



IAEA Board of Governors – September 2024

Agenda item 7

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

STATEMENT BY SWITZERLAND

Mr. Chair,

I will address both agenda items 7 and 8(d) in this statement. We thank the Director General for his reports associated with these agenda items and we thank DDG Aparo for the technical briefing.

Switzerland deplores the fact that since 2021 no agreement has been achieved to restore the non-proliferation measures of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) despite attempts to do so. The preservation of these measures and their benefits remains crucial for safeguarding the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. We call on all parties to redouble their efforts to conclude an agreement, as the JCPOA's benefits continue to erode. This is illustrated by Iran's continuously increasing stockpiles of 20% and particularly 60% enriched uranium as well as the ongoing installation and operation of new and advanced centrifuge infrastructure. Switzerland has repeatedly expressed its regret over the withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of sanctions by the United States, as we have expressed our concern over a series of steps taken by Iran that are inconsistent with its nuclear-related commitments.

Mr. Chair,

No progress has been made in fifteen months over the implementation of the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023 despite the efforts of the Director General to operationalize the Agreement. Switzerland urges Iran to fully implement the mutually agreed steps contained in the Joint Statement through serious engagement with the Agency, and also to facilitate the Agency's requests relating to the access to and servicing of surveillance and monitoring equipment without further delay.

Switzerland notes with concern the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) which is now greater than previously communicated and cannot be explained by accountancy measurement errors. We underline our repeated calls on Iran to provide the Agency with technically credible information regarding the previously undeclared locations Turqzabad und Varamin, as well as the current location of related nuclear material and equipment.

We once again express our deep concern regarding Iran's decision to cease implementing modified Code 3.1. The Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement cannot be modified or suspended unilaterally. We reiterate our call upon Iran to implement all legally binding obligations, such as Modified Code 3.1. Furthermore, it is regrettable that Iran has not reversed its decision to withdraw the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors, adversely affecting the Agency's ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran.

Mr. Chair,

Iran's continued suspension of the provisional application of its Additional Protocol, its non-implementation of other JCPOA-related transparency measures as well as the outstanding safeguard questions have seriously impacted the Agency's ability to verify that Iran's activities are exclusively peaceful. We strongly urge Iran to act upon resolution GOV/2024/8 and the Joint Statement which set out the nature of the information, cooperation and access required by the Agency and its membership.

We welcome the Director General's continued and tireless efforts with regards to the questions relating to Iran's nuclear program. We have full confidence in the independent, impartial and professional manner in which the Agency fulfils its mandate.

Thank you.