42
Local responders	**4.1**
3	15	3	29	50
UN agencies	**4.2**
3	68	29

Source: Groundtruth Solutions, 2017

As a result, responses to food crises have been determined in part by large surpluses of agricultural production in donor countries, or based on the interests of aid organisations (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005, cited in Kent et. al. 2016). Recent ODI research conducted in the Maratane refugee camp in Mozambique found that aid organisations were resisting the use of cash over food assistance, despite the fact that cash was 24% cheaper, more predictable and much preferred by refugees themselves. The research found that such resistance was based on an underlying concern that cash would diminish agencies' overall role and ability to raise funds for their operations (Bailey, 2016).

An inherent exceptionalism that puts humanitarian assistance in a separate category than other forms of aid. At the heart of this 'exceptionalism' lie the humanitarian principles, which distinguish humanitarian action from development activities and other forms of aid. Some would say there are good reasons for maintaining this distinction: separating humanitarian action ensures that humanitarian priorities are not downplayed, forgotten or manipulated to fit other foreign policy objectives, particularly in contexts where interventions require engaging closely with national and local authorities that may also be involved in the conflict. Others argue that, by relentlessly guarding their principles, humanitarians perpetuate artificial divisions that prevent them from recognising their own limitations and seeking out capacity, understanding and expertise outside of the sector to deal with both the symptoms and underlying causes of crises (Levine and Sharp, 2015). Still others contend that humanitarian principles are vectors of Western influence and used to exclude non-western and local organisations from response efforts, decision making and access to funding. The failure to resolve these tensions is a significant obstacle to more joined up ways of working with development and peace actors and national and local organisations to address the many facets of food insecurity.

Institutional pressures that discourage investments in conflict and crisis prevention and longer-term programming, resulting in a sector stuck in crisis mode. Experience has shown that raising the alarm ahead of a potential famine will trigger a response from aid agencies and donors, while also potentially having a deterrent effect on belligerents whose actions may exacerbate food insecurity. Such early action is often lacking, due to a lack of political will, lack of consensus among Member States in rel-

evant UN fora, general insecurity or lack of funding. Where conflicts and crises are imminent, there are few incentives for government donors to avert a crisis rather than respond to one, despite documented evidence that preventative action is safer, less costly and saves lives (IFRC, 2015). A recent ODI study on prevention highlighted the inability of Member States to resolve, at a political level, major crises and conflicts as one of the most significant factors constraining the UN system's prevention work (Metcalfe-Hough, 2017). The famines in East Africa are a case in point. These largely knowable and preventable crises have been allowed to play out because donors seem more willing to provide funds to respond to emergencies rather than investing in mechanisms that help prevent them.

Risk-aversion that prevents aid organisations and adequate funding from reaching those in need. Stringent due diligence and counter-terrorism policies employed in many donor countries compel international humanitarian organisations to operate remotely at the expense of monitoring, quality assurance and anti-corruption measures (Haver, 2016). For example, as a prerequisite for funding, many donors require NGOs to provide years of audited financial statements and demonstrate that they have managed large sums of money. While understandable, these policies create high barriers to entry for smaller organisations that might be better placed to implement a response. In addition, anti-corruption measures, counter-terrorism legislation and bank 'de-risking' exclude potential operating partners by cutting off their ability to receive or move funds in crisis contexts. According to a member survey of the Muslim Charities Forum, a coordinating body that represents the largest Muslim non-profit organisations in the UK, 37% had experienced difficulties in opening a bank account, with the greatest problems related to aid operations in areas facing conflict and violent extremism (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017). In terms of responding to food security or famine, this dynamic is most acute in places like Somalia, where organisations providing food assistance to communities in al-Shabab controlled areas risk individual criminal prosecution as well as organisational reputational damage. As a result, food assistance there is deemed both difficult and ill-advised (Majid, 2017).

Whither reform? The Grand Bargain and beyond

The Grand Bargain (GB) grew out of the recommendations of the United Nation's High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, which identified an opportunity to reform parts of the humanitarian system, create more than $15 billion in efficiencies and close what they identified as a widening gap between humanitarian needs and the available resources to address them. The GB's 52 signatories – including UN agencies, donors, NGOs, two parts of the Red Cross/Crescent movement, the OECD and the World Bank – represent 88% of the funding for international humanitarian assistance, positioning the agreement well as a key lever for change and importantly for protracted crises.

Close to two years into its implementation, and despite documented action on 40 per cent of the commitments (Derzsi-Horvath et. al. 2017), its ability to catalyse meaningful and systemic-level reform has been mixed. For example, on the positive side:

It has provided the impetus for multi-year funding and early funding. Although multi-year financing was already on most donor agendas when the GB was signed, the agreement has driven donors to scale up multi-year financing at a pace and to a level they may not have reached without it. A more stable funding base has the potential to reduce competitive behaviour among aid agencies. Multi-year commitments may allow for better planning by aid organisations, particularly in situations of hunger and famine and including through more focused investment in both preventative action and more balance between shorter and longer-term initiatives on the ground. For these reasons, it will be important for GB signatories to maintain momentum and encourage further action on these areas of the agreement.

It is increasing consideration of and evidence for the use of cash. With close to 20 percent of GB donor signatories reporting an increase in cash-based assistance in their funding portfolios (Ibid), including very large-scale cash programmes in Turkey and Lebanon, cash assistance is actively and substantially challenging out-dated notions of who decides what aid is appropriate, who delivers it and how. Evidence that cash assistance is effective in combatting hunger (ODI 2015) makes this a potentially game changing development in responding to food crises. Increasing the evidence base for when and how cash

should be implemented will continue to be important. However, there is an overall sense that much of Grand Bargain implementation has become mired in technical detail without chipping away at the pathologies discussed above and enacting the deeper reforms required for real systemic change:

For example, there has been very little activity toward GB **commitments on enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development actors** (Derzsi-Horvath et. al. 2017), and a growing sense that better humanitarian-development links are better taken up elsewhere. For example, initiatives around the humanitarian-development 'nexus' are being piloted through corollary initiatives such as the New Way of Working (NWOW) in places like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen where the risk of famine is high, through the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and through the promising partnership framework signed in April 2017 between the World Bank and the UN. In addition, private initiatives from multinational and local businesses aim to combine technology, innovation and local expertise to usefully enhance the response to food insecurity while improving employment and business networks in crisis contexts (Zyck and Kent, 2014; Oglesby and Burke, 2012). Such initiatives are worth watching.

It avoids the politics of conflict. As a decidedly a-political document and focused primarily on financing, the Grand Bargain neglects interests and power as key drivers of conflict and hunger and key impediments to prevention and conflict resolution. It offers no sticks or carrots for compliance with IHL or other elements of international law, despite the fact that access to food is a key element of both humanitarian and human rights law. It also does not offer political or financial incentives for conflict prevention or resolution. Alternative efforts in this regard might include recognising starvation as a war crime in non-international conflicts through the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court or strengthen the State's obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to adequate food in situations of conflict through adequate national legislation. Further efforts should also include sustaining political pressure on compliance with IHL, including through the Security Council and the ongoing intergovernmental process on strengthening respect for IHL, jointly facilitated by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

It ignores the cultural shifts that are needed for the system to change in a meaningful way and thus rendering it more relevant, indeed more legitimate. In doing so, it fails to overcome the question of the legitimacy of international humanitarian organisations whose behaviours, principles, and norms no longer represent the interests of today's humanitarian stakeholders, and which are no longer able to instil a sense of relevance and trust in aid recipients. For example, despite a commitment to 'localisation' and a more devolved way of working, it took nine months for GB signatories to agree on who 'local responders' are and what funding them 'as directly as possible' means, without local actors at the table. It also failed to consider that even the term 'localisation' still suggests an inherent power paternalism the Grand Bargain is trying to undo. It also fails to tackle the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and bank de-risking, which are major impediments to humanitarian access by international and local organisations and literally starving populations in places like Yemen (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017). Restoring legitimacy to humanitarian work requires shifts in behaviour that go well beyond the Grand Bargain. Humanitarian approaches should put the needs of affected people above those of organisational and political interests and view the solutions to problems of conflict and hunger as ones for a wider, more devolved and distributed constellation of aid organisations and approaches.

Conclusion

The causes of hunger are well-documented and well-understood. But much like a sick patient who acknowledges the symptoms of their illness, but remains resistant to the treatments that might help the source of the disease, so attention in the humanitarian sector is largely stuck on tinkering with its dysfunction, with little commitment made to own up to its underlying causes or taking remedial action to address them in full (Collinson, 2016).

In this respect, the Grand Bargain has made some progress in bringing new sheen to rusty conversations, reviving old debates and bringing some progress to technical sticking points. But as largely a technical exercise drawn up by the very organisations that have the most to lose from fundamental change, it is too narrow in its scope and too self-interested in its implementation. It fails to recognise the underlying biases, trade-offs and political costs that are essential to changing the lives of the people bearing the brunt of conflict and hunger and has made little progress in propelling the type of systemic shift in the way the humanitarian system operates. Such change requires not just the Grand Bargain, but a better deal for populations affected by conflict and hunger.

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Part 3: **Hunger and Multilateral Organisations**

WHO perspectives on Famine and Hunger: Addressing Food Security and Health

Zita Weise Prinzo[1]

Global context

After a prolonged decline, world hunger has been reported to be on the rise again - the estimated number of undernourished people has increased from 777 million in 2015 to 815 million in 2016[2]. The increase has largely been attributed to the greater number of conflicts in the past decade affecting countries in Africa and the Near East - mainly in countries already facing high food insecurity, often worsened by climate-related shocks. Food insecurity has also deteriorated in peaceful settings linked to economic crises reducing food access especially for the poor.

At the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016, emphasis was placed on bridging the humanitarian development divide, in the reduction of risk and vulnerability, while impact of climate change, natural disasters and conflicts on populations was also emphasized. In March 2017, United Nations officials called for urgent action to avert famine in four countries – Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria. The warning raised the alarm that without collective global and country level efforts, the populations affected in those countries risk starvation, malnutrition, and death[3]. Famine is declared after three specific criteria are met: when one in five households face extreme food shortages; more than 30 percent of the population is acutely malnourished; and at least

two people for every 10,000 die each day[4]. Yet, not enough investment is being made to build the resilience of these communities or the capacities of local institutions to sustain long-term impact.

The trend in hunger is not yet reflected in levels of stunting (chronic child under-nutrition or short for age) which are generally continuing to fall slowly. However, in 2016 stunting still affected one out of four children under the age of five years (155 million children globally) about 45% of them living in fragile and conflict-affected countries while wasting (acute malnutrition or low weight for height) affected one-third of children under five (52 million)[5]. Multiple forms of malnutrition are co-existing – child overweight and adult obesity are on the rise globally.

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2   FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2017. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. Rome, FAO. http://www.fao.org/3/a-I7695e.pdf

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YEMEN IDP camp – WHO / Sadeq Hasan

Undernutrition and disease

Undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies can be widespread among populations affected by food insecurity and famines where not only adequate food but also basic health services are not readily available. Those whose nutrition was poor before the crisis are even more vulnerable. Undernutrition, in combination with a lack of access to health facilities and water supplies, leads to disease outbreaks and epidemics, including acute watery diarrhoea and cholera. During humanitarian crises, such as conflict and drought, the increased spread of communicable diseases heavily burdens the already weakened health system. In countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, north-east Nigeria, Yemen, a weak health system and low vaccination coverage can quickly trigger a vicious cycle, eventually leading to higher mortality. Studies consistently show that infectious diseases have been a major determinant of famine mortality. Undernourished children are more sus-

ceptible to infections and have a harder time recovering because their immune systems are impaired. Undernutrition is an underlying cause in over 60 per cent of deaths, especially among children, resulting from diarrhoea, pneumonia and (in 40 per cent of cases) measles[6]. Undernutrition among pregnant and lactating women leads to higher-than-normal rates of mortality around childbirth.

Food insecurity crises can also aggravate diet-related noncommunicable diseases, such as heart disease, high blood pressure (hypertension), diabetes and cancer when healthy foods are not regularly available and appropriate medical care may not be ac-

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6   WHO Technical Note. Communicable diseases and severe food shortage. WHO, October 2010 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/70485/1/WHO_HSE_GAR_DCE_2010_6_eng.pdf

cessible, leading to the interruption or cessation of treatments for these diseases. Given that many populations have high levels of noncommunicable diseases, such emergencies can cause a significant increase in illness and even death from these diseases[7]. Famine and hunger can undermine decades of social development and hard-earned health gains, weaken health systems and slow progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Chronic undernourishment and repeated infections contribute to high rates of stunting, while acute malnutrition (or wasting) increases the immediate risk of death two- to nine-fold among children under five years of age. Repeated episodes of acute malnutrition in childhood undermine human capital development and thus stifle the economic growth of nations. Renewed efforts to address malnutrition in emergencies are therefore imperative for saving lives, as well as ensuring long-term development[8].

Breastfeeding: Food security for infants

Breastfeeding in all environments has major health benefits for both children and mothers. Breast milk gives infants all the nutrients they need for healthy growth and development. It is readily available and contains antibodies that protect infants from common childhood illnesses. Breastfeeding also reduces mothers' risks of breast and ovarian cancer, type II diabetes, and postpartum depression. Breastfeeding becomes even more critical for child survival in humanitarian emergencies including in settings affected by high levels of food insecurity. Lack of food, unsafe water, poor sanitation, overcrowding and overburdened health systems put infants and young children at greater risk of communicable diseases and mortality.

WHO recommends that all babies should be fed only breast milk for the first 6 months, after which they should continue breastfeeding (as well as consuming other foods) until 2 years of age, and potentially for longer, even in emergency situations.

Well-meaning donors may distribute breast-milk substitutes (such as infant formula) in emergencies.

This can undermine breastfeeding and, if there is a lack of clean water to make formula or clean bottles and teats, put children at increased risk of infections which can be deadly. In emergencies, the use of breastmilk substitutes requires a context-specific, coordinated package of care and skilled support to ensure the nutritional needs of non-breastfed children are met and to minimise risks to all children through inappropriate use of breastmilk substitutes[9].

WHO's emergency response in health and nutrition

WHO has an essential role in supporting Member States to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies. WHO also has obligations to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as Health Cluster Lead Agency, to the International Health Regulations (2005) and to other international bodies and agreements[10]. WHO takes a comprehensive approach to all aspects of emergency management, embracing prevention/mitigation, preparedness/readiness, response and recovery. It supports Member States to build their capacities to manage the risks of outbreaks and emergencies with health consequences. When national capacities are exceeded, the Organization assists in leading and coordinating the international health response to contain outbreaks and provide effective relief and recovery to affected populations. In support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly SDG2 and SDG3, and with the 2016-2025 UN Decade of Action on Nutrition, WHO's nutrition strategy aims for: "A world free from all forms of malnutrition where all people achieve health and well-being". One of the six WHO priorities in nutrition is to leverage the implementation of effective nutrition policies and programmes in all settings, including situations of emergency and crisis, by developing an operations model for nutrition in emergencies and preparedness plans to support the WHO Health Emergencies Programme. WHO is also a member of the Nutrition Cluster and supports the nutrition response, especially in the areas of management of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and nutrition surveillance (see Box 1)[11].

7   Q&A: Malnutrition and emergencies. WHO, February 2017 http://www.who.int/features/qa/malnutrition-emergencies/en/

8   Weise Prinzo Z. et al. Nutrition in health response in emergencies: WHO perspectives and developments. Field Exchange. Emergency Nutrition Network. Issue 56/ December 2017. http://www.ennonline.net/fex/56/nutritionhealthresponsewho

9   Infant and Young Child Feeding in Emergencies. The Operational Guidance for Emergency Relief Staff and Programme Managers. Infant Feeding in Emergencies Core Group. Version 3.0 – October 2017. http://www.ennonline.net/operational-guidance-v3-2017

10 Weise Prinzo Z. et al. Nutrition in health response in emergencies: WHO perspectives and developments. Field Exchange. Emergency Nutrition Network. Issue 56/ December 2017. http://www.ennonline.net/fex/56/nutritionhealthresponsewho

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Box 1: WHO areas of focus on nutrition in emergencies

Life-saving programmes on nutrition and health

1. Improve capacity of health staff on the inpatient management of SAM[12] with medical complications, including in the context of outbreaks such as cholera.

2. Improve capacity of health staff on appropriate infant and young child feeding (i.e. breastfeeding and complementary feeding), including risk management and support of health needs of non-breastfed infants in the inpatient management of SAM to prevent relapse.

3. Ensure necessary supplies for the inpatient treatment of SAM[13].

Identification of those in need of nutrition interventions and appropriate referrals

4. Integrate nutrition screening at all levels of the health system (community, primary healthcare, tertiary healthcare) including mobile clinics; ensure key nutrition interventions are conducted in the health facilities where appropriate (e.g. iron-folic acid supplementation/micronutrient supplementation in antenatal care, inpatient management of SAM) and that referral is conducted for nutrition interventions (e.g. outpatient SAM and, where needed, supplementary feeding programmes for moderate acute malnutrition and pregnant and lactating women).

Nutrition surveillance mechanisms and monitoring and evaluation

5. Monitor and evaluate inpatient management of SAM in health facilities, ideally integrated within existing systems. Health resources availability monitoring system to monitor availability of services and resources at different points of service delivery to identify gaps for appropriate actions, including nutrition.

6. Integrate nutrition and health surveillance. Technical support to strengthen the existing routine health information system and to integrate key programme performance indicators to monitor the outcome of nutrition services implemented at health facilities.

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12 Severe acute malnutrition is when a person is extremely thin and at risk of dying, and is defined by a very low weight-for-height or mid-upper arm circumference <115 mm or bilateral pitting oedema. They need immediate treatment. The response to acute malnutrition is broad and includes several elements such as medical, food, water and hygiene, and social services. Children who still have an appetite can stay at home and receive outpatient care. They need treatment with specially-formulated foods, and their recovery must be monitored regularly by a trained health worker. Children who have medical problems and do not have an appetite need inpatient care in a clinic or hospital. They need specially-formulated milks and treatment for infections or other potential complications.

13 WHO Kit for children with severe acute malnutrition with medical complications: http://www.who.int/emergencies/kits/sam/en/

The underlying causes of child malnutrition and death are not only the lack of access to food and inadequate food intake but also inadequate reproductive, maternal and child care practices and poor public health services. Necessary immediate medical interventions include the medical management of SAM and the detection and control of deadly diseases such as measles, acute respiratory infections, malaria, diarrhoea and waterborne diseases.

In the mid to long-term, countries prone to undernutrition need to ensure that preventative measures are taken and that their health systems are strengthened to increase the population's health resilience at times of famine or in settings where there is a risk of famine. In countries with high levels of food insecurity, WHO has identified several key activities to reduce the risks of missed opportunities for screening, prevention and treatment of uncomplicated illness and malnutrition and to ensure appropriate referral and synergies between nutrition and health services (see Box 2)[14].

14 Weise Prinzo Z. et al. Nutrition in health response in emergencies: WHO perspectives and developments. Field Exchange. Emergency Nutrition Network. Issue 56/ December 2017. http://www.ennonline.net/fex/56/nutritionhealthresponsewho

ETHIOPIA Afar Region – Breastfeeding mother – WHO/Ahmed Zouiten

Box 2: Key activities to maximise service delivery in countries affected by high levels of food insecurity

Early treatment of malnutrition and illness saves lives

1. In integrated community case management, including the 'backpack model' for health delivery in mobile populations, all community health workers (CHWs) should be trained to screen, treat and refer, as appropriate, both acute malnutrition and illness. At least malaria, diarrhoea, and acute respiratory infections should be recognised and treated by the CHWs.

2. Frequent screening for acute malnutrition and illness at community level should be used to offer a standard package of preventative care.

• All children screened should receive measles vaccination, long-lasting insecticide-treated nets, deworming and vitamin A (as per national protocol).

• All pregnant and lactating women should be referred for preventative care (including tetanus vaccination, iron and folic acid supplementation, long-lasting insecticide-treated nets, malaria prophylaxis) and safe delivery as indicated.

• All outreach personnel should support coordinated social mobilisation and messaging campaigns regarding recognition of disease and malnutrition, as well as where and how to seek treatment.

Each contact with health facilities is an opportunity to detect, refer and/or treat malnutrition

3. All people, but at least all children and pregnant and lactating women, presenting at inpatient and outpatient health facilities should be screened for acute malnutrition and referred to the appropriate nutrition programme or, when admitted, treated for malnutrition.

Each contact with nutrition programmes is an opportunity to detect, refer and/or treat illness

4. All people, but at least all children and pregnant and lactating women, who are in nutrition pro grammes (including general food distribution, blanket and targeted supplementary, and outpatient therapeutic feeding programmes) should be screened for both illness and malnutrition each time there is a contact.

5. Treatment and preventative health interventions should be ensured, either integrated within the food/nutrition programme or by referral to a health facility, provided this can be ensured on the same day.

6. When referring people with either illness or malnutrition ensure:

• that they actually reach the facility or programme (e.g. by supporting transport); and

• that the facility or programme has the capacity to treat all those referred on that same day.

7. All health and nutrition treatment sites should ensure the availability of the required quantities of safe drinking water and a correct water, sanitation and hygiene environment.

8. Health information and surveillance data should be shared with other sectors to ensure their inclusion in food security and nutrition analysis.

Conclusion

Reaching the most vulnerable populations through a collective multi-sectoral approach in times of food insecurity and widespread hunger will save lives and play a significant role in reducing and preventing malnutrition as well as lay the foundations for early recovery and resilience-building. The health and nutrition clusters/sectors need to work closely together and collaborate with other sectors such as water and sanitation, and early recovery and protection. To effectively address causes of food insecurity and hunger, as well as reduce the risks of famine, it is necessary to invest in multisectoral causal analyses and interventions that address both chronic and acute food insecurity to effectively bridge the humanitarian-development divide[15].

Disclaimer: The author is staff member of the World Health Organization. The author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this article and they do not necessarily represent the decisions, policy or views of the World Health Organization.

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Removed, but not disconnected : The Role of Multilateral Processes in and around the Rome-Based UN Agencies in the Fight against Hunger

Bruce Campbell[1]

Introduction

The high-level meetings and multilateral processes in and around the UN-based organisations in cities like New York, Geneva and Rome do not readily spring to mind as spaces where decisive and heroic battles are being fought and won against hunger. Their popular reputation is one of a global talk shop in which participants nominally tasked with finding high-level solutions to problems, are in fact so insulated from the realities of field operations and aloof to the life situations of those in need of help, that they become a drain on resources rather than any meaningful part of a solution. And indeed, even when urgent action would be required, progress on most fronts usually appears to be frustratingly and unexplainably slow. Discussions are sometimes derailed by parties using them as a forum to score political points. Agreed statements often represent the smallest common denominator of the international community and are so bereft of any substance that they form no concrete basis for action.

However, this article will argue that the multilateral struggles to combat hunger and malnutrition, while seldom spectacular and newsworthy, do nevertheless produce vital results that are instrumental and essential to creating the operational framework for action, or "getting the job done". The natural focal point of multilateral cooperation on hunger consists of the three so-called "Rome-Based" UN Agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP, or simply "RBAs" for short[2]. Each one of these organisations was at the time of its inception the result of protracted high-level multilateral processes.

Now all established organisations which are embedded in the larger UN system and under multilateral oversight, they themselves have become important international agents in their own right with the authority to speak and act on behalf of the UN. Within their defined areas of influence, they have the ability to operate with relative agility and freedom. Action is of course predicated by their own statutes and internal policies which are designed by the organisations themselves, but have been scrutinised and approved by nation states that are members of their governing bodies.

Besides these internal policy processes under multilateral oversight, there are also multilateral policy processes that lie outside the individual agencies. These are most prominently anchored in the Committee on World Food Security ("CFS"), which brings nation states, various UN agencies, civil society, private sector, and research organisations into a single, policy-directed forum. Another vessel is the World Summit on Food Security which last met in 2009 and forms an important impetus for multilateral action, albeit at irregular intervals.

So far so good, but the question remains, what does all this deliver for those ravaged by hunger? This we would like to explore in the following sections. In the first, we will introduce the three RBAs in context of their purpose and governance, and how they relate to one another. In the following chapter, we will then turn to the question of what multilateral processes actually entail, both within an individual RBA and across the entire RBA system. In a final chapter, we will highlight examples of multilateral processes in Rome and their impact on the quest to battle hunger.

The role of multilateral organisations in fighting hunger

The history of the UN's Rome-Based Agencies began before the UN itself was even established. Sponsored by the King of Italy, the now defunct International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) was established in Rome in 1905. It mainly served the collection and compilation of international agricultural statistics, leading, i.a., to the publication of the 1930 World Food Census. In the dark years of the Second World War, a 1943 United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture called for the inception of a permanent international organisation, which was achieved by the agreement of the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organisation only two years later, in October 1945. The nascent FAO was first headquartered in Washington DC and assumed the responsibilities of the IIA as part of a broader mandate, before it was relocated to Rome in 1951. Today, the organisation's goals are centred on the eradication of hunger, the elimination of poverty and, underpinning these, the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources, particularly in the areas of agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Today the FAO has a total of 197 member states.

The management and oversight structure of the FAO is quite typical of a UN organisation. The Conference of Members meets every two years to assess activities, endorse multilateral policy instruments and long term strategies, and adopt the Programme of Work & Budget for the coming two years. More general oversight is carried out by the so-called Council that sits regularly and consists of 49 member states. The Council in turn is supported by 3 institutional committees of 13 members each (Programme, Finance and Constitutional & Legal Matters). In addition, 4 Technical biennial committees open to all members (Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Commodities) report directly to the Conference. The FAO Conference is prepared by Regional Conferences which identify regional priorities. Switzerland is not currently part of the Council but is member of the Programme Committee and all four technical Committees. In addition, the FAO hosts a series of multilateral Agreements and bodies which each has its own constitution and governance.

But over time, the FAO has also begotten a number of additional, multilateral entities that have been designed to tackle specific problems. An early example

was the Codex Alimentarius Commission which was established in 1961 and quickly attracted the support of the WHO. The Commission oversees the application of the Codex, which is a body of internationally recognised standards, guidelines and codes of practice relating to food production and safety.

Pursuing its objectives, the FAO works along five axes. In the first it collects data and builds knowledge. In the second it provides a platform for policy discussion. In the third, it fulfils a normative function for food and agricultural systems. In the fourth, it provides technical advice to governments. Finally, in the fifth, it contributes to emergency responses. In working along these axes, the critical value of the organisation becomes discernible. The access to standardised and comparable international agricultural data is the basis for understanding food systems in the first place, and in pursuit of better nutrition and feeding, building internationally recognised standards that form the conversational basis for establishing national and multinational norms and agreements. The organisation's support to governments with less developed capacities than those of advanced economies has a direct influence on how countries can sustainably respond to acute and structural malnutrition and food shortages.

It is also out of these considerations that the FAO and the processes surrounding it have spawned a number of important additional organisations and bodies in the course of its history, eminently WFP and IFAD. It was in 1961 that the UN General Assembly and the FAO approved the formation of a multilateral food programme in response to US President Eisenhower's demand for "a workable scheme [that] should be devised for providing food aid through the UN system". The programme was first launched for a three-year probationary phase, but then extended indefinitely. With its charter to arrest hunger and malnutrition, protect and rebuild livelihoods in emergencies and fragile settings, reduce and manage risk, and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger, the WFP was always intended as a very direct and immediate response to acute and protracted hunger. Over time, the WFP has grown in size and capacity to incorporate special branches like the UN Humanitarian Air Services, the UN Logistics Cluster and the Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency Support Team. With an annual budget of over $ 6 billion and 15,000 employees, the WFP is now the largest single UN organisation,

the backbone of the UN's humanitarian response and a mainstay of shock recovery. The WFP is governed by a 36-member "Executive Board" consisting of member states who are elected typically for two-year terms and on which Switzerland currently sits. Half of those are nominated by the FAO-council, the other half by the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which illustrates to what extent the WFP is embedded in the wider UN system.

IFAD was created in 1976 as a specialised UN agency in direct response to the 1974 World Food Summit with a view to stimulating agricultural development and food production through a programme of sovereign loans and grants to developing countries. IFAD-funded projects are required to benefit rural populations with a view to raising productivity and incomes, thereby improving the quality of life. In essence, this should be combined with the good stewardship of natural resource, including access to land and water, the use of improved and appropriate agricultural technologies, the fostering of transparent and competitive agricultural markets and building opportunities for enterprise development. Similar to the WFP, IFAD is governed by a 36-member executive board, but consists of 18 full and 18 alternate nation state members (one currently being Switzerland) whose voting power is tied to their financial commitment to IFAD. The IFAD executive board is elected by the Governance Council, to which all IFAD member states are represented by governors.

A particularly important multilateral forum was the series of World Food Summits of 1974, 1996, 2002 and 2009. While the 1996 event was formative to the creation of the Millennium Development Goals, it is the one of 1974 that stands out as the one where the CFS was established as a new FAO committee to tackle hunger and food insecurity. In 2009 the CFS underwent a process of reform from which it re-emerged as a global forum open to a wide array of actors that probes and tracks policies related to food security and nutrition. Today, the organisation is tasked with seeking a broad approach by means of policy convergence and development of a global strategic food security and nutrition framework. As an intergovernmental body complete with a Bureau, Advisory Group, Plenary and a High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE), the CFS is an international forum in which the RBAs, other UN-agencies, civil society, research and financing institutions and the private sector can debate emerging issues relating to food security. The same organisational categories are all represented in the Advisory Group which represents an unusually broad array of bedfellows who pursue the CFS' goals often in very different and sometimes conflicting ways.

	FAO	IFAD	WFP
Total agency funding annual average (USD millions)	1,280	1,000	5,500
Total employment within organisation	3,500	600	15,000
Switzerland's average funding contribution (USD millions)	19.7	20	79.7
Average percentage of Swiss funding	1.1%	2%	1.1%
Switzerland's Rank in membership contributions	17th	10th	11th

Relative size of the three RBA organisations and Switzerland's contributions per year (approx. averages 2014-16)

To draw a first conclusion, what stands out at this juncture is that Rome has a varied "ecology" of multilateral vessels that relate to the question of food, nutrition and hunger in very varied ways. Reflecting the complexity of the subject, it is also apparent that simple beginnings have led to an ever-increasing number of sometimes complementary, sometimes competing entities that are trying to tackle the question of hunger. At least on paper, the constituent parts of this organisational jungle do appear to serve the purpose; in practice too, there is little doubt that focused organisations like the WFP make very tangible contributions to rolling back famine and malnutrition in emergency situations. Important regular publications such as the State of Food Insecurity Report (SOFI) are crucial guidance documents for policy design. However, the RBAs' performance is also not beyond reproach. It must be noted that IFAD was created partly because some members were unhappy with the FAO's performance. For much of its history, the FAO has been criticised for a bloated administrative structure and middling performance. At various points in time, some member states have used surprisingly strong language, openly describing it as ineffective and a waste of time and money, albeit without actually turning their back on the organisation[3]. While some political point scoring is part of accusations such as these, it is certainly reasonable to ask what the world's hungry gain from the vast resources being poured into the "Rome bubble". But before turning to that question, it is worth looking at what the multilateral processes in Rome entail.

What multilateral policy processes actually entail

Policy processes in Rome can be split into two categories. In the first category, there are the intra-organisational processes within each RBA. Here policies are designed within an agency and scrutinised by its governing body. Ultimately, it is the agency's executive that is usually driving the process (unless mandated from the outside). Depending on the purpose and function of the organisation, multilateral actors, for the most part member states, will to a greater or lesser extent engage in multilateral processes which serve the development of internal

policies, which particularly in the case of the FAO can have a very tangible effect even on the wealthier member states. In the second category, there are the inter-organisational processes that reach beyond the work of the individual RBAs. Here policies are designed by multilateral committees and gain assent in mutual agreement. This would particularly apply to the CFS. Most of the multilateral instruments developed in Rome are non-binding upon nation states, not even the Codex Alimentarius, although they may have the power to profess a direction and create a reference point for national policy processes and further international discussion on the matters they touch. However, Rome-based processes have also produced legally binding agreements such as the State Port Measures Agreement designed to eliminate unregulated fishing, or the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture which aims to enhance the availability of plant genetic materials to farmers across the world.

Intra-organisational processes at the WFP and IFAD are relatively simple, in that the policies and work of the organisation are prepared by the organisation itself according to its overall purpose and set objectives. The new policies and plans are reviewed by the members of the governing bodies, and in the course of the so-called informal consultation processes discussed and sent back and forth in a revision process that might entail several loops. This usually involves some level of multilateral collaboration between member states. When a policy document reaches a point where the governing body's members signal that it has reached a sufficient level of acceptance, the policy will then be tabled for formal approval at one of its formal sessions.

The process at the WFP is relatively straightforward in that member states have the opportunity to engage with new documents, either in the course of informal, joint consultations with WFP management or in so-called list meetings in which countries grouped by geographical zone multilaterally meet and develop joint positions on proposed plans and policies. Some larger member states also discuss policies bilaterally with the WFP's management. There can be a number of informal meetings before the proposed documents are passed to the formal Executive Board Meeting for approval, but when this is done, the adopted convention is that the documents are passed unanimously with little or no amendment. It is highly unusual that the Board would vote

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3   In response, the FAO underwent a substantial reform process that lasted from 2008 – 2012 ("Immediate Plan of Action") which was triggered on the basis of member state criticism and an independent external evaluation. This has served to defuse much of the criticism. More information available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/mg881e/mg881e.pdf

upon a proposal. The predominantly humanitarian nature of the WFP's work and the urgency to roll out decisions make it incumbent on member states to ensure that no unnecessary delay is incurred, and most abide by this principle. The relative clarity and tangibility of the WFP's mandate do also support the practicality of this approach. IFAD has a similar way of developing its own policies and strategies. A major difference is that voting power is awarded to member states according to how they contribute to the fund, meaning that large donors wield a greater influence in the decision-making process.

The process is incomparably more complex at the FAO, not least due to the normative characteristic of much of its work and the fact that its outputs are often of significant importance to the domestic agricultural interests of member states. As a result, the intra-organisational work of the FAO by design creates considerably larger spaces for multilateral processes. On the one side, some policy review processes are similar to what goes on at the WFP and IFAD in that the FAO's three committees (Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) discuss and amend internal policies such as climate change, gender or strategic frameworks before these are referred to the Conference for approval. However, other policy design processes are more complex and are refined in specialised subcommittees addressing individual issues where the multilateral engagement is considerably greater. Member states often dedicate considerable technical expertise to the work of these committees, and there is a higher degree of politicisation, as there are often influential agriculture interest groups to take account of back home. As a result, progress can often be slow, and sometimes frustrating. In turn, the complexity of this process and the sometimes unsatisfying solutions that result from it might at least in part be made responsible for the operational weakness of the FAO. However, given the nature of the business and the high stakes for member states, a more streamlined process is not easy to envision.

Inter-organisational process. With the repositories of knowledge, normative influence and financial capacities within these three organisations, the Rome UN cluster is sufficiently diversified and dynamic to invite and sustain intricate inter-organisational multilateral processes as well. More than the sum of their parts, the RBAs have attracted the desire of a good number of state and non-state organisations to partnership and collaborate, be these research insti-

tutes, philanthropic foundations, NGOs or international financing organisations. Some of them, such as Biodiversity, the World Farmers Organisation or the International Land Coalition, have even established their headquarters in Rome. In addition, there is a broad spectrum of formal and informal processes and initiatives that pop into existence and disappear again once they have outlived their usefulness. These may range from a number of organisations or member state representations grouping together to explore or promote a particular theme, e.g. through a cycle of workshops, to longer term processes which are intended to have concrete policy outputs. But it is the CFS that is clearly the preeminent vehicle for inter-organisational, multilateral processes. The CFS reform led the Committee to embrace the broader field of organisations which relate their activities to the question of global food security in a way that moves beyond the purview of the RBAs. As a policy-focussed platform, the CFS is as such not an exclusive membership organisation, but works as an open space in which ideas and solutions can be discussed, tested, and if appropriate, spread by means of various learning events and policy-convergence processes. The CFS might broadly be understood to be a forum for a joint learning experience. Rather than simply being situated clearly around the concerns of the RBAs and member states, the CFS structure and way of working incorporate work streams that enable the so-called Civil Society and Private Sector Mechanisms to convey the voice of groups affected by food insecurity and the interests of agri-food system businesses respectively. Various work streams also ensure that knowledge and experience from NGOs, philanthropic societies, scientific institutes and relevant UN agents like the Special Rapporteur to the Right to Food, find entry into the overall policy debates.

But how does this work, and what kind of outputs does the CFS produce? In the last instance, the CFS is governed by its plenary that sits annually. A bureau, elected by the CFS plenary and composed of a chairperson and 12 member-state representatives, decides over organisational matters with the support of the CFS secretariat during intersessional periods. An additional Advisory Group is made up of representatives from the various participant categories and supports the bureau in technical issues. Beyond these, the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) stands as a group of sages with intricate knowledge of food and nutrition systems. Each year, the CFS plenary

The WFP Executive Board in session, November 2017.
Source: WFP/Giulio Napolitano

identifies one or two themes that should become the Committee's policy focus. These are then processed by the HLPE who prepare a scientific report and deliver related recommendations. In the next step, the documents are converted to policy recommendations that are drafted by member states and other organisations participating in the CFS's committees and fora. Ultimately, it is still member states who have a final say on whether and how a policy proposal is passed – which has to happen on the basis of an consensual decision – but in practice, all participating bodies are bound into the decision-making process, not least through the Civil Society and Private Sector Mechanisms.

The CFS is credited with a number of far-reaching policy documents, which while not binding upon member states, do have authoritative status within various branches. Policy recommendations such as the "Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security", the "Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutri-

tion (GSF)" or the "Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI)" stand out. All of these CFS outputs were designed through the prism of human development in order to encourage nation states to design their agricultural laws in a way that has a lasting positive impact on food security. Going even further, in 2004 the CFS adopted the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, which has encouraged several developing countries to adopt progressive laws and strategies to proactively protect the food security of their citizens.

What Rome delivers for the poor and hungry

So there is little of doubt that there is a flurry of vibrant engagement taking place in Rome with an impressive amount of paper output. But the question remains, is it worth the trouble and cost? Or to put it otherwise, what would happen if the RBAs and all that goes with them were suddenly swallowed up by the earth?

The FAO is an important clearing house for agricultural data, platform for policy discussion, source of technical expertise and a custodian for normative standards that make data and goods comparable. For example, standards and norms developed by the Codex Alimentarius or the International Plant Protection Convention are important reference tools for arbitration in international trade and recognised by the WTO under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). Without these references, international trade in agricultural products might be more complex, as standards would have to be agreed piece meal and bilaterally. This could lead to complications that would inhibit trade. Meanwhile, important annual publications compiled in Rome, such as SOFA and SOFI[4], are an important repository of information for directing bilateral development policy in the area of food security and nutrition and informing non-state actors on where they should direct aid efforts. Without these, donors would have less reliable information to go on when deciding how to direct aid efforts, and finding a coordinative consensus with other donors on where and how to invest in food systems would become more cumbersome.

The WFP is arguably the indispensable humanitarian body. Without it, economies of scale and coordinative capacities would be greatly reduced, to the detriment of millions of people who depend daily on the WFP to shield them from hunger. While the WFP could theoretically work as a body without the effort of multilateral oversight, it still relies on member nations' funding in order to function efficiently. This will only be forthcoming as long as members can be sure that their resources are used effectively and according to purpose. Outside, multilateral oversight by donor and recipient countries alike is critical to ensuring that accountability to taxpayers and aid beneficiaries is upheld and the organisation operates efficiently and economically.

IFAD has made an average annual investment of nearly $1 billion since 2010, benefitting 24 million rural poor, mostly smallholder farmers. In its history, it has evolved from a relatively simple funding mechanism into a more sophisticated finance institution that prepares and supervises country-led projects with a focus on rural poverty reduction. Programme resources are leveraged through co-financing with national and international partners, so that every dollar invested by IFAD brings more than another dollar of financing to the rural poor. Half of IFAD's investments now go to Africa, and even more to fragile and conflict-affected areas. IFAD operates in difficult-to-reach geographical areas and keeps the attention of policy makers on small-scale agriculture and remote farming communities. Notionally, IFAD's services could be carried out by another financing body, for example the WB or commercial finance institutions, but the same interfaces to an FAO or national agricultural departments would still have to be maintained. Given the sector-specific know-how that IFAD has built, the outcome would probably be no better for the rural poor. It is safe to say that without IFAD, important investments in food systems across the developing world would not be taking place. Without the multilateral processes in and around IFAD and the advocacy for the poorest that go with them, the plight of remote rural communities would be greater.

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4   The State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA); The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI)

Finally, the CFS brings together various interest groups and perspectives, and merges the voices of affected populations, the discourses of practitioners and the sciences with those of high-level policy dialogue. While this causes a lot of noise, it also creates important currents of thought that find their way into coordinated action against hunger and malnutrition. Without the cross-semination of thinking that the CFS provokes, the fight against hunger would become, pun intended, stunted and sterile.

In summary, we can conclude that Rome as the multilateral hub for matters pertaining to food security and nutrition falls short of what could be expected in a perfect world. But in the imperfect world that we have, it is what it takes to make a measurable difference to how food insecurity and malnutrition are tackled. A lot of what is going on in Rome needs to happen. If not in Rome, the discussions would have to be had elsewhere. The likelihood is that most alternatives would be more cumbersome and costly, and the bilateral path to fighting global hunger bit by bit would ultimately be impractical. This fact alone suggests a certain inevitability about the processes taking place in and around the RBAs. If the FAO did not already exist, it would have to be invented. Perhaps it would be located elsewhere, have another name and look and feel slightly different, but the international community would still need an FAO and its children. Agencies carrying out the duties of the WFP and IFAD are indispensable. If it were not these, it would be others, working with an FAO in some form to carry them out. Accordingly, while the Rome processes are indeed to some degree detached from where hunger is being fought, they are to a high extent crucial to ensuring that aid and services across the world can be made more efficient and targeted better. They are an equally important contribution to building, maintaining and improving sustainable international food systems, or to producing commercially distributed agricultural goods fairly and economically, and in a way that ensures that food remains as affordable and nutritious as possible. Finally, the vibrant and sometimes cacophonous exchange of ideas is the bedrock of audible advocacy and an impetus for innovation. It is unlikely that SDG2, the Sustainable Development Goal to eradicate hunger by 2030, would be as focussed and ambitious without the multilateral processes taking place in Rome.

Part 4: **Hunger and Swiss Contributions**

Hunger in Äthiopien: Ernährungssicherheit im dürregeplagten Land und der Beitrag der Schweiz

Manuel Flury[1]

In seiner Abschiedsrede vor den versammelten Botschafterinnen und Botschaftern in Addis Abeba lobte der abtretende schwedische Missionschef Ende 2011 die äthiopische Regierung für die Art und Weise, wie sie die Dürrekatastrophe der vergangenen Monate bewältigt habe. Während 1984/85 rund die Hälfte der damaligen Bevölkerung Äthiopiens von Hunger bedroht gewesen und 400'000 Menschen an Hunger gestorben seien - dieser Missionschef vertrat Schweden in Äthiopien bereits damals ein erstes Mal - habe während der Dürre 2010/11 'nur' ein Zehntel der Bevölkerung zu wenig zu essen gehabt und es seien keine Hungertote zu beklagen gewesen.

Die Ernährungsunsicherheit[2] bleibt in Äthiopien zwar sehr hoch, rund 8 Millionen Menschen sind auch in normalen Zeiten auf staatliche Unterstützung und über 3 Millionen (rund 5% der Bevölkerung) auf Nahrungsmittelhilfe angewiesen. Zwar hat sich das Management der Dürren stark verbessert. Die äthiopische Regierung hat während der eben zu Ende gehenden, zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Dürren von 2015 und 2017 mit mehreren hundert Millionen Dollars einen beachtlichen Anteil der Kosten für Überlebenshilfemassnahmen selber finanzieren können, undenkbar vor über 30 Jahren. Trotzdem ist die internationale Hilfe über die Jahre hinweg massiv geblieben. Kaum verändert haben sich die grundlegenderen Aspekte wie beispielsweise ein gesicherter Zugang zu Land und die Möglichkeiten für die Menschen auf dem Land, in dieses zu investieren.

Dürren und Hunger sind politisch bedeutsam

Wiederkehrende Dürren - die Leute sprechen von einer grossen Dürre alle zehn Jahre, in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten gar noch häufiger - brachten die Menschen Äthiopiens immer wieder an den Rand ihrer Existenz und bedeuteten für Hunderttausende, ja Millionen von ihnen Hunger und Unterernährung. Die archaische Landwirtschaft Äthiopiens ist über Jahrhunderte hinweg wenig produktiv geblieben, ohne die nötigen Investitionen in die Erhaltung der Böden und der Bodenfruchtbarkeit. Die natürlichen Produktionsgrundlagen sind stark degradiert. Erst mit dem Ende der Monarchie und der Machtübernahme durch das DERG-Regime 1974 setzten die landesweit und bis heute durchgeführten Bodenrehabilitierungs- und -erhaltungsmassnahmen ein. Es waren die feudalen politischen Verhältnisse, die wesentlich für die wenig produktive Überlebenslandwirtschaft während der Kaiserzeit verantwortlich waren. Hohe Zwangsabgaben für den landwirtschaftlichen Anbau auf dem Land, welches zu überwiegenden Teilen Feudalherren und der orthodoxen Kirche gehörte, sowie Fronarbeit lasteten schwer auf der fast ausschliesslich ländlichen Bevölkerung Äthiopiens. Ein zur Existenzsicherung vermeintlich notwendiges hohes Bevölkerungswachstum trug das Seine dazu bei, dass bebaubare Böden knapp wurden und dass sich die Bewirtschaftung in immer ungeeignetere, oft steile und unstabile Gebiete ausdehnte. Heute stehen praktisch keine Landreserven für Ackerbau mehr zur Verfügung. Wie weit die orthodoxe Kirche ebenfalls zur Armut der ländlichen bäuerlichen Bevölkerung beitrug und allenfalls noch heute beiträgt, bleibt offen.

Die hohe Anzahl von Fasten- und kirchlichen Feiertagen mit Arbeitsverboten, so ein Landwirtschaftsexperte[3], sei bis heute dafür verantwortlich, dass die Menschen monatlich kaum häufiger als an jedem

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Traditionelle Landwirtschaft mit einfachsten Geräten
Foto: Manuel Flury

dritten Tag arbeiten dürfen, auch wenn der Arbeits-anfall hoch wäre, wie zum Beispiel zur Erntezeit. Hungerkatastrophen waren und sind auch weiter-hin politisch bedeutsam. Der 1960 vom Kaiser nie-dergeschlagene Putsch stand in Verbindung mit dem Unmut über das feudale Pachtsystem, das für die Hungerkatastrophe 1959 mitverantwortlich war. „Die Menschen haben nichts zu essen, weil sie kein Land besitzen" war die Kernaussage der Putschisten (Asfa-Wossen 2014). Der Umsturz, der Ende 1974 zur Absetzung des letzten Kaisers Ras Tafari, Haile Selassie, führte, ging ebenfalls auf die Unfähigkeit des „Königs der Könige" zurück, die Hungerkatas-trophe 1973 in Wollo und Tigray überhaupt wahr-zunehmen und entsprechend zu handeln. Auf seiner letzten Reise nach Deutschland Ende 1973 skan-dierten äthiopische Studierende auf Plakaten mit den Worten: „Haile Selassie – geh nach Hause und gib deinem hungrigen Volk zu essen" (Asfa-Wos-sen 2014, S.16). 1972/73 starben nach Angaben von Ki-Zerbo (1981) 40'000 Menschen an den Folgen des Hungers. Im selben Jahr exportierte Äthiopien noch 200'000 Tonnen Getreide (Asfa-Wossen 2014, S.331). Dort, wo Bauern das eigene Land bestellten und Waren auf lokalen Märkten verkaufen konnten, war die Not geringer. Die Unfähigkeit des Kaisers war ein Grund für das Ende seiner Regentschaft. Es

war auch der erstmalige internationale Aufschrei, ausgelöst durch den Film "The Unknown Famine" einer britischen Fernsehanstalt, der zu einer der da-mals umfangreichsten internationalen Hilfsaktionen führte. Gleichzeitig begann sich international das Bild Äthiopiens als das hungernde Land schlechthin zu etablieren.

Das DERG Regime[4] unter Mengistu Haile Mariam reagierte 1984 auf die Hungersnot nicht anders als der Kaiser gut zehn Jahre zuvor. Die Führung igno-rierte vorerst die Tatsache, dass Millionen Menschen in der Folge der Dürre hungerten, sie war mit der Feier ihres zehnjährigen Jubiläums beschäftigt. Die Getreidequoten, welche die Bauernfamilien dem Staat abzugeben hatten, wurden auch noch während des Dürrejahres eingefordert. Wiederum war es erst internationale Aufmerksamkeit im Zuge der vom iri-schen Rockmusiker Bob Geldof mit dem Benefizkon-zert am 13. Juli 1985 lancierten Band Aid Kampagne, die zur Hilfe an die Millionen von Betroffenen führte, für Hunderttausende zu spät. Das Bild des hungern-den Kindes setzte sich weltweit zum Sinnbild des von Hunger gezeichneten Landes fest, ein Bild, das noch heute den Stolz der äthiopischen Bevölkerung

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4   Amharisch für «Komitee» oder «Rat».

stark verletzt. Trotz einer radikalen Landwirtschafts-reform 1990 mit der Abschaffung der Zwangsabgabe von Getreide und des Obligatoriums für die Bauern-familien, sich in Kooperativen zu organisieren, war eine weitere Dürre 1991 für den Sturz der DERG Regierung mitverantwortlich.

Auch die jüngsten Dürreperioden und die Art und Weise, wie die Regierung auf diese reagiert, bleiben politisch bedeutsam. In einer mündlichen Erklärung spielte der heutige Premierminister im September 2015 vor internationalen Vertreterinnen und Vertretern[5] die Bedeutung der Dürre in den von Pastoralisten - den Viehzüchtern mit ihren Wanderherden - bewohnten trockenen und halbtrockenen Gebieten Äthiopiens herunter. Diese Gebiete seien von geringer wirtschaftlicher Bedeutung, führte er aus.

Politische Instabilität in Äthiopien ging weniger direkt von Dürre und Hunger aus, als vielmehr von den politischen Prioritäten resp. dem Nichthandeln der Regierungen in der Bewältigung der Situation. Dies hat sich bis heute nicht grundlegend geändert.

Von feudaler Ausbeutung hin zu einer Politik der Ernährungssicherheit

Die kontinuierliche Bodendegradierung im landwirtschaftlich bedeutsamen Hochland auf Grund der jahrhundertelangen „low-technology agriculture", der grossflächigen Abholzung, dem fehlenden Bodenschutz und der dichten Bestockung mit Nutztieren „is undoubtedly one of the main factors in the increasingly serious problem of food security in the country" (Wolde Mariam 1990). Auch in den besten Zeiten lebten die Menschen in den guten Anbaugebieten „am Limit", sie konnten sich nur knapp selber versorgen, dies nicht zuletzt als Folge des feudalen Herrschaftssystems.

Die Ende der 1950er Jahre im Rahmen von Entwicklungsplänen (Fünfjahrespläne 1957 – 1973) formulierte Landwirtschaftspolitik setzte auf den Ausbau der Infrastruktur und auf die Förderung kommerzieller, grossbetrieblicher Landwirtschaft zur Stimulierung der Modernisierung der Landwirtschaft. Moderne Produktionstechniken und Möglichkeiten zu privatem Landbesitz sollten die kleinbäuerliche Selbstversorgungslandwirtschaft an die Märkte

Landwirtschaft zur Selbstversorgung mit lokalem Saatgut
Foto: Manuel Flury

führen. Die Hoffnungen, welche in diese Reformen gesteckt wurden, blieben jedoch grösstenteils unerfüllt. Viele Bauernfamilien wurden zudem zu Gunsten von Grossbetrieben von ihrem Boden vertrieben. Eine nachhaltige Entwicklung der kleinbäuerlichen Landwirtschaft fand auch unter der DERG Regierung nicht statt. Zwar lancierte die Regierung landesweite Bodenkonservierungskampagnen, die vom Feudalsystem eben erst befreiten Bauernfamilien blieben jedoch unter dem Zwang, einen Anteil des geernteten Getreides zu staatlich festgelegten, tiefen Preisen (1984 ein Fünftel des freien Marktpreises in Addis Abeba, gemäss Meredith 2006, S.331f) an die staatliche Vermarktungskorporation zu liefern, dies um den Städten und der Armee günstige Nahrungsmittel zu ermöglichen. Zudem war es ihnen untersagt, Land zu verpachten oder gar zu verkaufen und die Bauernfamilien waren verpflichtet, auf ihrem Land zu wohnen (Residenzpflicht). Die Politik organisierte die landwirtschaftliche Bevölkerung in Bauernkooperativen, was zusätzlich dazu beitrug, dass keine eigenständigen Landwirtschaftsbetriebe entstehen konnten. Die DERG Regierung zwang Millionen von Bauernfamilien umzusiedeln und sich in Kooperativen und Dörfern zu organisieren. Der fehlende sichere Zugang zu Land und zu seiner Nutzung vermochte die unsichere Ernährungssituation nicht zu verbessern, im Gegenteil. Der Staat investierte seine Mittel in neue Staatsfarmen, die aber nicht entscheidend zu einer Verbesserung der Versorgungslage beitragen konnten.
1996, fünf Jahre nach dem Sturz des DERG Regimes, zeichnete die Regierung der Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) mit der Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation

(ADLI) den Weg zu einer kommerziellen Kleinbauernlandwirtschaft auf. Der Staat resp. die Regierung bestimmte weiterhin Politik und Massnahmen. Das Land blieb Staatseigentum mit Nutzungsrechten für die Produzentinnen und Produzenten mit sehr weitgehenden und bis heute anhaltenden Beschränkungen für den Übertrag dieser Nutzungsrechte (Pacht). Diese Tatsache ist mitverantwortlich für die weiterhin geringen Investitionen in Land und Betriebe. Auch die Residenzpflicht wurde aufrechterhalten. Mit dieser Politik war eine Öffnung für ausländische Investitionen in die Landwirtschaft verbunden, dies um die Produktion der Kleinbetriebe auszuweiten, die Ernährung zu sichern, die Industrialisierung zu fördern und dabei Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen und die landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsmethoden über Technologietransfer zu verbessern. Es ging der Regierung dabei auch um Einnahmen aus den Landzinsen und um Deviseneinnahmen aus dem Export weiterer landwirtschaftlicher Produkte, neben dem Kaffee. Mit dieser Politik fand auch ein wichtiger Wechsel der bisherigen Ernährungssicherungsstrategie statt, weg von der Sicherung der Ernährung mit eigener Produktion hin zu Ernährungssicherung über den internationalen Handel mit Nahrungsmittelimporten. Äthiopien exportiert in guten Jahren Getreideüberschüsse ins Ausland. Diese Politik wurde 2005 in der neuen Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) verankert. Die auf den Markt ausgerichteten landwirtschaftlichen Grossbetriebe sollten die kleinbäuerliche Landwirtschaft kommerzialisieren und auch gleich den Privatsektor „beschleunigen", dies die entwicklungs- bzw. wirtschaftspolitische Absicht. Die Landwirtschaft sollte zum Motor für die Entwicklung des Landes werden. Im Zuge der anschliessenden Growth and Transformation Plans (ab 2010) intensivierte die Regierung den Ausbau der öffentlichen Dienstleistungen mit der landwirtschaftlichen Beratung, Gesundheitszentren, Schulen und Berufsbildungsinstitutionen, Strom- und Wasserversorgung, Verkehrswegen sowie Telekommunikationsnetzen. Sie verbesserte damit die Grundlagen für eine Steigerung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, ohne jedoch den Schlüsselbereich, die Landpolitik und damit den sicheren Zugang zu Land grundlegend anzupassen.

Horn von Afrika: «End drought emergencies»

Die Dürre- und Hungerkatastrophe, die 2010/2011 das ganze Horn von Afrika erfasste, mobilisierte die Staats- und Regierungschefs der Mitgliedländer der Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD[6], der regionalen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Anlässlich ihres historischen Gipfeltreffens in Nairobi im September 2011 beschlossen sie „to end drought emergencies and vulnerabilities from the IGAD region once and for all" (IGAD 2013). Mit Interventionen in sieben Bereichen[7] sollte IGAD die strukturellen Ursachen angehen, die in der Region regelmässig zum Ausbruch von Hungerkatastrophen in Dürrezeiten führten. Erklärtes Ziel war, die Überlebensfähigkeit der Bevölkerung und der Länder unter dem Stichwort "Resilienz" zu stärken. Grundlegend war dabei die Einsicht, dass die bisherige zumeist kurzzeitige Hunger- und Wiederaufbauhilfe keine Antwort auf die Anfälligkeit („vulnerability") der mehrheitlich pastoralen lokalen Bevölkerung bietet und damit auf die Dauer in einer Region mit zunehmenden Dürreereignissen keine nachhaltige Lösung darstellt. Mit den Interventionsbereichen anerkannten die Länder auch, dass die internen wie internationalen vielfältigen politischen und sozialen Konflikte als eine der zentralen Ursachen für die Probleme direkt angegangen werden müssen.

In der Folge formulierten alle Mitgliedländer, koordiniert vom IGAD Sekretariat, eigene auf gemeinsamen Prinzipien und Aktionslinien beruhende nationale Strategien und Aktionspläne. Die Entwicklungspartner – darunter auch die Schweiz – erklärten sich bereit, Mittel in der Gesamthöhe von mehreren Milliarden Dollar in regionale und nationale Programme zu investieren.

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6   Mitgliederländer: Äthiopien, Djibouti, Kenia, Somalia, Sudan, Südsudan, Uganda; die Mitgliedschaft von Eritrea ist seit 2007 sistiert.

7   „priority intervention areas: (i) equitable access and sustainable use of natural resources, while improving environmental management; (ii) enhancing market access, facilitating trade and availing versatile financial services; (iii) providing equitable access to livelihood support and basic social services; (iv) improving disaster risk management capabilities and preparedness for effective response; (v) enhancing the generation and use of research, knowledge, technology and innovations in the IGAD region; (vi) promoting conflict prevention and resolution and peace building; (vii) strengthening coordination mechanisms and institutional arrangements for more organized, collaborative and synergistic action as well as improving partnerships to increase the commitment and support necessary to execute the objectives of the initiative." (IGAD 2013)

Die äthiopische Regierung stellte die Ernährungssicherheit ins Zentrum ihrer eigenen Strategie "(to) improve food and nutrition security and enhance resilience to external shocks with particular focus on the ASAL (arid and semi-arid lands) communities in Ethiopia" (Ministry of Agriculture Government of Ethiopia 2012).

Mit der regionalen Initiative und der Strategie ist eine Veränderung der Haltung der äthiopischen Regierung gegenüber der pastoralen Bevölkerung und ihrer Lebensweise verbunden. Gestützt von einer breiten internationalen Diskussion zur wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung der pastoralen Lebens- und Wirtschaftsweise und ihrer Rolle in der Pflege der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen Wasser, Boden und Biodiversität nahmen vor allem die technisch Verantwortlichen im Landwirtschaftsministerium die bis anhin weitgehend ignorierte und in ihrem Lebensstil und ihrer Kultur vielfältig diskriminierte Bevölkerung in ihren Fokus. Die Stimmen, welche die Zukunft der Pastoralisten als sesshafte, in neuen Dörfern wohnende Ackerbauern sahen, wurden leiser. Lebensstrategien mit mobilen Viehherden, mit Anschluss an die Vieh- und Fleischmärkte und in Verbindung mit beruflicher Ausbildung, sowie einem neuen Fokus auf nachhaltige Nutzung von Boden und Wasser in den vernachlässigten Gebieten der äthiopischen trockenen und halbtrockenen Regionen erhielten in den vergangenen Jahren ein grösseres Gewicht. Die Regierung gab damit der Sicherung der Ernährung der bis anhin oft vergessenen Bevölkerung in den äthiopischen «lowlands» eine grössere Bedeutung.

Landfrage, der zentrale Faktor für die Ernährungssicherheit

Ernährungssicherheit und, in Dürrezeiten, Hunger und Unterernährung sind wie erwähnt eng mit der Landfrage verbunden. Ein sicherer Zugang zu Land erlaubt den Bauernfamilien, sowohl für den eigenen Lebensunterhalt zu produzieren als auch in die Modernisierung des Betriebs und in die Erhaltung des Bodens und seiner Fruchtbarkeit Arbeit und Geld zu investieren. Die feudale Ordnung mit Zwangsabgaben und Fronarbeit während des kaiserlichen Regimes und die neue Ordnung unter der DERG Regierung mit den staatlichen Abgabequoten, Kollektivierung von Bauernfamilien in producers' cooperatives, Umsiedlungsprogrammen und Investitionen in grosse Staatsfarmen vermochten den „sicheren Zugang zu Land" nicht zu gewährleisten, dies entgegen der politischen Parole von „the land to the tiller", «das Land denjenigen, die es bearbeiten». Das ausbeuterische System der Feudalherren wurde von einem Feudalismus durch den Staat bzw. die staatliche Bürokratie abgelöst.

Trotz der vor Ende der 1990er Jahre landesweit begonnenen Abgabe von Landnutzungszertifikaten – diese können jedoch nicht als Kollateral für landwirtschaftliche Kredite dienen, weil das Land weiterhin nicht den Bauernfamilien gehört - und einer gewissen Auflockerung von Möglichkeiten, Land zu verpachten, bleibt der Zugang zu Land für die Bauernfamilien wenig sicher. Zweifelhaft bleiben auch die Ergebnisse der Vergabe von grossen Flächen an landwirtschaftliche Investoren. Zum einen verlieren Tausende von Familien, die über keine Landnutzungsrechte der Regierung verfügen, den Zugang zu produktiven Anbau- und Weideflächen. Zum anderen vermögen diese Grossbetriebe weder einen Beitrag zur Sicherung der Ernährung noch zu Deviseneinnahmen aus dem Export ihrer Produkte zu liefern. Posluschny zeigt in ihrer Untersuchung (2017) von 13 Investitionsprojekten auf «that these foreign large-scale investment projects are not fully operational and do not realize their agricultural productivity potential» (2017, S.233). Ebenso limitiert sind die Möglichkeiten für die lokale Bevölkerung in diesen Investitionsprojekten zu arbeiten. Posluschny (2017) kommt zu Schluss, dass zwar Beschäftigung geschaffen wird, primär für Landlose und Frauen, jedoch zu niedrigsten Löhnen, «with poor working conditions (…) without any knowledge transfer to locals,» und, im Zusammenhang mit Umsiedlungen «increase local food insecurity» (S.231). Die Regierung gewährt insbesondere ausländischen Investoren steuerbefreite Einfuhr für Investitionsgüter und erlässt während mehrerer Jahre die Steuern auf den Betriebsergebnissen. Mit einer äusserst tiefen Bemessung der Landzinsen sollen offenbar attraktive Bedingungen für Investoren geschaffen werden. Abbinck (2011) berichtet von der indischen Unternehmung Karuturi Global, welche 2009 2.5 USD resp. 135 ETB pro Hektare zu bezahlen hatte. Ramato (2011) erwähnt 30 – 35 ETB pro Hektare und Jahr in einem Beispiel in Gambella, im äussersten Westen Äthiopiens gelegen während Posluschny (2017) in ihrer Fallstudie einen durchschnittlichen Landzins von 114 ETB (rund 6 USD) festhält.

Insgesamt fehlt die Evidenz, dass die Ernährungssicherheit mit den grossbetrieblichen Investitionen gestützt und verbessert wird. Gemäss dem Oakland Report «commercial investment will increase rates of food insecurity in the vicinity of land investments. Despite Ethiopia's endemic poverty and food insecurity, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that these investments contribute to improved food security». (The Oakland Institute 2011, S.1). Zudem fördert die Regierung den Export von Nahrungsmitteln zur Gewinnung von Devisen, dies auf Kosten des Nahrungsmittelangebots im Lande selber. Unbedingt erwähnt werden muss die vielfach menschenunwürdige und menschenrechtswidrige Art, unter der Landzuteilungen vorgenommen wurden, wie dies die UNO Menschenrechtskommission verschiedentlich feststellte[8].

Der äthiopische Landrechtsexperte Daniel Behailu (2015) kommt in seiner Publikation zur äthiopischen Landpolitik zu folgenden Schlüssen:

• "Land is the biggest tool for political control & 'population hoarding'
• Tenure insecurity, land fragmentation, and massive poverty is emblematic to the nation
• The statute law is at odd with the custom in action
• The land policy undermines human rights and environmental protection projects"

Ernährungssicherheit ist verbessert, die Ernährung von 5-10 % der Menschen bleibt jedoch nicht gesichert

Heute gelten rund 8 Millionen Menschen in Äthiopien als chronisch „ernährungsunsicher", diese sind vom Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) der Regierung erfasst und erhalten Hilfe in Form von direkter finanzieller Unterstützung oder über „food and cash for work" Programme. Die Dürrekatastrophen 2015/2016 (El Nino) und 2016/2017 haben weitere 8,5 Millionen zu Empfängerinnen und Empfängern von Nahrungsmittelhilfe gemacht.

Gemäss dem Global Hunger Index (2017) bleibt die Situation in Äthiopien weiterhin „ernsthaft", auf der mittleren von fünf Stufen. Die Situation hat sich in den vergangenen knapp 20 Jahren substantiell verbessert, mit einer über 40 prozentigen Reduktion des Indexes, von der höchsten in die aktuell mittlere Stufe. Dies steht auch in Bezug mit der Armut, die gemäss Weltbank (2014) von 68% in den Jahren 1995-2000, 44% in 2000 auf 33% in 2011 gesunken ist. Gemäss dem Compact2025 des International Food Policy Research Institute IFPRI bleiben 2015 weiterhin 32% der Äthiopierinnen und Äthiopier unterernährt. Neben den menschlichen und sozialen Leiden sind die wirtschaftlichen Kosten der fehlenden Ernährungssicherheit hoch. Gemäss Schätzungen waren 2009 (Ramato 2011) mehr als ein Fünftel der Bevölkerung von einer Kombination von Hungerhilfe und staatlichen, von westlichen Geberländern finanzierten, Transferzahlungen abhängig. Rund ein Sechstel des Bruttoinlandprodukts musste in diesem Jahr für die Bekämpfung der Unterernährung aufgewendet werden.

Das politische Umfeld hat sich seither stark verbessert und im neuesten Plan der Regierung für die Jahre 2015/16 – 2019/20 (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016) figuriert die Ernährungssicherheit als unabdingbare Voraussetzung für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Transformation. Drei Programme stehen dabei im Vordergrund, (i) zur Steigerung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktivität, (ii) zur Erhaltung der natürlichen Ressourcen mit massiven Bodenkonservierungsanstrengungen und (iii) zur Unterstützung der Menschen ohne gesicherte Ernährung (PSNP).

Die Zahl der vom PSNP erfassten Menschen weist auf die erwähnte, chronische mangelnde Ernährungssicherheit von 8 – 10 % der äthiopischen Bevölkerung hin. Diese Zahlen haben sich in den vergangenen Jahren nicht verbessert. Forschungsarbeiten zeigen, dass es die Kombination der drei erwähnten Programme ist, welche die Ernährung im Land sichern kann. Die mit dem PSNP verbundenen massiven Transferzahlungen bleiben wirtschaftlich wie politisch jedoch problematisch, dies nicht zuletzt, weil sie im Wesentlichen (zu 86%, gemäss DFID 2015) mit Entwicklungsgeldern finanziert werden. Trotzdem, das PSNP ist beispielhaft dafür, wie ein Land und die internationale Gemeinschaft humanitäre Überlebenshilfe sinnvoll mit der langfristigen sozioökonomischen Entwicklung verbinden können.

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8   UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) im Rahmen der Universal Periodic Review zu Äthiopien.

Ernährungssicherheit im Kern der äthiopischen Entwicklungspolitik
Foto: Manuel Flury

Ein erstes Fazit
Politisierte Ernährungssicherheit: Der Staat bleibt der alles bestimmende Akteur

Die Regierung Äthiopiens ist auch im Politikfeld Ernährungssicherheit der allein massgebende Akteur. Die von ihr verabschiedeten Politiken, Strategien und Massnahmenpläne sind verbindlich für alle, staatliche wie nichtstaatliche und privatwirtschaftliche Akteure. Der Handlungsspielraum der nichtstaatlichen Akteure bleibt gering.

Die Regierung organisiert die landwirtschaftliche Produktion und beeinflusst damit auch direkt die wirtschaftliche Situation von drei Vierteln der äthiopischen kleinbäuerlichen, ländlichen Bevölkerung. Produktionssteigerndes Saatgut und Düngemittel werden von staatlichen Stellen bestimmt und verteilt, auch wenn der lokale Austausch unter den Bauern und Bäuerinnen und die lokalen Märkte weiterhin bedeutend sind. Beratung wird praktisch ausschliesslich von den staatlichen Beraterinnen und Beratern

angeboten, hier und dort unterstützt und ergänzt von Projekten nichtstaatlicher Organisationen. Auch die der Produktion nachgelagerte Vermarktung und allenfalls Verarbeitung prägt die Regierung stark, auch mit eigenen Unternehmungen und zu vorteilhaften Bedingungen eingeladenen internationalen Investoren. Sie hat mit Produktivitätsverbesserungen, wie zum Beispiel vertical agriculture aber auch mit dem Ausbau der Infrastruktur (Strassen, Elektrizitätsversorgung, Gesundheits- und Bildungseinrichtungen, Kommunikation) die Lage der ländlichen Bevölkerung massgeblich verbessert, worauf die periodischen Haushaltbefragungen (WIDE) hinweisen. Gründe für diese Monopolstellung sind in den politischen Vorstellungen von Partei und Regierung zu suchen. Die Machtbasis der dominierenden, alleine regierenden Partei befindet sich auf dem Land, bei den Millionen von Kleinbauernfamilien.

Ramato (2011) argumentiert in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Landpolitik Äthiopiens stark von politischen Interessen geprägt bleibe. Die herrschende EPRDF betrachte sich dabei als ideologisch und moralisch Einzige legitimiert, entwicklungspolitisch motiviert zu agieren. Die Landpolitik der EPRDF entspricht gemäss Lavers (2012) ihrer populistischen Politik als ursprünglich „peasant-based" Bewegung, womit sie sich die politische Basis sichert.

Eng mit der Machtpolitik der Partei verbunden ist die sicherheitspolitische Kontrolle über die äthiopische Gesellschaft. Was für die Grenzregionen insbesondere zu den Nachbarländern Somalia und Eritrea gilt, gilt ebenso für weitere Gebiete sowohl des äthiopischen Hochlandes westlich wie östlich des Riftvalley: allen Autonomiebestrebungen werden trotz föderalistischer Rhetorik das zentralstaatliche Sicherheits- und Machterhaltungsparadigma entgegengestellt. Damit bleibt, um beim Thema zu bleiben, auch die Ernährungssicherheitspolitik (wie bereits und speziell bei der Landpolitik erwähnt) stark von sicherheits- und machtpolitischen Prinzipien von Partei und Regierung bestimmt. Die Handlungsspielräume der technokratischen Kräfte innerhalb der Regierung bleiben damit gering und auf externe (Entwicklungs-)Finanzierung angewiesen. Die beabsichtigte Transformation der Landwirtschaft mit der Sicherung der Ernährung für alle ist noch nicht gelungen.

Der Beitrag der Schweiz[9]

Die Schweizerische Humanitäre Hilfe (DEZA/HH) hat spätestens seit der grossen Dürre- und Hungerkatastrophe Mitte der 1980er Jahre eine wichtige Rolle zur Sicherung der Ernährung in Notzeiten gespielt. Im Zentrum stand dabei die technische und finanzielle Unterstützung der Vereinten Nationen in ihren Koordinationsaufgaben. Der entsprechende Mechanismus, die Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, wurde technisch von der DEZA/HH etabliert. Aus diesem Mechanismus ist ein eigentliches «early warning and food security analysis network» entstanden (SDC 2010). Die DEZA/HH spielte diese Rolle nicht nur während der verschiedenen Notsituationen, sondern auch in den nachfolgenden Übergangs- und Wiederaufbauzeiten mit Blick auf nachhaltige Er-

nährungssicherung. Über eine Periode von knapp 20 Jahren sicherte die Schweiz als Katalysator mit rund CHF 50 Millionen diesen wichtigen Mechanismus, der später in die heutige United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN OCHA einging und damit zu einer festen Institution im UN System wurde. Neben logistischer und finanzieller Unterstützung spielten die «secondments», die Entsendung Schweizerischer Fachleute, eine entscheidende Rolle.

Ergänzend zu dieser strukturellen Unterstützung leistete die Schweiz Nothilfe[10] über das Welternährungsprogramm WFP, das IKRK und die Rotkreuzgesellschaften. Diese Hilfe stand intern wie extern jedoch immer wieder in der Kritik, auch im Zusammenhang mit dem Entscheid von 2002, die Präsenz der DEZA/HH abzuschliessen. Kritisiert wurde unter anderem der kontinuierliche Bedarf Äthiopiens bzw. der äthiopischen Regierung für Nahrungsmittelhilfe und die trotz verschiedener Ernteüberschüsse hoch bleibende Zahl an Menschen, die mit Nahrungsmitteln versorgt werden müssen. Die von verschiedenen Ländern gelieferten Naturallieferungen und Nahrungsmittel[11] und die damit verbundene Beeinflussung der Preise zu Ungunsten der äthiopischen Bäuerinnen und Bauern war ebenfalls Gegenstand der Kritik. Die Fragen zur Präsenz der Schweiz blieb über Jahre hinweg aktuell: Was ist die richtige Art, Äthiopien zu helfen? Wie soll die Schweiz in Äthiopien präsent sein und mit wie vielen Mitteln? Die internationale Nahrungsmittelhilfe stand vor grossen Schwierigkeiten, weil die Regierung ungenügend Rechenschaft über die von ihr verteilten Waren, aber auch über die Zahl der Bedürftigen leistete. Die Geberorganisationen waren aus guten Gründen sehr skeptisch, ob diese Nahrungsmittel auch wirklich bei den Bedürftigen ankamen resp. ob alle Begünstigten gleichberechtigt behandelt wurden. Sie hatten den Verdacht, dass die Verteilung der Nahrungsmittel politischen Zwecken diente. Der Schliessungsentscheid der Schweiz von 2002 stand auch damit im Zusammenhang.

Ende 2010 richtete die DEZA/HH im Zusammenhang mit der Not- und Wiederaufbauhilfe nach der grossen Dürre am Horn von Afrika in Addis Abeba

10 1966 – 2016: 301 Mio CHF, DEZA interne Angaben 3.4.2017.

11 Unter der Führung des von den USA und ihren Produktionsüberschüssen bestimmten und von der äthiopischen Regierung instrumentalisierten Welternährungsprogramms.

eine Antenne des Büros in Nairobi ein, womit die Schweizerische Humanitäre Hilfe in Äthiopien wieder vor Ort präsent wurde. Neben eigenen Projekten und Beiträgen an schweizerische und internationale Entwicklungsorganisationen sprach der Bundesrat substantielle zusätzliche Mittel für Nothilfemassnahmen infolge der neuesten Dürrekatastrophen 2010/2011 und 2015 – 2017. Die Schweiz stellte wiederum technische Expertinnen und Experten, mit denen Aktionen von UN OCHA, dem UN Flüchtlingshilfswerk HCR und dem Welternährungsprogramm WFP unterstützt werden. Neben gezielter Überlebenshilfe kümmert sich die Schweiz um den Schutz der Flüchtlinge und intern Vertriebener, dabei insbesondere der Kinder. Wiederum übernimmt die DEZA/HH aktiv Verantwortung für die Koordination der humanitären Organisationen in Äthiopien.

Fortan ist die Humanitäre Hilfe der Schweiz ein fester und integrierter Teil der neuen regionalen Kooperationsstrategie Horn von Afrika und der Antwort der Schweiz auf die humanitären und politischen Krisen in Somalia und dem Horn von Afrika (siehe weiter unten).

Eine grosse Anzahl weiterer Schweizerischer Akteure (private Hilfswerke und Entwicklungsorganisationen, wissenschaftliche Forschungsinstitutionen) engagieren sich seit vielen Jahren für die Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse insbesondere der kleinbäuerlichen Bevölkerung im äthiopischen Hochland. Humanitäre Hilfe, aber auch langfristig ausgerichtete Initiativen von privaten Hilfswerken und von Einzelpersonen haben eine lange und erfolgreiche Geschichte. Viele werden dabei auch vom Bund mit Geldern aus den Budgets der öffentlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und der Forschung via dem Schweizerischen Nationalfonds unterstützt. Ausgerichtet auf die Ernährungssicherheit in Äthiopien ist namentlich die intensive wissenschaftliche Erforschung von Bodenerosion resp. der Entwicklung von Boden- und Wasserkonservierungstechniken zu erwähnen. Die von den Universitäten Bern und Addis Abeba und der äthiopischen Regierung seit anfangs der 1980er Jahren unternommenen Arbeiten mündeten in technische Standards, die in den landesweiten Bodenkonservierungs- und –rehabilitierungskampagnen zur Anwendung kamen und weiterhin kommen. Aus dieser Forschungszusammenarbeit ist beispielsweise das Land and Wa-

ter Resources Centre[12] (WLRC) hervorgegangen, das landesweit anerkannte Kompetenzzentrum für einen nachhaltigen Umgang mit Land resp. Boden und Wasser. Die DEZA arbeitet mit diesem Zentrum weiterhin zusammen. Ebenfalls im Rahmen schweizerisch-äthiopischer Forschungspartnerschaften stehen die Entwicklung human- und veterinärmedizinischer Versorgungskonzepte, vor allem für Viehzüchter mit ihren mobilen Herden, und Fragen des (föderalen) Staatsaufbaus. Das neue Kooperationsprogramm Horn von Afrika stützt sich mit spezifischen Projekten auf die dabei gewonnenen Einsichten ab.

Die Schweiz richtet ihr Engagement am Horn von Afrika mit der neuen Strategie (ab 2013) auf die Linderung der Not und die Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse der vorab somalischen Bevölkerung in Somalia, Somaliland, Nordostkenia und Süd- und Südostäthiopien aus. Diese Menschen leben im Wesentlichen von der Tierhaltung, mit mobilen Herden. Sie leiden unter Krieg, Terror, immer häufigeren Dürren und einer wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, die ihre Lebensräume zusätzlich einschränkt. Die Schweiz verbindet mit ihrer Zusammenarbeit die kurzfristige Überlebenshilfe mit langfristigem Aufbau besserer Lebensgrundlagen. In Anlehnung an die erwähnte Strategie von IGAD geht es um Bedingungen, die es den Menschen erlauben, ihr Leben so zu gestalten, dass sie weniger anfällig sind für Dürren und politische Krisen (Stichwort «Resilienz»). Dazu gehören sowohl ein sicherer Zugang zu Weideland, zu Märkten und zu (veterinär-) medizinischer Versorgung als auch eine glaubwürdige, rechenschaftspflichtige und transparente Verwaltung. Erste Projekte wurden 2015 und 2016 lanciert.

Ein zweites Fazit
Die Schweiz unterstützt humanitär und technisch, jedoch ohne nennenswerten politischen Einfluss

Schweizerische Akteure kümmern sich seit Jahrzehnten um das Leben der Menschen in Äthiopien und tragen mit vielfältigen Projekten und Einsätzen zu Verbesserungen ihrer Lebensverhältnisse bei. Im Vordergrund standen und müssen weiterhin Massnahmen stehen, die das Überleben der Menschen sichern helfen. Weiterhin bleiben Millionen von Äthiopierinnen und Äthiopier von Nahrungsmittelhilfe abhängig, es gelingt der Regierung des Landes nicht,

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12   http://www.wlrc-eth.org/

«Vertical agriculture» zur Verbesserung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion
Foto: Manuel Flury

die Ernährung für alle zu sichern. Dies liegt, wie aufgezeigt, nicht nur in den wiederkehrenden Naturereignissen wie Dürreperioden und Überflutungen begründet, sondern ist eng mit den macht- und sicherheitspolitischen Interessen der Regierung und der Eliten im Land verbunden.

Die Schweiz hat erst 2014 einen Staatsvertrag mit Äthiopien zu politischen Konsultationen unterzeichnet. Sonst bleibt der Schweizerische Beitrag an die Ernährungssicherung und die Politik Äthiopiens im Wesentlichen ein humanitärer und technischer, mit einiger auch langfristig positiver Wirkung. Die Schweiz hat jedoch, salopp formuliert, keinen «political stake» in Äthiopien resp. bei der äthiopischen Regierung. Der im Zusammenhang mit der Migration von Äthiopierinnen und Äthiopier von der äthiopischen Regierung nicht aufgenommene Wunsch nach einem migrationspolitischen Dialog ist dafür sinnbildlich. Ebenso wenig Gehör finden bei der äthiopischen Regierung menschenrechtliche Bedenken, wie sie etwa im Zusammenhang mit der Landvergabe an grosse Landwirtschaftsbetriebe, mit der Umsiedlung pastoraler Bevölkerungsgruppen, im Umgang mit den ethnisch-politischen Spannungen im Land oder mit den Konflikten um Zugang zu Wasser und Weideland aufgeworfen werden.

Das neue Kooperationsprogramm ist durchaus auch politisch ausgerichtet. Es tut dies «bottom-up», in der Unterstützung von guter Regierungsführung auf unterer (Verwaltungs-) Stufe, aber auch mit gezielter Unterstützung technischer Standards (im Bereich Boden- und Wasserkonservierung) auf nationaler Ebene. Dabei kann die Schweiz mit vergleichsweise geringen finanziellen Mitteln, aber einer gezielten Präsenz auf lokaler Ebene einen auch politisch relevanten Beitrag leisten an die notwendige Veränderung hin zu einer gesicherten Ernährung und nachhaltigen Lebensweise der Menschen in Äthiopien. Der politische Einfluss jedoch bleibt beschränkt.

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Wie Caritas Schweiz den Hunger bekämpft

Monique Frey[1]

Caritas Schweiz verteilt Lebensmittel und Wasser in Hungerregionen. Sie reagiert rasch und zielgenau, dank ihrem weltweiten Netzwerk lokaler Partnerorganisationen. Aber Hunger wird nicht nur reaktiv bekämpft, sondern muss vor allem prospektiv verhindert werden. Dies geschieht über die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, welche dem Menschenrecht «Zugang zu ausreichenden und gesunden Lebensmitteln» Geltung verschafft. Denn trotz einem globalen Lebensmittelüberschuss sind immer noch über 800 Millionen Menschen unterernährt (FAO 2017)[2]. Absurderweise leben die meisten der mangelernährten Personen auf dem Land und produzieren selber Lebensmittel!

Wer an Hunger denkt, denkt an Afrika. Wer die 80iger Jahre erlebt hat, kann sich kaum von den Bildern der äthiopischen Kinder lösen, welche mit spindeldürren Ärmchen und aufgeblähten Bäuchen in Massen starben. Abgemagertes Vieh, das sich zwischen dürren Sträuchern durch ödes Land schleppt, hat diese Bilder abgelöst. Das Land bleibt das gleiche. Zwischen dem Viehsterben 2016/2017 und der Hungersnot 1983 liegen mehr als 30 Jahre erfolgreiche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

In der Subsahara kämpfen afrikanische Staaten mit Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft seit über 50 Jahren gegen wiederkehrenden Hungersnöte. Sind vor 30 Jahren bei der Dürre in Äthiopien hunderttausende – gewisse Quellen sprechen von einer Million – Menschen verhungert, so sind heute einzelne Tragödien von verhungernden Kindern immer noch eine traurige Realität, doch zum Glück setzt kein Massensterben mehr ein.

Und das ist nicht nur in Äthiopien so. Auch wenn es nach wie vor Hunger gibt, sterben heute weniger Personen an Hunger, als vor 10, 20 oder 30 Jahren. Das ist auch ein Verdienst von Organisationen wie der Caritas Schweiz. Denn heute ist die Nothilfe besser koordiniert, sie gelangt schneller und in weiter entfernte Regionen. Das hilft Leben retten. Und sie konzentriert sich nicht mehr nur auf das unmittelbare Überleben der Bevölkerung, sondern schafft Übergänge zu nachhaltiger Entwicklung. Auch die Länder selber tragen heute viel zur Hungerbekämp-

fung bei. In Äthiopien müssen zum Beispiel alle Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner nach Bedarf bis zu 30 Tage Dienst am Land erweisen. So terrassieren die Menschen unermüdlich das Gelände, um neue Ackerflächen zu gewinnen, und verbessern die Bodenfruchtbarkeit durch Boden- und Wasserkonservierungsmethoden. Dies sind wichtige Massnahmen um Hunger mittelfristig zu verhindern.

Hunger hat in einer globalisierten Welt immer komplexe Ursachen und ist nicht die Folge eines einzelnen Auslösers. Wo staatliche Strukturen funktionieren und die internationale Gemeinschaft Zugang hat für humanitäre Hilfe, wird aus einer Dürre nicht eine Hungerkrise. Trifft die Dürre aber ein Land, in dem Unsicherheit und Instabilität herrschen, besteht die Gefahr einer Hungersnot. In Konfliktsituationen ist der Hunger auch nach wie vor eine schreckliche Waffe, unter der die Zivilbevölkerung am meisten leidet. Aktuelle Beispiele sind Jemen oder Südsudan.

2016/2017 musste Caritas zwar wiederum Nothilfe in Äthiopien leisten und verteilte an mehr als 100'000 Personen Lebensmittel und Wasser. Aber gleichzeitig intensiviert Caritas auch die Bestrebungen, dass die nächste Dürre sich nochmals weniger auswirkt. Getreu dem Motto «Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe» werden Saatgut, Ochsen und Werkzeug abgegeben und Caritas schult Bauern und Bäuerinnen darin, wie sie mit Wetterextremen umgehen können. Dies führt dann nahtlos in die Instrumente der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit über, respektive Nothilfe und Entwicklungshilfe werden parallel angeboten.

Hungerbekämpfung hört also nicht mit der Überlebens- und Nothilfe auf, sondern führt weiter zur Prävention von Hunger, Aufklärung über Marktme-

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1   Fachstelle Ernährungssicherheit und Märkte, Caritas Schweiz

2   FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2017. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. Rome, FAO..

chanismen und Besitzverhältnisse hin zur landwirtschaftlichen Schulung. Insgesamt werden die Ziele verfolgt, die Erträge zu steigern und die Produkte zu diversifizieren. Alle diese Instrumente der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit betreibt Caritas ebenso intensiv wie die Nothilfe.

In der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit hat Caritas zwei Hauptziele, um Ernährungssicherheit und eine gesunde Ernährung zu erreichen: erstens die Unterstützung von Bäuerinnen und Bauern in der nachhaltigen, profitablen Bewirtschaftung ihrer Äcker und Weiden und zweitens die Schaffung von Zugang zum Markt zu fairen Bedingungen.

Ziel 1: Kleinbauern und Viehhalter befähigen, natürliche Ressourcen nachhaltig zu bewirtschaften, um den Zugang zu Lebensmitteln und einer ausgewogenen Ernährung zu verbessern.

Caritas engagiert sich seit über drei Jahrzehnten in der ländlichen Entwicklung. Sie ist überzeugt, dass Kleinbauern und Viehhalter die wichtigsten Partner in der Lebensmittelproduktion sind. Um die Ernährungssicherheit und eine ausgewogene Ernährung von Kleinproduzenten zu gewährleisten, muss die Produktivität gesteigert, müssen die Produktionssysteme mit ökologischen Ansätzen diversifiziert

und die Fähigkeiten der Kleinbauern, natürliche Ressourcen auf nachhaltige Art und Weise zu verwalten, verbessert werden. Landwirte, lokale Kleinbauernorganisationen und Beratungsdienste werden in agroökologischen Anbaumethoden und nachhaltigen Landmanagement-Technologien ausgebildet. Diese sind nicht nur wichtig, um die natürlichen Grundlagen zu schützen, sondern sie erhöhen auch die landwirtschaftlichen Erträge und somit das Einkommen. Zudem muss der sektorübergreifende Dialog zwischen Gemeinschaften, zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen, dem Staat und dem Privatsektor initiiert und so gestaltet werden, dass eine gerechte Verteilung der natürlichen Ressourcen ermöglicht wird und informierte Entscheide gefällt werden können. Noch immer werden zum Beispiel zu oft Land- oder Wasserrechte veräussert, ohne dass Bauern und Bäuerinnen etwas dazu zu sagen hätten. Um das obenstehende zu erreichen, fördert Caritas ländliche Beratungsdienste. Beratungen richten sich auch nicht mehr nur an den Haushaltsvorstand, sondern vermehrt auch an Frauen. Denn sie sind es oftmals, die die gesamte Landwirtschaft übernehmen, während die Männer anderswo ein höheres Einkommen suchen.

Die Bäuerin Kalo Bokata in Dhas in der Borana Zone in Äthipien hat alle ihre Tiere verloren. Sie hilft bei der Rehabilitation von landwirtschaftlichem Land und bekommt dafür einen Lohn, mit welchen sie nebst dringend benötigten Lebensmittel (Zucker, Mais, Mehl, etc.) auch noch eine Ziege kaufen will.
Bild: Caritas.

Beispiel Haiti: Geprägt von Armut und verheerenden Wirbelstürmen

Haiti ist eines der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder der Welt und das ärmste Land der westlichen Hemisphäre. Die Wirtschaft des Landes ist schwach und das politische System instabil. Die Bevölkerung leidet unter Arbeitslosigkeit, Unter- und Mangelernährung sind weit verbreitet. Die Situation wird zudem durch regelmässige Umweltkatastrophen wie Wirbelstürme und Überschwemmungen, aber auch das verheerende Erdbeben vom Januar 2010, weiter verschärft.

In Haiti leben 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung unter der Armutsgrenze. Dreiviertel der Armutsbetroffenen leben in ländlichen Gebieten. Die Existenzgrundlage von knapp 70 Prozent der Bevölkerung ist der landwirtschaftliche Sektor, welcher aber nur 27 Prozent des Bruttoinlandprodukts des Landes erwirtschaftet. Die nationale Produktion deckt nur gerade 50 Prozent des Lebensmittelbedarfs ab, die andere Hälfte muss importiert werden. Die Ernährungssicherheit hat sich durch das Erdbeben 2010, Choleraausbrüche sowie zahlreiche Wirbelstürme (z.B. Isaac und Sandy 2012, Matthew 2016) weiter verschlechtert. Die landwirtschaftliche Produktion ist nicht profitabel, wodurch Investitionen in diesen Sektor ausbleiben. Als Folge steigen die Lebensmittelpreise und verschlimmern die Krise.

Haiti war einst von üppigen Wäldern bedeckt, die in den letzten 50 Jahren abgeholzt wurden. Heute sind nur noch zwei Prozent der Fläche bewaldet. Diese Abholzung hat gravierende Folgen: Bodenerosion, instabile Berghänge, Hangrutschungen, Murgänge mit verheerenden Konsequenzen für die Landwirtschaft. Die Bodenqualität verschlechtert sich und ein landwirtschaftlicher Ertrag bleibt aus. Dies zwingt die Bäuerinnen und Bauern, die letzten Bäume zu fällen und als Bauholz oder zur Kohleproduktion zu verkaufen.

Um diese Situation zu verbessern, arbeitet Caritas in den Berggebieten von Petit Goâve. Das städtische Zentrum Petit Goâve, wo die Bauern und Bäuerinnen ihre Produkte zu einem guten Preis verkaufen könnten, ist nur durch eine kaum befahrbare Strasse erreichbar. Caritas trägt dazu bei, dass die Zielgruppe des Projekts effizientere Produktionsmethoden anwendet, ihre Produktion diversifiziert sowie Zugang zum Markt erhält und dadurch ihr Einkommen steigern kann.

Da die Abholzung der Wälder stark mit dem Problem der Armut verknüpft ist, zielt das Projekt von Caritas nicht nur auf die Verbesserung der Anbaumethoden, sondern auch auf Wiederaufforstung und den Schutz der natürlichen Ressourcen ab. Um die Wiederaufforstung im Projektgebiet zu fördern, werden kleine Baumschulen eröffnet, sowie Schulungen zu Aufforstung und Unterhalt der Baumschulen durchgeführt. Die produzierten Baumsetzlinge werden zu einem subventionierten Preis an die Bauern und Bäuerinnen verkauft. Ein besonderes Augenmerk wird auf die Pflanzung von Obstbäumen gelegt, da der Verkauf der Früchte das Einkommen der Familien steigern kann. Weiter diversifiziert werden die Einkommensmöglichkeiten der lokalen Bevölkerung durch die Förderung von Gemüsegärten oder der Kaninchenzucht. Durch effizientere Produktionsmethoden (z.B. kürzere Produktionszyklen) und besseres Saatgut können Produkte auf den Markt gebracht werden, wenn die Preise noch nicht ins bodenlose sinken. Für die Verbesserung des Zugangs zu den Märkten im nächsten städtischen Zentrum Petit Goâve hat Caritas in enger Zusammenarbeit mit der lokalen Bevölkerung die Wiederinstandsetzung der Verbindungsstrasse Delatte – Petit Goâve erreicht.

Nach dem Verlust von mehr als 60 Prozent der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion infolge der Dürre, die durch das El Niño-Phänomen im Jahr 2015 verursacht wurde, wurde das Projekt um den Bau einer Wasserrückhalteeinrichtung ergänzt. Heute verfügt die Gemeinde über 4 Mikrostaudämme mit einem Fassungsvermögen von je 200 m³. Damit können die Menschen ihren Bewässerungsbedarf besser decken und ihre Tiere tränken. Ein lokales Wasserkomitee ist für die Bewirtschaftung und den Unterhalt verantwortlich.

Nachdem der Hurrikan Matthew 2016 die Region stark getroffen, Obstbäume entwurzelt und viele Feldkulturen zerstört hatte, unterstützte Caritas die Bäuerinnen und Bauern mit sogenannten „Cash for Work"-Aktivitäten: Dank der Spende von Saatgut konnten die landwirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten schneller wiederaufgenommen werden und mit dem zur Verfügung gestellten Wellblech wurden Häuser und Schulen repariert.

In diesem Projekt arbeiten auch Madame und Monsieur Jean-Louis mit. Sie leben in einem Bergdorf in der Gemeinde Petit-Goâve mit vier ihrer sechs Kinder und bewirtschaften ein Grundstück von 0,2 Hektaren. Dank der technischen und finanziellen Unterstützung konnten sie ihre Produktion diversifizieren und produzieren heute Obst und Gemüse für den Markt. Ihre Kaninchenzucht dient als kurzfristige Geldquelle zur Bezahlung der Schulbildung ihrer Kinder oder von Arztkosten. Durch die höhere Produktivität ihrer Flächen und dem dank der Sanierung der Strasse besseren Marktzugang, konnten sie ihr Einkommen um 30% verbessern. Trotz den Naturkatastrophen 2015 und 2016 produzieren Madame und Monsieur Jean-Louis heute wieder für den Markt und können ihre Familie mit den Erzeugnissen ihres Betriebes ernähren.

Madame et Monsieur Jean-Louis in der Bergregion Petit Goave. Photo: Caritas Schweiz

Ziel 2: Ökologisch produzierte Produkte sollen zu fairen Preisen auf den Markt gebracht werden, wodurch sich das Einkommen und die Arbeitsmöglichkeiten der armutsbetroffenen Bevölkerung verbessern.

Ernährungssicherheit geht über subsistenzlandwirtschaftliche Interventionen im Betrieb selbst hinaus: Es sind gemeinsame Anstrengungen unterschiedlicher Akteure nötig, um Landwirte so mit Marktsystemen zu verbinden, dass sie ihre Unabhängigkeit behalten. Konkret sind drei Bereiche entscheidend:

Unterstützung für die Marktentwicklung:
In ländlichen und abgelegenen landwirtschaftlich geprägten Gegenden ist der Zugang zu Märkten unterentwickelt und oftmals nicht vorhanden. Kleinbauern werden beim Verkauf ihrer Produkte mit einer Reihe von Hürden (z.B. hohe Transportkosten und lange Wegstrecken zu Marktstandorten) konfrontiert. Darüber hinaus fehlen vielen Landwirten

Informationen über das Preisgefüge und die tatsächliche Marktnachfrage. Interventionen müssen deshalb darauf abzielen, den Zugang zu Dienstleistungen von Inputlieferanten zu verbessern, eine gute Infrastruktur zur Verbesserung des Marktzugangs bereitzustellen, Preisinformationssysteme einzurichten und Landwirte mit Forschung und Technologie sowie mit Rechts- und Finanzdienstleistungen zu vernetzen. All diese Dienste müssen auf eine inklusive Art und Weise gestaltet werden, damit die Chancen der Armutsbetroffenen verbessert werden, sich unter fairen Bedingungen an den Märkten zu beteiligen. Sensibilisierung, Advocacy und Vernetzung mit Regierungen, Administrationen und Lieferanten können zu Gesetzen und Regeln für ein Marktsystem führen, das den Bedürfnissen marginalisierter Menschen als Produzenten und Produzentinnen und Lebensmittelkonsumenten besser entspricht. Caritas investiert in die Marktforschung und engagiert sich im Bereich Qualität, Quantität und faire Preisverhandlungen. Caritas arbeitet mit Kleinbau-

ern und Händlern zusammen und schult sie in Geschäftskompetenzen, Verhandlungsgeschick und dem Aufbau von Marktnetzen. Die Programme umfassen einen starken geschlechtsspezifischen Ansatz und schulen nicht nur, sondern regen Frauen auch zur Übernahme von Führungsverantwortung und Beteiligung bei wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten an. Es werden Multistakeholder-Plattformen etabliert, um die Marktentwicklung sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf lokaler Ebene zu fördern und alle Interessenvertreter in der Wertschöpfungskette anzusprechen.

Post-harvest management und Lebensmittelverarbeitung: Damit die Produkte vermarktet werden können, verbessern Caritas-Projekte die Lagerung und Konservierung für landwirtschaftliche Produkte – sowohl für die Verarbeitung als auch für den nachhaltigen Konsum. Es werden Lagerhallen oder Silos gebaut und Verarbeiter hinsichtlich deren Betriebsführung geschult. Dank Techniken des Nacherente-Managements, wie dem Kühlen und Trocknen von Gemüse und Obst, verringern sich die Verluste und steigert sich die Vermarktbarkeit der Produkte.

Konsumentenschulung und lokale Märkte: Caritas unterstützt das Wachstum lokaler Märkte und fördert nachhaltig produzierte lokale Produkte. Die Verbindung von Produzenten mit Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten auf lokalen Märkten und mittels lokaler Marketingorganisationen verbessert das Weiterleiten wertvoller Produktinformationen und Konsumentenwünsche an lokale Produzenten und Produzentinnen.

Beispiel Tschad: Erd- und Shea-Nüsse für eine bessere Zukunft

Ein eindrückliches Beispiel für den Erfolg der Förderung von Marksystemen und der Bekämpfung von Hunger liefert ein Projekt im Tschad, welches die Zusammenarbeit mit lokalen Akteuren und den tschadischen Behörden für die Wertschöpfungsketten Erdnuss und Sheabutter fördert.

Der Tschad ist eines der ärmsten Länder der Welt. Zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung können weder lesen noch schreiben, und lediglich drei von zehn Personen haben Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Bevölkerung lebt von der Land- und Viehwirtschaft. Es werden Hirse, Sor-

ghum, Bohnen, Erdnüsse und Baumwolle angebaut. Der grösste Teil der Lebensmittel wird im Regenfeldbau, d.h. ohne künstliche Bewässerung, erzeugt. Rund die Hälfte der Bevölkerung lebt im fruchtbaren Süden des Landes. Daher kommt es dort häufig zu Konflikten zwischen sesshaften Bauernfamilien und nomadisierenden Hirten um die immer knapper werdenden Ressourcen Land und Wasser. Obwohl die Projektregion im Süden grundsätzlich über ein grosses landwirtschaftliches Potenzial verfügt, sind die Erträge gering und schwanken stark. Dies ist einerseits auf die schwierigen klimatischen Bedingungen zurückzuführen (abnehmende und ungleichmässig verteilte Regenfälle). Weitere Gründe für die geringe Produktivität sind der Mangel an verbessertem Saatgut und die ungenügende technische Ausrüstung der Bauern und Bäuerinnen. Es fehlt auch an landwirtschaftlicher Forschung und Beratung sowie am Zugang zu Krediten. Ausserdem stehen den wenigen Bauernfamilien, die Überschüsse produzieren – z.B. Erdnüsse oder Gemüse –, keine funktionierenden Vermarktungsstrukturen zur Verfügung.

Caritas unterstützt Kleinbäuerinnen und Kleinbauern darin, mit angepasstem Saatgut und mehr landwirtschaftlichem Wissen bessere Erträge zu erwirtschaften. Dazu fördert sie die Gründung von Bauerngenossenschaften, unterstützt diese beim Aufbau ihrer Organisation und hilft den Genossenschaften, gute Lagerhäuser zu bauen, in denen die Ernten richtig gelagert werden können. Um die Marktbedingungen und die Preise für die Erdnüsse und Sheabutter zu verbessern, verhandelt Caritas mit Handelsvertretern, mit der Industrie und den Behörden.

Wichtig ist der Zugang zu Kleinkrediten. Ohne Darlehen – etwa für den Kauf eines Pflugs oder einer Schubkarre für den Transport des Komposts – können die Erträge der Kleinproduzenten und -produzentinnen nicht erhöht werden. Regionale Spar- und Leihkassensysteme werden deshalb darin begleitet, spezifisch auf Produzentinnen und Produzenten ausgelegte Finanzprodukte aufzubauen und anzubieten.

Rosalie Ounyaï bewirtschaftet zusammen mit ihrem Mann Gilbert Allessem einen kleinen Hof in der Region Moyen-Chari im Süden des Tschad. Die vierfache Mutter hat in ihrem jungen Leben bisher vor allem eines kennen gelernt: den Kampf gegen den Mangel und die Armut. Auf drei Hektaren Land baut die Familie Erdnüsse, Baumwolle und Hirse an. Gilbert rodet vermehrt die alten Baumwollstauden. Der Preis der Baumwolle auf dem Weltmarkt ist eingebrochen und der Staat ist der einzige Käufer. Das Haupteinkommen erzielt die Bauernfamilie nun mit der Produktion von Erdnüssen. Deren Vorteil ist, dass die Familie selber bestimmen kann, wann sie sie auf dem Markt verkauft. Ein weiterer Vorteil ist, dass man Erdnüsse essen kann. Weil Schimmel die ganze Ernte wertlos machen kann, ist eine gute Lagermöglichkeit immens wichtig.

Um das Familieneinkommen zu verbessern, produziert Rosalie Öl und Butter aus Shea-Nüssen, das sie auf dem lokalen Markt verkauft. Für das Einkommen der Familie ist dies unverzichtbar. Von der Kosmetikindustrie wird Shea als Alternative zum Palmöl zunehmend geschätzt. Bäuerinnen wie Rosalie sollen mit Unterstützung der Caritas Zugang zu diesem internationalen Markt bekommen und mit dem kostbaren Öl mehr als nur ein Zubrot verdienen.

Rosalie ist davon überzeugt, dass ein besseres Leben möglich ist. Daran arbeitet sie zusammen mit ihrem Mann Gilbert. Die junge Frau weiss aber genau, dass Fortschritt und etwas mehr Wohlstand nur möglich sind, wenn die ganze Gemeinschaft dies will. Deshalb engagiert sie sich in der lokalen Frauen-organisation und Gilbert ist Mitglied der Bauerngenossenschaft, die zum Beispiel sichere Lagerhäuser baut. Beide Organisationen werden von Caritas unterstützt. Ziel ist es, mit der besseren Vermarktung der Erdnussernte und von Produkten aus der Shea-Nuss nachhaltig ein höheres Einkommen zu erzielen.

Rosalie und ihr Mann Gilbert wollen Bäuerin und Bauern sein und in ihrem Heimatdorf bleiben: «Wir sind fest davon überzeugt, dass es für unsere Kinder hier eine Zukunft gibt und wir gemeinsam einen Weg aus der Misere finden. Wir wollen einen Beitrag leisten, damit wir alle zusammen unsere Lebenssituation verbessern können. Wir verbessern unser Einkommen und dies gibt uns die Chance, dass unsere Kinder eine Zukunft bekommen. Heute sind unsere Pläne nicht mehr reines Wunschdenken. Wir können sparen, in die Landwirtschaft investieren und wir können die Schule für unsere Kinder bezahlen. Sie sind die Zukunft unseres Landes.»

Die Verarbeitung der Shea-Nüsse ist aufwändig. Rosalie Ounyaï sammelt die Nüsse in der Steppe. Die Ernte wird dann geröstet, gemahlen, zu Butter geknetet und aufgekocht, wie es Rosalie hier macht. Das Öl verkauft sie dann auf dem kleinen lokalen Markt.
Foto: Alexandra Wey/Caritas Schweiz

Kurzporträt von Caritas Schweiz

Caritas Schweiz setzt sich ein für eine Welt ohne Armut, die sich von Solidarität, Gerechtigkeit und Frieden leiten lässt. Wir helfen Menschen in Not professionell, effektiv und effizient, unabhängig von ihrer religiösen und politischen Anschauung, ihrem Geschlecht oder ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit. Alle unsere Programme verfolgen das Ziel, die Armut zu bekämpfen, die Widerstandsfähigkeit von Menschen zu stärken, die Achtung ihrer Rechte zu gewährleisten und ihre Fähigkeiten so zu verbessern, damit sie ihre Lebensziele verwirklichen können. Wir sind eine unabhängige Schweizer Hilfsorganisation und Mitglied von Caritas Internationalis, einem Netzwerk aus über 160 nationalen Caritas-Organisationen.

From Famine Relief to Resilient Food Systems

Firiehiwot Yibeltal[1], Raphael Dischl[2]

Resilience has become a key concept in recent years greatly contributing to breaking the 'silo thinking' between development and humanitarian work. Today, there is a growing trend towards policies to address vulnerabilities of people to natural and manmade food crisis by a more systemic, multi-sector approach and joint programming. This article presents the experience of HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation in Wag-Himera, Ethiopia, in fostering community resilience to the impacts of climate change and food crisis. The example illustrates how even in vulnerable contexts, resilience can be addressed through a set of measures that complement each other, linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

What are resilient food systems?

Resilience has been embraced as an overarching theme by both the international humanitarian and development communities in recent years. It is based on the recognition that people are part of larger systems such as ecosystems, markets, and social networks that are constantly in flux with feedback loops between them. Resilience is understood as the ability of individuals, communities or systems to

1) cope with and absorb the impacts of shocks (events) and trends (stresses) without sustaining permanent harm or damage (absorptive capacity),

2) adjust and adapt to trends and events while still functioning in broadly the same way (adaptive capacity), and

3) change the system fundamentally when its current modus operandi are no longer viable (transformative capacity).


Figure 1: The three dimensions of risk
(adapted from IPCC)

Resilience is thus the ability to deal with risks. Risks are the outcome of three factors: the hazard, the exposure to it and the nature and degree of vulnerability (Figure 1). Uncertain rainfall for example is a hazard to which rainfed farmers are particularly exposed. Families who only engage in rainfed farming, with no diversified income source, are most vulnerable to the hazard. People's assets and capabilities are decisive in building resilience and reducing their vulnerability to shocks and trends. For example, households who have access to wells for protective irrigation can bridge dry spells (i.e. have absorptive capacity). Families who learn to grow drought tolerant crops or who invest in non-farm activities can enhance their adaptive capacity and reduce their vulnerability to erratic rainfall in future years while families that have members working in urban centres or abroad can transform their livelihoods with wise investments of the remittances. Resilience can thus be built through measures that modify the hazard, such as land-use practices that may trigger hazards, by reducing exposure and the vulnerability to a hazard as also by building assets and capabilities of people and communities.

Food and nutrition security is the outcome of several processes related to production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food that are in turn influenced by factors such as environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures and institutions. It is important to recognise that food systems are complex, with interdependent elements and feedback loops. Resilient food systems would be

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those that have the ability to provide sufficient, accessible and nutritious food to all today and in the future in spite of various, unforeseen disturbances and trends. They are able to recover quickly and flexibly and to adapt themselves to changing environments. Figure 2 below shows the climate and non-climate related drivers of change that food systems face and the possible areas of response.

The following chapters will illustrate concrete approaches towards resilience building at the interface between humanitarian aid and development, drawing upon the work of HELVETAS in Ethiopia.


Figure 2: Climate and non-climate related drivers of change in Food Systems (IPCC, 2014)

Resilience of food systems in the context of food crisis and recovery – what and how?

Food crises are not only nature-induced but are often anthropogenic and are thus more complex. They are often a combination of low food system productivity, fragmented markets, weak government institutions, inadequate policies, the lack of basis infrastructure and services, and political conflicts that can exacerbate the effects of climatic events such as droughts or floods. Babu et al. (2017)[3] further point to the lack of institutional memory and learning that would be crucial for resilience building: "When the threat of famine subsides, many (…) governments, NGOs and development partners return to whatever they were doing before famine struck – running projects, fighting local political adversaries, etc. – instead of doing the work needed to avert or mitigate the next famine threat."

Over the past years, the concept of resilience has greatly contributed to breaking the silos between humanitarian and development actions and to foster policies that address the complex causes of vulnerabilities and food crisis by a systemic, multi-sector approach and joint programming. The Rome based agencies for example developed a joint approach towards resilience building in food and nutrition security[4]. A lot remains to be done though to put such policies into action. Discussions at the recent Alliance 2015 Round Table on Resilience, Hunger and Poverty in Dublin[5] showed again that despite the recognized need for integrated and flexible programming, implementation often fails due to the de-facto persisting procedural and administrative barriers in donor and implementing agencies. It is also broadly agreed that a long-term investment in resilience-building "across the silos" greatly increases the cost-effectiveness of interventions related to recurrent crisis, since they reduce the financial, administrative and resource burdens of responses. In the Grand Bargain report 2016[6] recommendations were formulated how to address these issues. Some donors have made ef-

forts since to develop innovative, flexible funding mechanisms. SDC's project Sustainable Natural Resources Management for Enhanced Pastoralist Food Security in the Borana Zone (Ethiopia), for example, integrates a contingency fund for humanitarian aid. In times of crises, the project can activate this fund and engage in emergency work through a close nexus to its general development work.

During a crisis, humanitarian measures such as food distribution or cash transfers are valuable means to support the absorptive capacities of communities and to avoid negative coping strategies such as reducing the number of meals or selling cattle. Beyond this, responses to food crises and famine are beginning to incorporate resilience-building measures and long-term development efforts into relief actions. Many NGOs and UN agencies' cash transfer programmes today combine provision of food or cash for work on the rehabilitation of assets and infrastructures such as restoration of degraded land, reforestation or the rebuilding of wells. Such approaches have the potential to meaningfully contribute to resilience building of local communities during food crisis, but only if they are based on 1) thorough analysis of vulnerabilities before a shock, 2) consideration of disaster risk reduction aspects, and 3) ownership and institutional capacities of local and national governments to programme and support such action and to embed it into wider development plans. The current practice however shows that in many emergencies, most recovery activities are programmed short notice and rather detached from integrated development plans.

Finally, while the provision of food or seed is an uncontested relief intervention to save lives in acute crisis, more attention is needed to ensure that such actions help foster food system resilience in the long run rather than undermining it. For example, the distribution of food through parallel structures established by aid interventions, instead of operating through existing market actors, can disrupt local food markets. They may cause a slump in local grain prices and the crowding out of existing food traders. This is particularly true for persistent relief aid. Dorosh and Chabot (2007) for example found that in Afghanistan, temporary food aid imports of relief programs did not have major price disincentive effects on domestic production, however continued

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3 www.ifpri.org/blog/strategies-preventing-recurring-famines-and-building-resilient-food-systems

4 WFP 2015: Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition: www.wfp.org/content/policy-building-resilience-food-security-and-nutrition

5 alliance2015.org; spark.adobe.com/video/x56bPecJucUVm

6 Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap. High-Level Panel on humanitarian Financing – Report to the Secretary-General, January 2016.

food aid inflows proved to depress producer prices by 15%[7].

IFPRI[8] highlights that national response systems need to promote resilience to respond to natural and manmade shocks. This is required to avoid repeated absorption of economic resources and institutional capacities for "fire-fighting" of recurrent crisis to re-build national food systems, while losing ground on long-term developments. They propose to seize current emergencies to strengthen national capacities to protect vulnerable populations both in the immediate and the long term, addressing resilience in the triangle of food systems, policy systems and institutions.

History of food crisis in Wag-Himera, Ethiopia

Ethiopia has shown over the past 30 years that with the right combination of investments and policies, the threat of famine can be significantly reduced. HELVETAS continues to support this development towards enhanced food systems resilience in Ethiopia.

Wag-Himera Zone in Amhara National Regional State in the Northern Ethiopian highlands covers six Woredas (districts) and one town administration with an area of 9,039 km² and a total population of 520,000. The altitude ranges from 3'715 metres to below 1'200 metres in the Tekeze Valley. The climate is predominantly semi-arid, with mean annual rainfalls ranging from 350 to 800 mm and a high variability of rainfall during the single rainy season (Keremt). Wag-Himera is characterized by very limited arable land (only about 17% of the land is suitable for crop production), fragmented land holding size with the majority of smallholders having less than 1 ha, and low productivity due to poor soil fertility. A mixed crop-livestock farming system prevails in the zone with the share of livestock increasing with decreasing altitude, since lowlands receive less rainfall and hence are less suitable for crop production.

Through the famines of 1973 and 1984, Wag-Himera Zone became well-known as an area of chronic food insecurity, high rate of malnutrition and severe environmental degradation. The 2011 East Africa drought also left its deep impact on human and livestock wellbeing, and the 2015/16 drought, triggered by El Nino, was one of the worst faced by the zone in decades.

In general, the 2015/16 drought and food security crisis represents a sharp break in the mostly positive trends of Ethiopia's agricultural development and food security since the 80ies, when the country started to mitigate the risk of famines substantially. Between the 90ies and 2010, the Ethiopian government followed an Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy, investing heavily in agricultural production and rural infrastructure[9]. The public investments in agricultural technology, expansion of road networks and infrastructures, better information flows and a functioning early warning system helped shorten the response time for emergency relief.

Moreover, the Government of Ethiopia created the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 2005 which embraces food and cash transfers to the poorest and most food insecure households. Between 43 to 46 percent of the people in Wag-Himera are categorized as poor or poorest households and are eligible for support under PSNP.

Since 2013, HELVETAS, in close collaboration with the government of Ethiopia and other NGOs has been contributing to building capacities of the communities in the zone for enhanced resilience against climate change induced shocks and trends, with a key emphasis on enhancing food system resilience.

7   Chabot, Ph. and P. A. Dorosh (2007): Wheat Markets, Food Aid and Food Security in Afghanistan, Food Policy 32:334–53.

8   From Famine to Food Security, Policy Paper, IFPRI / April 2017.

9   International Food Policy Research Institute: reliefweb.int/ report/ethiopia/ethiopia-s-2015-drought-no-reason-famine

Building food system resilience in Wag-Himera

The natural resources base of the Wag-Himera zone has been severely deteriorated. The combination of the rouged topography, uncontrolled open access grazing and ploughing or hoe tilling in extremely steep slopes have led to severe degradation of soils, vegetation and watersheds. This has left the zone highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, in particular droughts and extreme rains.

With the objective to overcome the chronic food insecurity and repeated relief aid in the area, HELVETAS launched the Wag-Himera Rural Future Initiative project in 2013, founded on a strong partnership with the local government of Wag-Himera zone and community based institutions. The project was launched in all six districts of the zone, followed by a series of other projects, namely Disaster Risk Management through Improved Agriculture Solution project, the Drought Recovery and Climate Resilience project and the Wag-Himera Climate Adaptation and Rural Development project. Through this series or contiguum of projects, HELVETAS aimed to strengthen the capacity of local administrations, extension services, community based organizations and the private sector in order to develop and implement a coherent long-term strategy for resilience building based on environmental rehabilitation, adaptation to climate change and rural development. Key intervention strategies of the projects are 1) rehabilitation of severely degraded watersheds, 2) enhancing food security and agricultural productivity through improved farming and household asset building and 3) development of improved rural urban linkages and the establishment of value chains.

HELVETAS' experience in the zone shows that linking relief, rehabilitation and development or the LRRD approach enables multiple projects, working at different stages of the disaster cycle, to reinforce and complement their actions contributing to the resilience of highly fragile ecosystems and livelihoods such as in Wag-Himera. This approach is described in further detail below.

Since the start of its interventions in the zone, HELVETAS has built on its long standing experience of sustainable integrated rural development and combined it with relief elements as demanded by the context. HELVETAS' key entry point for enhancing food system resilience in Wag-Himera is sustainable natural resources management combined with locally adapted improved agriculture solutions:

Intensive hillside farming through bench terraces: Since 2013, HELVETAS successfully initiated and promoted bench terraces as an effective soil and water conservation measure to repair and control the damaging impacts of ploughing in extremely steep slopes of Wag-Himera. Since 2014, bench terracing has been widely accepted and institutionalized by the zonal government as an effective measure to increase productivity and enhance food security. The Zonal authorities have incorporated bench terraces in their regular programme and are committed to mobilize other local and international partners to adopt and scale up the technology.

Moisture conservation tillage: Land tilling influences rainwater runoff, its infiltration and soil moisture conservation and is thus crucial in Wag-Himera where severe moisture stress is one the major factors for low agricultural productivity. Contour ploughing, broad furrowing and tied ridging are effective means of conserving soil moisture and controlling soil erosion. HELVETAS, in collaboration with the Zone Department of Agriculture, introduced the Devean moisture conservation tilling device. Compared to conventional tilling, the new practice enhanced farmer's yields by 33 to 47 percent.

Promotion of controlled grazing and fodder production: Uncontrolled grazing is an important factor of soil deterioration. At the same time, availability of fodder is a key constraint for families to maintain their livestock through dry periods. HELVETAS, in collaboration with local partners, has promoted controlled grazing and cut and carry practices, through skill development and awareness raising and the provision of supportive grazing tools such as peg and rope for livestock tethering. A total area of 6,650 ha was protected from uncontrolled grazing by these measures. Further, more than 3 million multi-purpose tree seedlings were planted to boost the fodder sources and biologically stabilize the watersheds.

Roof water-harvesting system: In the absence of safe ground-water or springs, many families rely on unsafe surface water, endangering the health of entire communities. HELVETAS has developed the Kalamino Cistern as an innovative solution to overcome the severe drinking-water constraints. It is a reliable and affordable roof-water harvesting system, providing households with safe drinking water also during dry periods. The system is now promoted by the Government and other NGOs, and community members have come forward to adopt it themselves paying a considerable part of the costs.

Effective homestead gardens: Through the promotion of in-situ water harvesting structures, mainly ring basin infiltration pits and perma-gardening, vegetable and fruit production is boosted in homesteads. The horticulture produce not only generates additional income from marketable surpluses, but also enriches the diets of the families and enables consumption of diverse, nutritious food. This intervention is positively discriminated in favour of women, who are supported to develop homestead gardens, resilience using run-off water from their homes.

Promotion of diversified livelihood options: A set of carefully selected high value, nutritious and drought tolerant crops were identified and introduced to the beneficiary households. In addition, backyard poultry and beekeeping were strengthened – a valuable contribution to the families' nutrition as well as a source of income to purchase supplementary food during periods of shortage. During the 2015/16 drought, as a part of recovery measures, HELVETAS promoted the Madagascar bean, a drought resistant, nutrient rich and high yielding crop. Within two months of planting, farmers could harvest their first crop. The bean is a significant contribution to the household nutrition. Due to its high market value, it has the potential to create alternative incomes through development of a value chain, thus fostering the transformative capacities of the communities in the mid and long-run. In 2018, the project will start promoting local seed production and seed banks of key food crops as an additional resilience building measure for local food production systems.

Figure 3: A woman accessing water at the homestead form kalamon-Cistern, Dehana, Wag-Himera Zone / Photo: HELVETAS / Patrick Rohr-2017

Figure 4: A couple working on the ring basin infiltration pit during dry season, Wag Himera Zone / Photo: HELVETAS / Patrick Rohr-2017

Figure 5: Ring basin infiltration pit, Dehana Woreda, Gaqiew village. Photo: HELVETAS / Firiehiwot Yibeltal-2016

Emergency relief to absorb 2015/16 shock: In order to meet the immediate needs of the target communities in Wag-Himera during the drought, HELVETAS launched a short-term emergency response project. The project provided families with drinking water, livestock feed and seed. The intervention aimed to sustain the absorptive capacities of the families helping them bridge the emergency situation without damaging the local resource base. This prevented people from slipping into extreme poverty and allowed them to continue on their development pathway soon after the crisis.

Social and economic empowerment of women: Across all projects, HELVETAS put an emphasis on the access of women to resilience building capacities and assets. The projects foster access of women to extension services for improved agronomic practices, effective low cost technologies and alternative options for income generation. This not only helped fostering women in their key role in household food and nutrition security, it also contributes to enhancing women's confidence to challenge traditional gender roles related to local food systems.

What did we learn?

The integrated approach across different thematic fields, at the interface between relief, rehabilitation and development, is based on strong partnerships with local governments and community based organisations. This helps ensure ownership, complementarity in our actions and long term sustainability. The programmatic approach enables multiple projects, operating at different stages of the disaster cycle, to reinforce and complement their actions contributing to enhancing food system resilience in the region at different levels.

Through soil and moisture conservation measures and drought tolerant varieties the projects enhanced the capacity of the communities to produce diverse foods locally and sustain production, to increase productivity and reduce harvest losses during dry spells. Measures against soil erosion combined with controlled grazing and fodder production helped in preserving and restoring soils, biodiversity and water resources – a precondition for resilience. In-situ water harvesting, perma-gardening, poultry and beekeeping contributed to a more diverse food basket and thus a better nutritional base for the families. At the same time, they created additional income

sources that help bridging lean seasons and mitigating future food crisis. The better access to safe drinking water from roof water harvesting and cistern systems reduces the risks of waterborne diseases, thus enhancing the nutritional uptake of the food consumed by children, women and men. Overall, more than 17'000 households have improved their access to food, hence reaching a total of roughly 100'000 people which is nearly 20 percent of the population living in the zone. Most importantly however, the projects successfully engaged the entire zone's administrative establishment, extension services, the civil society and local small enterprises to invest in resilience building. The adoption and replication of the knowhow, technologies and methodologies developed by these actors is the most essential guarantee that food system and climate change resilience building will continue to be pursued in the future.

At the same time, different challenges lie ahead. Given its multi-dimensional nature, measuring resilience is complex. So far, there are no widely accepted tools to measure resilience comprehensively. For food system resilience, measuring nutrition outcomes and their interlinkage with agriculture, water and sanitation will need more thorough attention in future. Furthermore, seeing the trend towards a dryer climate with erratic rainfalls and extreme weather events forecasted for Northern Ethiopia, the transformative capacities of communities in Wag-Himera and neighbouring zones should become a priority in the coming years. Not only do farmer communities need the capacity to further adapt their agricultural practices to a dryer climate, they also need alternatives for livelihoods that are less dependent on farming to generate income and ensure food security.

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22	**La Politique étrangère de la Suisse: Bilan et perspectives (I)** (1/2000)	• Die Beziehungen der Schweiz zu den Vereinten Nationen (UNO): Vom Beobachter zum „Beitrittskandidaten" und weiter • Les relations de la Suisse avec l'Europe intégrée, 21 juin 1999: une date historique • Les relations de la Suisse avec les Etats-Unis • La Suisse et l'OTAN: bilan et perspectives • La politique humanitaire • Les droits de l'homme: le cas de la défense des droits de l'enfant
23	**La Politique étrangère de la Suisse: Bilan et perspectives (II)** (2/2000)	• L'implication de la Suisse dans les Balkans • Une politique méditerranéenne pour la Suisse • Droits de l'homme au Moyen Orient • La Suisse et l'Asie de l'Est • La Suisse, modèle pour Singapour? • La Suisse et l'Amérique latine • La Suisse et l'Afrique des conflits
24	**La sécurité humaine** (3/2000)	• «Menschlichen Sicherheit» • Kleinwaffen • Nicht-staatliche Akteure (NSA) • Aussenpolitischer Ausblick • Perspectives de la politique extérieure • Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur UNO • L'adhésion de la Suisse à l'ONU
25	**La Suisse et la Chine** (4/2000)	• La Reconnaissance de la Chine populaire par la Suisse et l'établissement des relations diplomatiques • Aspekte der Beziehungen Schweiz – China vor 1950 • Überblick über die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und der Volksrepublik China ab 1950 • Von der Chinamode des Spätbarock zur heutigen Menschenrechtsdiskussion mit der Volksrepublik China - ein Beitrag zum mangelnden Verständnis zwischen West und Ost • L'économie chinoise - Vers les prochaines étapes • Zur Verteidigungspolitik der Volksrepublik China • L'évolution de la Chine: tentative de prévision • China in the 21st Century: Reflections on the past, and projections into the future Republic of China
26	**Die Schweiz und die UNO** (1/2001)	• Die Schweiz: Abseits der Welt oder in der Welt? • Völkerbund und UNO • Die Beziehungen der Schweiz zur UNO • La Genève internationale et l'ONU • Die jüngsten Reformen der UNO • Wieviel Macht braucht die UNO ? • Universalismus der UNO und Regionalorganisationen • Neutrale Staaten in der UNO am Beispiel Österreichs • Kodifizierung des Völkerrechts im Rahmen der UNO • UNO, Entwicklung und humanitäre Hilfe • Jüngste und künftige Entwicklungen der UNO
27	**Afrika / Afrique** (2/2001)	• Afro-pessimisme, afro-euphorie ou afro-lucidité ? • H.E. Deiss's Opening Address to the Accra Conference • Sichtweisen auf, Diskurse über und Visionen für Afrika • Afrika: Gedanken zur Lage des Kontinents • Données de base sur l'Afrique sub-saharienne • La Suisse et la prévention des conflits en Afrique • Die humanitäre Hilfe und Katastrophenhilfe des Bundes in Afrika • La Coopération suisse en Afrique de l'Ouest • La Francophonie et l'Afrique • Die kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Afrika • Die Umwelt in Afrika • L'Afrique dans le multilateralisme onusien • L'Afrique est-elle « autre » ? • Eteindre la lumière, fermer la porte et revenir dans un siècle?

28	**Suisse – Maghreb – Machrek** (3/2001)	• Aussenpolitische Strategie der Schweiz gegenüber den Ländern des südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraums • Stratégie de politique extérieure de la Suisse pour le bassin sud et est de la Méditerranée
29	**Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Deutschland in der Nachkriegszeit (1945 – 1961)** (Kolloquium 27.-29. September 2001, Bern) (4/2001)	• „Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Deutschland: eine historische Partnerschaft auf dem Weg in die Zukunft" • Die Schweiz und Deutschland: Gedanken und Einschätzungen aus der Perspektive eines Politikers und Zeitzeugen • Les relations entre l'Allemagne et la Suisse: und perspective historique • „Nicht die ersten sein, aber vor den letzten handeln – Grundsätze und Praxis der Anerkennung von Staaten und Regierungen durch die Schweiz (1945-1961)"
30	**Suisse – Europe du Sud-Est** (1/2002)	• Stratégie de politique extérieure de la Suisse pour l'Europe du Sud-Est • Aussenpolitische Stüdosteuropa-Strategie der Schweiz
31	**La Suisse et les accords d'Evian** (2/2002)	• La politique de la Confédération à la fin de la guerre d'Algérie (1959-1962) • Aperçu des ralations de la Suisse avec l'Algérie • Les premiers entretiens (1960-1961) • La première phase des négociations • La seconde phase des négociations • L'année 1962: drames et espoirs
32	**Federalism** (1/2003)	• Föderalismus in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik • La pertinence de l'idée fédérale dans le monde contemporain • Federalism and Foreign Relations • Federalism, Decentralization and Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies • Assignment of Responsibilities and Fiscal Federalism
33	**Iran – Wirklichkeiten in Bewegung** (2/2003)	• Helvetiens guter Draht zum Pfauenthrom - Die Beziehungen der Schweiz zu Iran (1946-1978) • Islamische Republik Iran: Innen und Aussenpolitik • Political Cartoons in Iran • Etat actuel des relations bilatérales vues de l'Ambassade suisse à Téhéran • Situation économique de l'Iran • Verhandlung statt Verurteilung: Die Schweiz beginnt in diesem Jahr einen Menschenrechtsdialog mit Iran • Iran, quo vadis? Eine Rück- und Vorschau • Iran als Objekt – Kurzbibliografie zur Iranforschung in der Schweiz • Iran – einige Daten
34	**Sommet mondial sur la Société de l'Information** (3/2003)	• Die Schweiz und der Weltgipfel zur Informationsgesellschaft • Le Sommet Mondial sur la Société de l'Information : Un somet sur un projet sociétal global • The World Summit on the Information Society: Overview of the process • Des resultants mi-figue mi-raisin • Entre concepts flous et illusion techniciste • Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien: Instrumente für Entwicklung und Armutsminderung • La fracture médiatique • The Council of Europe and the Information Society: Some key issues • OECD and the Information Society: New challenges
35	**Suisse – Proche-Orient** Perspectives historiques et politique actuelle (1/2004)	• Les articles du Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse sur les pays du Proche-Orient • Die Artikel des Historischen Lexikons der Schweiz über die Nahost-Länder • Une saison en arabie • La Méditerranée arabe: un axe prioritaire pour la politique étrangère suisse • La neutralité suisse à l'épreuve des deux guerres en Irak (1991 et 2003)
36	**Das schweizerische Konsularwesen im 19. Jahrhundert** (2/2004)	• Das schweizerische Konsularwesen von 1798 bis 1895 • Die heutige Situation im konsularischen Bereich • Répartition géographigue des postes consularies
37	**L'Asie** **Quelles évolutions et quelles consé-quences pour la Suisse?** (1/2005)	• Etat des lieux, une perspective régionale • L'Asie du Sud • L'Asie du Sud-Est • L'Extrême-Orient • Politique asiatique de la Suisse, une approche thématique • Politique économique extérieure de la Suisse: Priorités en Asie • Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Armutsbekämpfung in Asien

		• La politique de coopération économique au développement en Asie • Frieden, Menschenrechte und Migration – das Engagement des EDA in Asien • Politique culturelle du DFAE en Asie • Herausforderungen für die schweizerische Umweltaussenpolitik am Beispiel der Region Asien
38	**Processus de Barcelone** (2/2005)	• La Méditerranée comme espace invente • Die Bedeutung des Mittelmeerraumes und des Barcelona-Prozesses aus Schweizer Perspektive • 10 ans après Barcelone, où en est le partenariat euro-méditerranéen? • The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the run-up to the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration • Partenariat Euro-méditerranéen ou Partenariat euro-arabe? • Promoting Political and Economic Reform in the Mediterranean and Middle East • L'avenir politique du partenariat euro-méditerranéen: l'Erope face aux dilemmas démocratiques • Barcelone +10: l'immigration comme risque transnational
39	**Globale öffentliche Güter –** **die Globalisierung gestalten** (3/2005)	• Through the lens of global public goods: Managing global risks in the national interest • Gesundheit als globales öffentliches Gut: eine politische Herausforderung im 21. Jahrhundert • Internationale Finanzstabilität: Nutzen und Beitrag aus der Sicht der Schweiz • Globale öffentliche Güter und das internationale Umweltregime • Globale Gemeinschaftsgüter aus entwicklungspolitischer Sicht • Globale öffentliche Güter und die multilaterale Reformagenda des Millennium +5-Gipfels • The International Task Force on Global Public Goods • Globale öffentliche Güter und die Schweizer Aussenpolitik
40	**Die Schweiz als Schutzmacht** (01/2006)	• Protecting powers in a changing world • Die Vertretung fremder Interessen als Ausgangspunkt für weitergehende Friedensinitiativen • Kleine Schritte, langer Atem Handlungsspielräume und Strategien der Schutzmachttätigkeit im Zweiten Weltkrieg am Beispiel der „Fesselungsaffäre" • Une occasion risquée pour la diplomatie suissen Protection des intérêts étrangers et bons offices en Inde et au Pakistan (1971-1976) • Annexe: Liste des intérêts étrangers représentés par la Suisse depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale
41	**Südamerika –** **Teil des Westens, Teil des Südens** (02/2006)	• Der Linksruck in Südamerika • Die soziale Problematik Lateinamerikas: Ihre Entwicklungsrelevanz • Brésil-Amérique du Sud – partenariat ou Leadership? • Die Schweiz und Südamerika: Herausforderungen, Interessen und Instrumente • Brasilien – Partner für die nachhaltige Entwicklung, Perspektiven für brasilianisches Bio-Ethanol in der Schweiz • La décentralisation dans les Andes ou l'art d'accompagner un processus • Vers une politique scientifique et technologique bilatérale • Coopération scientifique et développement: Diversité et disparités-l'Amérique du Sud à l'aube du XXIe siècle • Argentinienschweizer in der Krise – ein kritischer Rückblick • Stagnierende Entwicklung – zunehmende Auswanderung: Migration als Überlebensstrategie in Südamerika
42	**The Fragile States Debate –** Considering ways and means to achieve stronger statehood (01/2007)	• The International Debate • Seeking out the State: Fragile States and International Governance • Assessing Fragility: Theory, Evidence and Policy • Failed state or failed debate? Multiple Somali political orders within and beyond the nationstate • Sharing the spoils: the reinvigoration of Congo's political system • Administering Babylon – on the crooked ways of state building and state formation • Since when has Afghanistan been a "Failed State"? • Switzerland and Fragile Contexts • Fragile Statehood – Current Situation and Guidelines for Switzerland's Involvement

43	**Islam et politique dans les Balkans occidentaux** (02/2007)	• Entre nationalisme laïc et instrumentalisation des institutions religieuses islamiques • Fin de l'hégémonie du S.D.A. et ancrage institutionnel du néo-salafisme • Bibliographie sélective
44	**La politique étrangère de la Suisse : permanences, ruptures et défis 1945 – 1964** (01/2008)	• De la neutralité «fictive» à la politique de neutralité comme atout dans la conduite de la politique étrangère • Partizipation oder Alleingang?Die UNO-Beitrittsfrage aus der Sicht Max Petitpierres (1945-1961) • La Suisse et la conférence des Nations Unies sur les relations diplomatiques • Die Guten Dienste als Kompensationsstrategie zur Nicht-Mitgliedschaft bei der UNO • L'accord italo-suisse de 1964: une rupture dans la politique migratoire suisse • Die Diplomatischen Dokumente der Schweiz (DDS) und die Datenbank DoDiS
45	**Power sharing The Swiss experience** (02/2008)	• Sharing History • Sharing State and Identity • Sharing Territory • Sharing Rule • Sharing Democracy • Sharing Language and Religion • Sharing Justice • Sharing Wealth and Income • Sharing Security • Sharing the Future
46	**Efficacité de l'aide: Bilan et perspective** (01/2009)	• Efficacité de l'aide et querelles de méthodes: l'émergence de la 'Déclaration de Paris' et ses conséquences • Wirksamkeit: Aktualität und Herausforderungen eines alten Anspruchs der Entwicklungspolitik • Country Ownership and Aid Effectiveness: why we all talk about it and mean different things • Die Wirkung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im ultilateralen System • Public Private Partnerships und Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit • Der Bedeutungszuwachs von Public Private Development Partnerships • Can Coherent, Coordinated and Complementary Approaches to Dealing with Fragile State Yield Better Outcomes? • The Prospects of Colombia and Latin America concerning the Paris Declaration • Coopération au développement triangulaire et politique étrangère: simple avatar de la coopération bilatérale ou nouvel instrument pour une coopération publique «globale»? • Von Paris nach Accra – und darüber hinaus Lehren aus der Aid Effectiveness Debatte aus der Sicht der Zivilgesellschaft • Opportunities and Challenges for EU Development Cooperation after the Accra High-Level Forum • Aid Effectiveness after Accra: What's next?
47	**Genocide Prevention** (02/2009)	• Today's conversation about Genocide Prevention • Emerging paradigms in Genocide Prevention • Genocide Prevention in Historical Perspective • What is Genocide? • What are the Gaps in the Convention? • How to Prevent Genocide? • Options for the Prevention and Mitigation of Genocide: Strategies and Examples for Policy-Makers • Why the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a Doctrine or (Emerging) Norm to Prevent Genocide and Other Massive Human Rights Violations is on the Decline: The Role of Principles, Pragmatism and the Shifting Patterns of International Relations • Risks, Early Warning and Management of Atrocities and Genocide: Lessons from Statistical Research • How to Use Global Risk Assessments to Anticipate and Prevent Genocide • Prevention of Genocide: De-mystifying an Awesome Mandate • Prevention of Genocide: The role of the International Criminal Court • Transitional Justice and Prevention • Seeding the Forest: The Role of Transnational Action in the Development of Meaningful International Cooperation and Leadership to Prevent Genocide • Religion and the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocity • The Systematic Violations of Human Rights in Latin America: The need to consider the concepts of genocide and crimes against humanity from the "Latin American margin"

		• Genocide Prevention and Cambodian Civil Society • A Reflection from the United States: Advancing Genocide Prevention Through a High-Level Task Force • The construction of a global architecture for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities • The regional fora: a contribution to genocide prevention from a decentralized perspective
48	**La situation des femmes dans le monde arabe** (01/2010)	« La situation des femmes dans le monde arabe » • La violence domestique à l'égard des femmes dans la société palestinienne • Les femmes dans les professions de la santé en Jordanie • « Dernier voyage à Marrakech » ou Comment moraliser le genre dans une chronique judiciaire • « Féminisme d'État Tunisien »: 50 ans plus tard, la situation des Tunisiennes • La longue marche des femmes marocaines. De Akhawât as-safâ' à la Caravane des droits • Le parcours militant d'une femme kurde de Syrie. De la cause kurde à la défense des droits des femmes • Les représentations des femmes dans le discours nationaliste palestinien autour de la commémoration du cinquantenaire de la Nakba • Représentations de la place des femmes musulmanes dans l'Islam en Suisse romande
49	**Swiss Science Diplomacy** (02/2010)	• Genèse et première croissance du réseau des conseillers scientifiques suisses (1958-1990) • Le réseau suisse des conseillers scientifiques et technologiques de 1990 à la création de swissnex • Gedanken eines Zeitzeugen zum Start des Wissenschaftsrates von 1958 • Douze années japonaises: 1986-1998 • La nouvelle diplomatie scientifique de la Suisse et le modèle swissnex: l'exemple de Boston après 10 ans • La Suisse scientifique dans le monde du 21ème siècle: maintenir le cap ! • Science Diplomacy Networks
50	**Dealing with the Past** (03/2010)	• A Conceptual Framework for Dealing with the Past • A normative conception of Transitional Justice • The right to know: a key factor in combating impunity • Rule of law and international, national justice mechanisms • Reparation programs: Patterns, Tendencies, and Challenges • The role of Security Sector Reform in Dealing with the Past • Dealing with the Past in peace mediation • Pursuing Peace in an Era of International Justice • Transitional Justice and Conflict Transformation in Conversation • Reflection on the role of the victims during transitional justice processes in Latin America • Archives against Amnesia • Business in armed conflict zones: how to avoid complicity and comply with international standards • Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay • The application of Forensic anthropology to the investigation into cases of political violence • Dealing with the past: The forensic-led approach to the missing persons issue in Kosovo • A Holistic Approach to Dealing with the Past in the Balkans • West and Central Africa : an African voice on Dealing with the Past • Dealing with the Past in DRC: the path followed? • Challenges in implementing the peace agreement in Nepal: Dealing with the Impasse • Switzerland, the Third Reich, Apartheid, Remembrance and Historical Research. Certainties, Questions, Controversies and Work on the Past
51	**Un Kosovo unitaire divisé** (01/2011)	• Définitions constitutionnelles du Kosovo • Les prérogatives de l'Etat au Kosovo dans la pratique • Approche • Environnement humain au Nord du Kosovo • Grille d'analyse, hypothèses et concepts • Géographie • Populations : descriptions et chiffres • La division au quotidien

51	**Un Kosovo unitaire divisé** (01/2011)	• Economie • Niveaux de vie • Perceptions • Institutions • Trois niveaux de blocages • Etat de droit : quel droit ? • Institutions locales • Efficacité des institutions ? • Les institutions vues par les citoyens • Organisations internationales • MINUK, OSCE, KFOR • EULEX • ICO / EUSR • Le facilitateur de l'UE pour le Nord du Kosovo • Stratégies et discours • Absence de dialogue – politique du fait accompli • Discours inachevés • Stratégie de Belgrade • Stratégie de Pristina • Du partage à la partition ? • Implications d'une partition pour le Kosovo • Dialogue et coopération régionale
52	**Religion in Conflict Transformation** (02/2011)	• Religion in Conflict Transformation in a Nutshell • When Religions and Worldviews Meet: Swiss Experiences and Contributions • Introduction to the Conference "When Religions and Worldviews Meet" • Competing Political Science Perspectives on the Role of Religion in Conflict • Transforming Conflicts with Religious Dimensions: Using the Cultural-Linguistic Model • Culture-sensitive Process Design: Overcoming Ethical and Methodological Dilemmas • Transforming Religious-Political Conflicts: Decoding-Recoding Positions and Goals • Creating Shifts: Using Arts in Conflicts with Religious Dimensions • Diapraxis: Towards Joint Ownership and Co-citizenship interviewed by Damiano A Sguaitamatti • Diapraxis in Different Contexts: a Brief Discussion with Rasmussen • Bridging Worlds: Culturally Balanced Co-Mediation • Connecting Evangelical Christians and Conservative Muslims • Tajikistan: Diapraxis between the Secular Government and Political Islamic Actors • Swiss Egyptian NGO Dialogue as an Example of "Dialogue through Practice" (Diapraxis) • Communities Defeat Terrorism–Counter-Terrorism Defeats Communities, The Experience of an Islamic Center in London after 9/11
53	**« Révoltes arabes : regards croisés sur le Moyen-Orient »** (01/2012)	• Révoltes arabes : Regards croisés sur le Moyen-Orient • La position géopolitique de l'Asie antérieure • Les révoltes arabes : réflexions et perspectives après un an de mobilisation • Printemps arabe et droit public • Le cas syrien • The Arab Gulf Monarchies: A Region spared by the 'Arab Spring'? • La France dans le piège du printemps arabe
54	**Tenth Anniversary of the International Criminal Court: the Challenges of Complementarity** (02/2012)	• Ten Years after the Birth of the International Criminal Court, the Challenges of Complementarity • We built the greatest Monument. Our Monument is not made of Stone. It is the Verdict itself. • Looking Toward a Universal International Criminal Court: a Comprehensive Approach • What does complementarity commit us to? • Justice and Peace, the Role of the ICC • Towards a Stronger Commitment by the UN Security Council to the International Criminal Court • Where do we stand on universal jurisdiction? Proposed points for further reflection and debate • Challenges in prosecuting under universal jurisdiction • Commissions of Inquiry : Lessons Learned and Good Practices • Towards the Creation of a New Political Community • The Fate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-Serbia

		• When Politics Hinder Truth: Reflecting on the Legacy of the Commission for Truth and Friendship • On Writing History and Forging Identity • Colombia and the Victims of Violence and Armed Conflict • Historical Memory as a Means of Community Resistance • How We Perceive the Past : Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 Years On • Regional Approach to Healing the Wounds of the Past • Challenges in Dealing with the Past in Kosovo : From Territorial Administration to Supervised Independence and Beyond • Setting up Mechanisms for Transitional Justice in Burundi : Between Hope and Fear • « My Papa Is There » • Transitional Justice Mechanisms to Address Impunity in Nepal • Nepal: Better no Truth Commission than a Truth Commission Manipulated • Spain and the Basque Conflict : From one Model of Transition to Another • Moving to a new Social Truth • Peace and Coexistence • EUSKAL MEMORIA : Recovering the Memories of a Rejected People • France and the Resolution of the Basque Conflict • Democracy and the Past
55	**L'eau – ça ne coule pas toujours de source** **Complexité des enjeux et diversité des situations** **(01/2013)**	• L'Eau douce est au centre du développement de l'humanité, la Suisse est concernée • Empreinte hydrique: la Suisse et la crise globale de l'eau • S'engager sur le front de la crise globale de l'eau au service des plus pauvres: un défi que doivent relever les entrepreneurs des Greentec suisses • Le partenariat innovant de la Haute Ecole de l'Arc Jurassien dans l'acquisition des données pour l'eau et l'agriculture : les nouvelles technologies participatives au service du développement • Se laver les mains avec du savon, une des clés de la santé publique mondiale • De l'or bleu en Asie Centrale • Ukraine: quand la décentralisation passe par l'eau • Noël à Mindanao • La contribution de la coopération économique du SECO au défi de la Gestion des réseaux d'eau urbains • Diplomatie de l'eau: l'exemple du Moyen-Orient • Le centime de l'eau: la solidarité de toute une ville !
	La diplomatie suisse en action pour protéger des intérêts étrangers (01/2014)	• Swiss Diplomacy in Action: Protective Power Mandates • Aperçu historique sur la représentation des intérêts étrangers par la Suisse et sur les activités de Walter Stucki en France • Du mandat suisse de puissance protectrice des Etats-Unis en Iran • Le mandat suisse de puissance protectrice Russie-Géorgie : négociations avec la Russie et établissement de la section des intérêts géorgiens à Moscou • Questions et réponses lors du débat du 15 décembre 2011 • Documents et photographies
57	**Switzerland and** **Internet governance:** **Issues, actors, and challenges** (02/2014)	• The evolution of Internet governance • WHY is Internet governance important for Switzerland? • What are the Internet governance issues? • What are the seven Internet governance baskets? • WHO are the main players? • HOW is Internet governance debated? • WHERE is Internet governance currently debated? • Foreseeable scenarios • Recommendations
58	**Bei Not und Krise im Ausland** Konsularischer Schutz und Krisenmanagement der Schweiz im 21. Jahrhundert **En cas de détresse et de crise à l'étranger** La protection consulaire et la gestiondes crises de la Suisse au 21ème siècle (03/2014)	• „Plane Gut. Reise gut" Der konsularische Schutz der Schweiz • « Départ réfléchi. Voyage réussi » La protection consulaire de la Suisse • Das Krisenmanagement-Zentrum des EDA – Heute und in Zukunft • Le Centre de gestion des crises du DFAE – Aujourd'hui et demain • « Responsable moi ? » La perception de la notion de responsabilité individuelle chez le citoyen suisse se rendant à l'étranger • « Un indien averti en vaut deux » Le point sur l'aventure psychologique des voyageurs

58	**Bei Not und Krise im Ausland**	• „Ich denke immer wieder daran!» Langfristige Verarbeitung von schwerwiegenden Ereignissen • Abseits der Normalrouten Reisealltag eines Afrikakorrespondenten • Konfrontiert mit dem Ungewissen Zwischen institutioneller Pflicht und Eigenverantwortung am Beispiel einer Mitarbeiterin von Mission 21 in der Republik Südsudan • Das kollektive Gedenken zur Bewältigung von Katastrophen • Luxor – 1997 • Drei Tage, die eine Ewigkeit waren • Halifax – 1998 • SR 111 • Thailand – 2004 • Tsunami im indischen Ozean / Tsunami dans l'océan indien • Rückblick vom damaligen Missionschef der Schweizer Botschaft in Bangkok • Rückschau eines Detachierten der Schweizer Botschaft zur Situation im Unglücksgebiet in Thailand • Détachement pour la coordination des interventions dans la zone de Phuket • Learing by doing an der Tsunami-Hotline • Liban – 2006 • « Evacuez ! » • Guerre Hezbollah / Israël • Haiti - 2010 • Im Kriseneinsatz nach dem Erdbeben in Haiti • À la recherche de concitoyens • Evakuation von Kindern • Fukushima - 2011 • Erdbeben, Tsunami, nukleare Verstrahlung • Organisation der Verwaltung / Organisation administrative • Das Krisenmanagement des EDA im Zeitraum 2002 bis 2006 • Das Krisenmanagement des EDA, die Entwicklung bis 2010 • Création du Centre de gestion des crises Multiplication des crises et des défis • Die Konsularische Direktion Konsequente Weiterführung eines Erfolgsmodells • Umsetzungsinstrumente / Instruments de mise en oeuvre • Im Büro fühle ich mich am sichersten Reisehinweise des EDA • Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass das Unwahrscheinliche geschieht Die Entwicklung der Hotline und Helpline EDA • Missions KEP : un témoignage Synergies d'actions Collaboration entre l'Aide humanitaire et le Centre de gestion des crise (KMZ) • Zusammenarbeit in Krisen, eine Notwendigkeit Zusammenarbeit des Eidgenössischen Departementes für auswärtige Angelegenheiten mit dem Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz • Protection consulaire : le dynamisme indispensable d'une institution millénaire
	Konsularischer Schutz und Krisen-management der Schweiz im 21. Jahrhundert	
	En cas de détresse et de crise à l'étranger	
	La protection consulaire et la gestion des crises de la Suisse au 21ème siècle	
	(03/2014)	
59	**Réflexions autour du pétrole au Moyen-Orient** (01/2015)	• A Middle Eastern "Rubik's Cube": Solution Problems Reflections on the First Stage of the Arab Spring • What the Drop in oil prices holds for the Middle East, Russia and beyond? • Pétrole - Moyen-Orient, Irak et Kurdistan irakien : état des lieux et évolution • Petrole et geopolitique au Kurdistan irakien • Vers une indépendance kurde en Irak ? Le Kurdistan et l'évolution de ses relations avec la Turquie • Rente, fédéralisme et transition en Irak : démocratie ou nouvel ordre autoritaire ? • Le Moyen-Orient au cœur des enjeux énergétiques de la Chine • Avec le négoce des matières premières, la Suisse joue sa réputation
60	**The Caucasus Conflicts: Frozen and Shelved ?** (02/2015)	• Abkhazia: Regulations for Trade with Disputed Statehood • Conflict and Peace in South Ossetia – from a Local Perspective • History Dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz: How Can Working with the Past Pave New Ways? • Bridging Gaps in Civilian Peacebuilding in the Nagorny Karabakh Context • Armenia: An Interior View • Stability without Peace in Chechnya • The Role of the Chairmanship in the OSCE Engagement in the South Caucasus • The Work of the OSCE High-Level Planning Group

		• Mediating Ambiguity – Contrasting the Mediation Perspectives of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and the Geneva International Discussions • Neither War Nor Peace in Georgia: Geneva Discussions Seen from a UN Angle • The EUMM's Work in Georgia
61	**Schweizer Partnerschaft mit der NATO** 20 Jahre Schweizer Teilnahme an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden (01/2016)	• 20 Jahre PfP: Geschichte und Rückblick der Schweizer Erfahrungen • Adolf Ogi: „Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden ist vielleicht der beste Deal, den wir je erhalten haben" • 20 Jahre Schweizer Beteiligung an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden mit der NATO • Behutsame Schritte in die Partnerschaft für den Frieden - Überlegungen eines aussenstehenden Beobachters • Die Schweiz und die NATO vor der Partnerschaft für den Frieden,1949-1995 • Aktueller Stand der Beziehungen • Partnerschaft für den Frieden: sicherheitspolitische Einbettung • Aussenpolitische Bedeutung der Partnerschaft für den Frieden • Le rôle de la Mission suisse auprès de l'OTAN • Der Beitrag der Genfer Zentren zur Partnerschaft für den Frieden • Praktische Aspekte der Schweizer Teilnahme an der PfP und die Rolle der PfP angesichts aktueller Herausforderungen • Entwicklung der Partnerschaft und ihre Bedeutung für die Schweizer Armee • Le Partenariat pour la Paix: tout bénéfice pour les Forces aériennes • Praktischer Nutzen der Partnerschaft für die Schweizer Armee • Utilité de l'interopérabilité • Nutzen der Partnerschaft für die einsatzorientierte Ausbildung in der Friedensförderung • armasuisse und die Partnerschaft für den Frieden • Einsatz der SOG im Rahmen von «Partnership for Peace» • Les défis du PPP • Die PfP aus Sicht anderer europäischer Staaten • 20 Years of Austrian Partnership with NATO – Record and Outlook • Finnish view of NATO Partnership • Ausblick: Wie entwickelt sich die PfP in der Zukunft? • Rethinking NATO's Partnerships for the new security environment • PfP, Multipolarity and the Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa • Die Schweiz und der Wandel der NATO-Partnerschaftspolitik, 1996-2016
62	**Der Bund und die Auslandschweizerinnen und -schweizer** La Confédération et les Suissesses et Suisses de l'étranger (02/2016)	• Die Tätigkeit des Bundes für eine starke Verbindung der Auslandschweizerinnen und Auslandschweizer zur Heimat • Invitation à la decouverte des Suissesses et Suisses de l'étranger • Mobility to and from Switzerland • La construction de la Cinquième Suisse au cœur de l'internationalisation de l'économie • Aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen des Profils der Auswanderinnen und Auswanderer aus der Schweiz • Die Aus- und Rückwanderungsberatung des EDA • Stagiaires: Auslandschweizerinnen und Auslandschweizer auf Zeit • Gelebte Mobilität in der beruflichen Grundbildung im Technologiekonzern Bühler • Schweizer (Berufs-)Bildung im Kontext internationaler Mobilität • Neue Wege für das Studium im Ausland • Que fait concrètement le SECO pour aider les Suisses de l'étranger ? • Les 50 ans de l'article constitutionnel sur les Suisses de l'étranger • Immatriculation hier, annonce aujourd'hui – un exemple de lien entre le citoyen à l'étranger et les autorités de la patrie • eVERA – à l'heure des services consulaires en ligne • La Cinquième Suisse, maillon important du réseau de contacts de notre diplomatie • Lyon - Depuis 2010 • Sydney - Zweimal Nationalfeiertag 2015 • Kairo - „Revolution" 2011 • Los Angeles - 2010 bis 2013 • Bangkok - 2009 bis 2015 • New York - de 2010 à 2014 • Mailand-Abidjan-Wellington - 2005 bis 2016 • Seoul - 2012 bis 2016 • Hong Kong - 2014 bis 2015 • Die Schweizer Revue zwischen Leistungsauftrag und Sparvorgaben • Swissinfo.ch – der Link zur Heimat • Der Bund und die Ausübung der politischen Rechte aus dem Ausland • Die Sozialhilfe für Auslandschweizer und Auslandschweizerinnen

62	**Der Bund und die Auslandschweizerinnen und -schweizer** La Confédération et les Suissesses et Suisses de l'étranger (02/2016)	• Der Zugang zur Sozialvorsorge des Bundes für Auslandschweizerinnen und Auslandschweizer • Haben Schweizer Banken etwas gegen Auslandschweizerinnen und Auslandschweizer als Kunden? • Der Schweizerverein Helvetia: Ein Stück Heimat in Hamburg • Die Plattform in einer Region ausserhalb der Metropolen: Der Schweizerverein Jütland und Fünen • Das Swiss Institute, New York • Pro Ticino, l'associazione che riunisce i ticinesi fuori cantone … in rete • Vous avez dit OSE? • Die ASO und die Jugend • Schweizerschulen im Ausland • Erinnerungen an die Schweizer Schule Rom • Portrait d'une école suisse à l'étranger : le Colegio Helvetia de Bogota • Mit zwei Kulturen aufzuwachsen bringt viele Erfahrungen und erweitert den Horizont • Die Schweizerschule Bangkok und ihr Patronatskanton Luzern • Von der Schweiz nach Mexiko und wieder zurück
63	**Die Auslandschweizergemeinschaft: Profil – Netze – Partnerschaften** **La communauté des Suisses de l'étranger : profil – réseaux – partenariats** (03/2016)	• Internationale Wanderungen von Schweizer Staatsangehörigen • Schweizerinnen und Schweizer in der Volksrepublik China: jung, mobil und auf der Suche nach Herausforderung • Les habitants suisses des régions françaises limitrophes de la Suisse • Südbaden und die Schweizer – einkaufen ja, wohnen nein? • Zuwanderung von Schweizerinnen und Schweizern: eine deutsche • Perspektive • Auslandschweizer sind mehrheitlich Doppelbürger – Grund und mögliche Folgen • Chancen und Schwierigkeiten der Doppelbürgerschaft in Frankreich • Wenn Statistiken an ihre Grenzen stossen – das Beispiel der Schweizerinnen und Schweizer in Israel • Integration und Assimilation in fremden Ländern • Kästen und Interview: Beispiel Thailand • «Migration in den Herkunftsstaat der Vorfahren»: Das Beispiel von Personen schweizerischer Abstammung aus Argentinien • La Cinquième Suisse, maillon important du réseau de contacts de notre diplomatie • Die Partnerschaften des Bundes
64	**In Support of Federalism Debates** (01/2017)	• What is federalism, what are federations? • What are origins, rationales and determinants of federal systems? • What are 'alternatives' to federalism? • Federalism in contexts of peace-statebuilding and democratic transitions • Federalism debates as part of peace negotiations, national dialogue and constitutionk making • Common issue: who shall participate? • On dynamics of debates on substance and possibilities to manage them • How to demarcate federal units? • How to distribute powers and resources? • What to consider when establishing the second chamber of parliament? • How much importance shall federalism give to ethnic diversity? • Shall federal units have their own Constitution? • Do federal units have a right to self-determination? • When do federations fail? • What aspects of the federal design determine how centralized or non-centralized a federation is? • Selected literature • List of tables and figures • Questions on Federalism
65	**Ne tirez pas sur l'ambulance : Protégez la mission médicale** (01/2018)	• The ICRC at the Heart of Medical Protection • The Role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in protecting the Medical Mission • MSF on Attacks on Hospitals and the Protection of Health Care in Time of Conflict • The Role of Permanent Missions in Promoting the Protection of the Medical Mission • De l'utilisation des armes explosives en zones urbaines : le cas de la Syrie • La protection juridique de la mission médicale • Humanity: Military Doctors' Ethical Obligations in the midst of Armed Conflicts • International Humanitarian Law and State Responses to Terrorism